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Abstract 
According to David LewisÕ influential thesis of Humean Supervenience, the 
world is a plurality of self-contained individuals standing in external relations 
of spatiotemporal distance. In the last decades, this thesis has been under attack 
by what I call Ôholistic ontologiesÕ, the most salient of which are Dispositional 
Essentialism, Ontic Structural Realism, Priority Monism, and Existence 
Monism. These reactions obey different but closely related suspicions against 
the central features of Humean Supervenience. On one hand, there are 
suspicions against the idea of external relations; on the other hand, there are 
suspicions against the idea of self-contained plurals. Common to these holistic 
ontologies is to conceive the world not as an externally related heap but, in 
different degrees of strength, as an Ôinternally related wholeÕ. This work, 
following BradleyÕs stance against relations, puts under critical scrutiny the 
merits of these holistic ontologies. The central aims are to make explicit the 
different senses of ÔwholenessÕ and Ôinternal relatednessÕ that they happen to 
endorse; make explicit their internal flaws; and show the relative superiority of 
Existence Monism. As it happens, Existence Monism vindicates BradleyÕs core 
ideas about relations, namely: that external relations are unable to relate; that 
internal relations are inherently unstable; and that all relationsÐexternal and 
internalÐare better understood as imperfect abstractions from a more 
substantial, non-relational, kind of unity. I conclude with some skeptical 
remarks against my own metaphysical preferences and against ontology in 
general. 
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Preface 
According to the thesis of Humean Supervenience, the actual world is a 
plurality of self-contained, concrete and physical individuals standing in 
external relations of spatiotemporal distance. This ontological thesis, needless 
to say, has exerted enormous influence, and many philosophers agree with its 
core claim: the world is a Ôloose and separateÕ mosaic of plurals. However, the 
thesis has been under attack during the last years by what I call Ôholistic 
ontologiesÕ, the most salient of which are Dispositional Essentialism, Ontic 
Structural Realism, Priority Monism, and Existence Monism. These holistic 
reactions respond to different but closely related suspicions against the central 
ingredients of Humean Supervenience. On one hand, there are foundationist 
suspicions against external relations; on the other hand, there are holistic 
suspicions against self-contained individuals. Common to these holistic 
ontologies is to understand the world not as a loose and separate heap but, in 
different degrees of cohesion, as an Ôinternally related wholeÕ.  
I am in basic agreement with what is common to these holistic ontologies: 
Humean Supervenience is unsatisfactory so we better look elsewhere. In this 
work I put under critical scrutiny the merits of these alternatives. Inspired by 
BradleyÕs stance against relations, my aims are to: (i) make explicit the 
different senses of ÔwholenessÕ and Ôinternal relatednessÕ that these holistic 
alternatives happen to endorse; (ii) make explicit their flaws, in particular their 
internal deficiencies and incoherences; and (iii) show the relative superiority of 
Existence Monism, at least in terms of internal consistency and empirical 
adequacy. As it happens, Existence Monism vindicates a Bradleyan stance 
against relations. Central to this stance is the following group of ideas: that 
external relations are unable to relate and are as mysterious as it gets; that 
internal relations get closer to reality but are inherently unstable; and that all 
relationsÐexternal and internalÐare better understood as imperfect abstractions 
!7
from a more substantial, non-relational, kind of unity. Although I do think that 
Existence Monism is relatively superior to the other ontologies presented here, 
I still have many doubts about its tenability. In fact, the more I think about 
ontology in general and about relations in particular, the more I doubt. So my 
ambitions will be well satisfied if at least I convince the reader that neither of 
the ontologies examined here is good enough. Perhaps Ô[a]ll that philosophy 
can do is to destroy idols. And that means not creating a new 
oneÕ (Wittgenstein 1993: 171). 
The thesis is structured in six chapters. I will start by pointing out the general 
problems of pluralism of self-contained individuals and external relations, the 
core ingredients of Humean Supervenience (ch. 1). Then I will re-examine the 
arguments that Russell and Moore gave for pluralism and external relations. I 
will show their failure, defend BradleyÕs stance, and close by offering three 
plausible ways of understanding Ôinternal relatednessÕ that will be useful for 
my critique (ch. 2). After this historical vindication I will go through a 
systematic and critical assessment of the most salient contemporary ontologies 
that offer us a holistic picture of reality, whether by giving monadic or monistic 
foundations for external relations or by defending some form of relational 
constitution or strong kind of interdependence: Dispositional Essentialism (ch. 
3), Ontic Structural Realism (ch. 4), Priority Monism (ch. 5), and Existence 
Monism (ch. 6). Focusing on how these alternatives defend the claim of this 
world being an internally related whole, I will show why the first three face 
objections and difficulties that make them incomplete, incoherent or unstable. 
Most of those difficulties are internal to them, due to the inadequacy of their 
own ontological ingredients. I will also argueÐnot conclusively, but by giving 
good ÔsignsÕ or ÔsymptomsÕ in favour of itÐthat, extreme as it may seem, the 
most stable, coherent, and empirically adequate amongst the holistic 
alternatives under assessment is Existence Monism, which understands 
relations as Bradley did. I leave for the Epilogue some doubts and skeptical 
remarks against my own preference. 
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Some warnings:  
First, why I am revisiting Bradley? In short, because Ôcontemporary analytic 
metaphysics is in many ways a parody of the great metaphysics of the 
pastÕ (Putnam 1992: 197). Most of the arguments and methods of contemporary 
analytical ontology have pre-Kantian or even scholastic nature. Furthermore, 
post-Quinean ontology also shares many of the vices of pre-critical philosophy, 
with the sad addition that we, unlike Spinoza or Leibniz, do not have the 
excuse of having lived before the work of Kant, Hegel, Carnap or Wittgenstein. 
Although I profoundly dislike the cultural and historical void in which post-
Quinean ontology is practiced, it is beyond my capacities to change this state 
of affairs. Fortunately, this impoverished context gives me some strategic 
advantages: (i) all the work of great post-scholastic and pre-critical 
philosophers can be seen with renewed interest, and it can be used to support 
many of the arguments discussed here; and (ii) a post-Kantian metaphysician 
like Bradley appears, in relative terms, as totally pertinent and up to date. 
Second, I do not have any direct scientific knowledgeÐfar from thatÐso all what 
I say in this work about science, in particular about physics, is based on the 
writings of those philosophers that, as far as I know, are competent authorities 
on the matter. I take their words at face value. After all, my interest is not much 
in the science itself but in the underlying metaphysics. Occasionally, I have 
dealt directly with the writings of some scientists, when these very scientists 
have a metaphysical outlook and exhibit self-consciousness about the 
metaphysical implications of their scientific theories. This is particularly true 
of those scientists-philosophers like Bohm, Eddington, Einstein and 
Schrdinger, who were obviously striving to make sense of reality in a very 
general and creative way, a way that respects the scientific evidence but goes 
beyond it by making sense of it within a wider, coherent and all-embracing 
worldview, like metaphysicians attempt to do. 
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Third, the focus of my arguments is the actual world. Whether there are any 
other concrete possible worlds is something that I am not prepared to argue for 
or against. It is a common place to argue that metaphysical claims are 
necessarily true, if true at all, since they are about the essence or real definition 
of the world or about which are its fundamental constituents, the building 
blocks of reality, and what kind of combinations they allow (Rosen 2006). If 
so, then it seems that if a view like monism or atomism is true about the actual 
world, then it is so necessarily. But it is complicated. It seems clear that if this 
world is one atom, then surely there are no plural counterparts of it, since they 
could hardly be considered counterparts at all. But can I exclude the existence 
of other wholly alien worlds, other worlds located in alien dimensions that 
donÕt have anything in common with the basic materials, categories or 
inhabitants of this one? I have no clue. My only consolation is that if the 
metaphysical possibilities about the actual world can be mapped only after we 
have clarity about its actual constitution, then the job of finding out which is 
that constitution comes first and the existence of wholly alien worlds is not 
very relevant for us. 
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1 The fragmented world: Pluralism and external relations      
In this chapter I will offer objections against the metaphysics of Humean 
Supervenience, according to which our world consists in a plurality of self-
contained objects standing in external relations. Its aim is to raise suspicions 
against these two basic constituents and justify the initial plausibility of the 
holistic alternatives that will be assessed later. 
In ¤1.1 I discuss the central elements of Humean Supervenience and similar 
ontologies. In ¤1.2 I explain the contemporary dichotomies of internal/external 
relations and intrinsic/extrinsic properties, central to the claim of independence 
or separability embraced by Humean Supervenience. In ¤1.3 I give a hint about 
the historical origin of external relationsÐsomething that will be explored with 
more detail in ch. 2Ðand raise initial doubts against the fragmented worldview 
that they entail. In ¤1.4 I raise some metaphysical difficulties with external 
relations. In ¤1.5 I do the same with self-contained objects. In ¤1.6 I present 
the ultimate empirical challenge against the fragmented worldview. Finally, in 
¤1.7, I give a synopsis of what follows. 
1.1 Just one little thing and then another . . .     
The dominant picture in contemporary metaphysics says that our world is a 
plurality of self-contained objects having categorical properties and standing 
to each other in external relations. What I have in mind is, of course, LewisÕ 
thesis of Humean Supervenience: 
Humean Supervenience is named in honor of the great denier of necessary 
connections. It is the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of 
local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another. (But it is 
no part of the thesis that these local matters are mental.) We have geometry: a 
system of external relations of spatiotemporal distance between points. Maybe 
points of spacetime itself, maybe point-sized bits of matter or aether or fields, 
maybe both. And at those points we have local qualities: perfectly natural 
intrinsic properties which need nothing bigger than a point at which to be 
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instantiated. For short: we have an arrangement of qualities. And that is all. 
There is no difference without difference in the arrangement of qualities. All 
else supervenes on that. (Lewis 1986b: ixÐx) 
The thesis of Humean Supervenience comprises at least three closely related 
sub-theses: 
First, there is radical pluralism. Lewis is our contemporary Democritus. He 
embraces an extreme physical atomism, where the building blocks of reality 
are self-contained point-like objects standing in external relations of distance, 
and what we call Ôthe worldÕ is Ôjust one little thing and then anotherÕ. 
Lewisian objects are individuals, since they enjoy determinate identity-
conditions and determinate countability (Lowe 1998: chs. 2Ð3, Strawson 
[1959] 2003) and they are neither sets nor classes. Allegedly, we can quantify 
over them and make reference to them. These individuals are supposed to be 
concrete, particular and physical (though all these labels are contentious, as 
we will see). Furthermore, a Lewisian individual enjoys the status of a 
substance, at least in the technical sense that its conditions of identity are not 
only determinate but also independent of everything else (Lowe 1998: ch. 6). 
If you prefer, each Lewisian individual has its own and independent real 
definition since it is and can be conceived only through itself. The world of 
Humean Supervenience is like a heap of sand: every feature of the heap 
ultimately rests on the nature of each of the grains and their spatiotemporal 
arrangement. With an obvious difference: according to Lewis, each grain of 
sand is a heap of spatiotemporal parts, a heap of point-like individuals 
standing to each other in external relations of spatiotemporal distance. 
Properly speaking, Lewisian individuals are breathless events and/or 
extensionless space-time points. They are not continuants, they do not 
endure. And they are not events if by ÔeventÕ we understand an irreducible 
occurrent particular that essentially involves some breath or duration, or a 
change that a persistent individual undergoes. Lewisian point-like individuals 
can be understood under three basic schemes: (i) Dualistic-relationalism: 
point-like individuals occupy many space-time points (i.e., individual 
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locations). Occupants stand to other occupants in external relations of 
distance, and so locations to other locations and occupants to locations. (ii) 
Monistic-relationalism I: point-like individuals stand to each other in external 
relations of distance. (iii) Monistic-relationalism II: space-time pointsÐon 
which properties directly inhereÐstand to each other in external relations of 
distance. Lewis wants to remain neutral. However, he is tempted to reject (i) 
based on considerations of parsimony, and to reject (ii) based on empirical 
considerations (Lewis 1986a: 76n). Never mind which of these is better 
suited for expressing Humean Supervenience: the fragmented worldview is 
common to all of them. 
Second, there is separability or independence. Allegedly, each point-like 
individual could exist and be what it is with independence from others. Each 
bit of the world is separable from the other. Object and object, subject and 
subject, subject and object, are all externally related things-in-themselves. It 
is important to notice that the thesis of independence or separability is not 
entailed by the thesis of pluralism. Rather, it is entailed by the fact that those 
plurals have Ôperfectly natural intrinsic propertiesÕ and stand to each other in 
Ôexternal relationsÕ.  As we will see throughout this work, our conception of 1
individuality cannot be divorced from our conception of relations: what we 
take as legitimate ÔrelataÕ or ÔtermsÕ fixes what we take as legitimate 
ÔrelationsÕ, and vice-versa. The properties of the Humean Supervenience base 
 In fact, you can be a pluralist and reject separability by offering a different treatment of 1
properties and relations. LeibnizÕs and WhiteheadÕs ontologies are the most obvious 
examples. More on this later (ch. 5). 
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are all natural or sparse.  They are also of categorical or purely qualitative 2
nature, i.e., they are what they are in virtue of brutal distinctness, with 
independence of any causal or nomic role, and, in particular, with 
independence of the existence or intrinsic nature of other individuals. And all 
natural or sparse relations are external relations of spatiotemporal distance. 
How these individuals stand to each other, the where and the when of them, is 
a contingent matter that has nothing to do with their intrinsic natures. If Plato 
is two feet apart from Socrates, then it is not part of PlatoÕs nature to be so 
related with Socrates, nor is part of SocratesÕ nature to be so related with 
Plato. They both could have existed and be what they are without being so 
related. Their intrinsic natures are not affected by being, for instance, five 
instead of two feet apart, because PlatoÕs intrinsic nature involves no 
reference whatsoever to SocratesÕ intrinsic nature. And this feature is 
pervasive: each point-like individual has its self-contained physical state 
regardless the physical state of the others, and the physical state of the whole 
world is determined by the local, intrinsic, physical state of the plurals plus 
their spatiotemporal arrangement. This is why these individuals allow 
duplication and free recombination. This is why a Lewisian world could be 
chopped down without its constituents suffering annihilation or intrinsic 
alteration. In principle, in this Ôloose and separateÕ world, external relations of 
 Sparse or natural properties are ontologically serious. As Lewis says: ÔSharing of them makes 2
for qualitative similarity, they carve at the joints, they are intrinsic, they are highly specific, the 
sets of their instances are ipso facto not entirely miscellaneous, there are only just enough of 
them to characterise things completely and without redundancy.Õ (Lewis 1986a: 60) All the 
Armstrong-Lewis ontological program rests on the idea that there is such an elite class of 
properties. Allegedly, this elite class contains whichever properties Ôour best physicsÕ tells us 
that exist (e.g., spin, electric charge, mass), and is mapped either in terms of universals, tropes, 
or primitive naturalness. Which of these terms is better? Lewis remained neutral on this dispute 
(Lewis 1986a: 64), and I will not attempt to solve it or take sides here. However, for the 
treatment of relations, the language of universals and tropes seems more adequate and helpful 
to express some classical problems, so I will stick to these two terms for practical reasons. 
Besides, Ôprimitive naturalnessÕ remains in the dark for me (I am not saying that ÔuniversalÕ and 
ÔtropeÕ are clear notionsÐfar from that!Ðbut at least they enjoy more historical pedigree). What 
is definitely clear is that the pure extensionalism of sets is not sufficient to give an account of 
those sparse properties, as Lewis himself acknowledged. Because extensionalism (even when 
improved as trans-world extensionalism) does not discriminate between metaphysically 
important (sparse, natural) and metaphysically arbitrary (abundant, gruesome) sets. In 
particular, if it is already difficult to understand how can a relation conceived as a universal or 
as a trope can relate its relata, it is simply beyond my understanding how two concrete 
individuals can be really related simply by being members of a set of ordered or unordered 
pairs. 
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spatiotemporal distance also enjoy substantial status. Since external relations 
do not belong to the intrinsic nature of any point-like individual, we can say 
that their existence and identity is not ontologically dependent on the 
existence and identity of any point-like individual. A complete inventory of a 
Lewisian world must include spatiotemporal relations, since one that includes 
only individual relata doesnÕt give us a specific world, i.e., a specific 
spatiotemporal arrangement of individuals, but only a list. Even a Hume-
world has a little bit of structure. 
Third, there is supervenience. On the physical, sparse, and purely categorical 
base just described, all the rest supervenes, meaning by Ôall the restÕ all facts 
of resemblance and symmetry, and in particular all nomic facts like those of 
causation, chance and law. And not only that, but also all what is usually 
included under the label of Ômental lifeÕ: knowledge and experience, will and 
imagination, memory and qualia, and whatever else you think is missing. I 
will not spend too much time discussing the controversial notion of 
ÔsupervenienceÕ, mainly because my worries are focused on the sparse 
ontology that constitutes LewisÕ supervenience base. The following remarks 
should suffice: (i) What Lewis means by ÔsupervenienceÕ is basically that 
there is no difference in any worldly fact without a difference in the sparse 
base; conversely, if you duplicate the sparse base, then you duplicate all the 
worldly facts (Lewis 1986a: 14, 1986b: 111). (ii) Typically, those who use the 
word ÔsupervenienceÕ try to show themselves as moderates that do not want 
something as extreme as reduction or elimination, yet we are immediately 
told by themselves that when they say that some Y ÔsupervenesÕ on some X, 
we should understand them as saying that there is Ôno real addition of beingÕ, 
or that Y is an Ôontological free lunchÕ, or that Y is Ônothing over and aboveÕ 
X. These are typical modes of expression within the Armstrong-Lewis 
ontological program (e.g., Armstrong 1997: 11Ð13, Lewis 1986a: 14Ð17), and 
they are very confusing. Because if supervenience is this, then we should 
better say that what exists is X, period, and that talking about Y is just 
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another way of talking about X, or that ÔYÕ is simply a different name or 
mode of presentation of the very same object picked out by ÔXÕ. 
Alternatively, if we want to affirm that both X and Y really stand to each 
other in some relation of asymmetrical dependence, then we should better 
stop saying that Y is Ôno real addition of beingÕ, because if some entity 
depends on some other entity, then there are at least two entities.  (iii) 3
Someone who is fond of the idea of supervenience might try to make sense of 
it by using the ontology/ideology distinction. According to Quine, given a 
determinate theory, ontology and ideology are Ôtwo distinct domains of 
inquiryÕ. The ontology of a theory is Ôthe doctrine of what there isÕ, where 
Ôwhat there isÕ means simply the things over which the theory (existentially 
and universally) quantifies, that is, the things that are the values of the bound 
variables of the theory. In contrast, the ideology of a theory consists in the 
ideas that can be expressed by it. That is, Ôthe ontology of a theory is a 
question of what the assertions say or imply that there isÕ and Ô[t]he ideology 
of a theory is a question about what the symbols meanÕ (Quine 1951a: 13Ð
14). Although Quine introduced the distinction as one that was meant to hold 
between different parts of a theory, he then drew it in absolute terms: on one 
hand, Ôin absolute ontology we ask what there really isÕ; on the other hand, 
Ôin absolute ideology we ask what ideas can legitimately be had, or what 
primitive ideas are given to us as a basis for thinkingÕ (Quine 1951a: 14Ð15). 
Thus, someone could say that the supervenience base is part of what there 
really is, part of those things towards which we have serious ontological 
commitment, and say, at the same time, that the supervenient layers are part 
of those ideas we can legitimately have. My response against this possible 
move is that, in a quite obvious sense, recurring to the ontology/ideology 
distinction to understand the notion of supervenience is simply admitting the 
point that I made before: taking the supervenient base as serious ontology and 
the supervenient layers of being as ideology is simply to give up the idea of a 
really existent (an objective or mind-independent existent) supervenient layer 
 Lowe (2012) makes a similar complain about this use of the word ÔsupervenienceÕ. I follow 3
him in rejecting this way of talking.
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of being standing in a relation of ontological dependence to another really 
existent supervenience base. Because what the move is doing is simply 
restating that when one says that Y supervenes on X, one is admitting the 
existence of X but not of Y, or that while X is what really exists, Y is (merely) 
a legitimately expressible idea. That is, that what really exists is the 
supervenience base, period. This doesÕt mean that I am comfortable with 
QuineÕs distinction (as it will become clear in the Epilogue, I am not), but 
only that, if the distinction is right, then one cannot be ontologically 
committed about the relation of supervenience and pretend to be 
ontologically uncommitted at the same time. If one is ontologically serious 
when saying that both X and Y exist and that Y supervenes on X, then one 
has an existential commitment towards both X and Y, and one should try to 
spell out the way in which X and Y (asymmetrically) stand to each other. If 
one is not ontologically serious when saying that Y supervenes on X, because 
one has only an existential commitment towards X, then one should try to do 
the honest thing and reveal that one has no objection whatsoever against the 
ontological elimination of Y. In either case, there is no such thing as an 
Ôontological free lunchÕ. In the first case, admitted the existence of the 
supervenience base X, the supervenient layer Y (and the way in which X and 
Y stand to each other) represents real addition of being. In the second case, 
admitted the existence of the supervenience base X, there is no more being 
around, because the so-called supervenient layer Y is not a value of a bound 
variable; the so-called supervenient layer Y simply doesnÕt exist (it is 
ideology), so, strictly speaking, there is nothing that supervenes on X. 
The central features of LewisÕ worldview are shared by other influential 
contemporary metaphysicians. Take, for instance, ArmstrongÕs world of states 
of affairs (Armstrong 1997)  or van InwagenÕs world of atoms and persons 4
 After his (1997), Armstrong has reconsidered his views on instantiation, and now he takes it 4
to be a case of Ôpartial identityÕ between particulars and universals (Armstrong 2004: ch. 4). I 
have no space to treat ArmstrongÕs later views here (for more details, see Mumford 2007 and 
Simons 2005). I will only say that this last move radically affects the alleged independent 
status of his basic constituents and of states of affairs themselves, and puts ArmstrongÕs 
ontology, unsurprisingly, close to pre-analytical monistic pictures.
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(van Inwagen 1990, 2009). They both share the following central ideas: (i) 
that the world is a plurality of individuals (states of affairs or ÔthickÕ 
particulars in ArmstrongÕs case; particles and persons in van InwagenÕs case); 
(ii) that the existence and nature of those individuals does not depend on 
whether or not there are other individuals making accompaniment; and (iii) 
that all those individuals stand to each other in at least one type of external 
relation, namely that of spatiotemporal distance or that of causation. There 
are differences, of course, but not substantial. Take, for instance, Armstrong, 
who thinks that the world makes more sense if the spatiotemporal order is the 
result of the causal order, and that the causal order makes more sense if 
causation is more than mere juxtaposition of events and if laws are more than 
general patterns of occurrence. He feels compelled to add second-order 
nomic states of affairs to an austere base of first-order states of affairs, so that 
the former can govern the latter. But this addition means nothing more than 
another layer of external relations, this time of primitive nomic nature. 
ArmstrongÕs states of affairs are informed by the principles of independence, 
separability and free recombination, and these principles receive full 
expression in the fact that ArmstrongÕs laws of nature and causal relations 
(i.e., the instances of those laws) are not immanent to the objects they are 
meant to govern. They are thoroughly external relations; they govern from 
outside, from above; they are supposed to be contingent additions of being 
that impose nomic constraints over lower-order states of affairs (Armstrong 
1983: chs. 6 and 11, 1997: chs. 14Ð15). IfÐas I will showÐfirst-order external 
relations are already problematic, then adding a second-order layer of 
external relations just brings more problems or simply moves the problems to 
a higher level. Underlying the criticisms against how ArmstrongÕs laws of 
nature are supposed to govern (Beebee 2000, Bird 2007: ¤4.4, Lewis 1983b: 
366, Mumford 2004: ch. 6, van Fraassen 1989: ch. 5), there is a more deep 
and old worry: that external relations donÕt make any difference to the 
intrinsic nature of the terms, so these remain indifferent to each other and to 
the fact of being so related; that is, that external relations do not really relate. 
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No wonder that an Armstrong-world with second-order external relations 
could look exactly like a Hume-world without them. 
1.2 Internal and external relations, intrinsic and extrinsic properties     
The metaphysics of externally related plurals comes with a distinction 
between internal and external relations (Armstrong 1978b: 84Ð88, 1997: 12, 
87Ð89, Lewis 1983b: 356n, 1986a: 62). An internal relation supervenes on 
the existence or intrinsic natures of the relata, where ÔsuperveneÕ is 
understood in the deflationary sense noticed above.  Qua supervenient, 5
internal relations have no ontological weight, and we should better stop 
talking about real existence of them if all what there is when we use that 
expression is some terms. Thus, an internal relation is entailed by the relata. 
The most paradigmatic cases of internal relations in this sense are qualitative 
resemblance and difference. When we say that Plato is taller than Socrates, 
there is nothing like the relation of being taller than: what we have is only 
Plato being a certain height and Socrates being a certain height. If you 
duplicate Plato and Socrates, the fact that Plato is taller than Socrates thereby 
obtains, regardless how they stand to each other. Allegedly, Plato would still 
be taller than Socrates, regardless where and when each of them happens to 
be. So, apart from Plato and Socrates, there is no real item that stands for the 
relation is taller than. Internal relations are Ônothing over and aboveÕ the 
relata. This is why external relations are the only real relations around. 
External relations are addition of being because the relata do not entail their 
existence. If you duplicate Plato and Socrates the fact that Plato is two feet 
apart from Socrates will not necessarily obtain. Plato being two feet apart 
from Socrates is something additional to the existence and nature of Plato and 
Socrates. As I said before, it is a common place in contemporary ontology to 
 Certainly, this is not the only relevant meaning of ÔinternalÕ but simply the dominant in 5
contemporary ontology. I will distinguish other relevant meanings later (¤2.4, ¤5.2).
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say that relations of distance (spatial or spatiotemporal) are the paradigmatic 
external relations. 
Lewis claims that there is a sense in which external relations can also be said 
to be internal. Thus, Plato being two feet apart from Socrates would be an 
external relation if we duplicate Plato and duplicate Socrates taken 
separately, but it would be an internal relation if we duplicate Socrates and 
Plato taken together, that is, as a composite. In this case, the relation of 
distance could be said to supervene on the intrinsic nature of the composite. 
Based on this, Lewis offers a three-head classification of relations (Lewis 
1983b: 356n, 1986a: 62): (i) relations internal to the relata, which are those 
supervenient on the relata taken separately (e.g., qualitative resemblance); (ii) 
relations external to the relata but internal to the composite, which are those 
supervenient on the relata taken together, as a composite (e.g., distance); and 
(iii) what we can call wholly external relations, which are those that do not 
supervene on the relata taken separately nor on the relata taken together (e.g., 
Humean causation). I think this classification is not enlightening, since it 
departs from the traditional one only in a superficial way. First, because if 
Humean Supervenience rules, and we take seriously the claim that 
supervenient entities represent Ôno addition of beingÕ, then it is not clear what 
kind of individual is a ÔcompositeÕ apart from point-like terms standing in 
external relations. Second, because even if supervenience does involve real 
addition of being, then the thesis of Humean Supervenience suggests that the 
existence of such a ÔcompositeÕ supervenes upon the existence of some terms 
standing in some external relations. Point-like individuals with their intrinsic 
natures standing in external relations of distance are all the basic building-
blocks around, together they conform the basic inventory of which everything 
else is made, and they are at least metaphysically prior to whatever 
ÔcompositesÕ they might give place. Third, because the relations that fall 
under the head of (iii) are non-natural or non-sparse under Lewisian 
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standards: they are obviously derived from global patterns of instantiation 
across the sparse base. 
No one has attempted to provide an exhaustive inventory of external 
relations. What seems uncontroversial is that distance and/or causation are 
the most plausible candidates. Someone like Lewis, as any good Humean, 
would say that causation is obviously a derivative notion, ultimately 
reducible to patterns of relations of spatiotemporal distance (Lewis 1986a: 
67n). Someone like Armstrong, a moderate anti-Humean, would make his bet 
for causation as more fundamental, and regard the spatiotemporal order as 
supervenient on the causal order (Armstrong 1978b: 90Ð91, 1997: 89). And a 
pluralist that is also a presentist will probably accept only relations of spatial 
distance between present objects, since he would have to deny both cross-
temporal relations and causation (at least if the latter is understood as a 
relation that holds between earlier and later relata). What seems also quite 
uncontroversial is that no one has come up with other clear examples. This 
state of affairs is very natural. After all, it is contingent position the ground 
for independence and free recombination of the plurals, the dogmas assumed 
by most of contemporary ontology. And for the where and the when of the 
plurals being contingent features and not part of their intrinsic natures, then 
distance and/or causation must be relations that do not supervene on the 
intrinsic natures of the relata. So in this work I will assume that, prima facie, 
distance and causation are the only real external relations around and that 
plausibly one of them grounds the other. On the contrary, if it is the case that 
the world is not a plurality of separate individuals but only one extended 
simple, or if it is the case that the world is a plurality of individuals but these 
somehow are capable of grounding the spatiotemporal or causal order in their 
intrinsic natures, then presumably there are no external relations, hence no 
relations at all. All relational-talk would be an oblique way of talking about 
something non-relational, something ultimately grounded in monistic or 
monadic foundations. 
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CanÕt external relations be replaced by monadic properties? CanÕt the relation 
Socrates being two feet apart from Plato be replaced by two distinct 
properties, namely that of being two feet apart from Plato, instantiated by 
Socrates, and that of being two feet apart from Socrates, instantiated by 
Plato? Well, if pluralism, independence, and separability are part of what 
needs to be preserved by the program, then it seems that external relations 
need to be recognised in the inventory. First, because those relational 
properties could not be intrinsic properties. If we want Plato to be 
independent and separable from Socrates, then PlatoÕs intrinsic nature should 
not include the ways in which he stands to other things. In fact, when 
relations of distance are replaced by intrinsic properties, the result is a sort of 
Leibnizian monadism, where there is nothing like free recombination or the 
possibility of duplication, because it is part of PlatoÕs nature to stand in the 
way he stands to all of his world-mates. If all PlatoÕs relations are grounded 
in his monadic intrinsic nature, then Plato mirrors the whole world from his 
own perspective.  Second, because it wouldnÕt make sense to replace external 6
relations by extrinsic properties, since extrinsic properties rest on the prior 
existence of external relations. With the distinction intrinsic/extrinsic 
properties we map the same features that the distinction internal/external 
relations maps. When the analytic ontologist talks about internal relations he 
is obliquely talking about intrinsic properties; conversely, when he talks 
about extrinsic properties he is obliquely talking about irreducible external 
relations, since the extrinsic properties of a thing at least partly depend on 
how that thing is related to other things (Lewis 1983a). And when that 
extrinsic property consists only in relative location, like that of being two feet 
apart from Plato, then it totally depends in a relation of distance and in the 
existence of other thing standing in that very relation. So extrinsic property is 
 It is quite obvious that LeibnizÕs reductive account of relations has as a consequence that 6
there must be coordination between monadic natures and that no mere Cambridge changes ever 
occurs. Since there are no external relations, there are no extrinsic properties: Ô...and no one 
becomes a widower in India by the death of his wife in Europe unless a real change occurs in 
him. For every predicate is in fact contained in the nature of a subject.Õ (Leibniz 1989: 365)
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a derivative notion; it depends on the existence of a more basic item: an 
external relation. A good reason for the irreducibility of external relations to 
relational/extrinsic properties is given by Armstrong: relational/extrinsic 
properties, like that of being two feet apart from Plato, which is instantiated 
by Socrates, are complex properties. Without considering the subject of 
predicationÐi.e., SocratesÐthe property itself seems to be composed by two 
constituents: one is Plato, a particular individual, which obviously does not 
inhere in Socrates; the other one is being two feet apart from, which seems 
obviously to be an external relation (Armstrong 1978b: 79; cf. Russell [1903] 
2010: ¤214; more on this in ch. 2). In a pluralism governed by the principle 
of independence and separability, external relations are an irreducible 
additional item, independent of the nature of the terms.  
The central point that this regimentation aims to express is this: whether a 
thing preserves its identity is something that depends wholly on its intrinsic 
properties, and these are had with complete independence of accompaniment 
or loneliness (Lewis 1983a, Langton and Lewis 1998), hence, with complete 
independence of the relations in which that thing stands to other wholly 
distinct things. The internalisation of external relations has the opposite 
consequence: the identity of a thing cannot be determined in isolation (unless 
such thing is the only thing). 
1.3 Why external relations?    
The idea that external relations are numerically distinct constituents of reality 
is part of the legacy of the early analytical philosophers. Before Russell and 
Moore defended the existence of external relations against the late British 
idealists, relations were regarded as relations of ideas, creatures of reason or, 
in the best case, as the most insignificant of individual accidents. Aristotle, 
the medievals, the moderns, and those late idealists were all worried about 
the status of relations and defended different views, yet all of them had a 
!23
minimal common agreement: relations are not independent existents or 
beings in their own right, i.e., there are no external relations (Aristotle 1941a: 
ch. 7, 1941b: book V, ch. 15, Campbell 1990: ¤5.2, Henninger 1989, Morales 
1994, Weinberg 1965: ch. 2). Relational discourse is always about some non-
relational features of reality, some foundations, as the medievals said.  The 7
most refined versions of foundationism are LeibnizÕs monadic system and the 
monistic systems that became dominant during the late 19th century. Russell 
and Moore divorced from this tradition by rejecting what they called the 
ÔaxiomÕ or ÔdogmaÕ of internal relations, according to which, very crudely, all 
relations are internal, meaning by this that all relations are grounded in the 
nature of the terms (Russell) or that all relations are essential to their relata 
(Moore). Where the expression Ôall relationsÕ was meant to cover, well, all 
relations, including those which are now regarded as external. The attack that 
Russell and Moore executed on this dogma gave place to one of the most 
central debates in contemporary philosophy and was perhaps the most 
important step in their emancipation from British idealism, specially from F. 
H. Bradley, who was their main target. Getting rid of the dogma was thought 
to be an essential step for building a new general metaphysics, committed to 
realism, pluralism, externality, contingency, atomic truths and, in general, to 
the adequacy of analysis as the right path to truth and reality.  8
The success of Russell and Moore has been assumed in a natural way. After 
all, believing that the world consists in a plurality of individuals standing in 
external relations is a commitment of what van Inwagen calls ÔCommon 
Western MetaphysicsÕ (van Inwagen 2009: ch. 2). It is, however, very 
surprising how unreflectively this legacy has been assumed. A sign of this is 
 For a good historical survey of the category of relation, see Weinberg (1965: ch. 2). For a 7
detailed treatment of the medieval period, see Henninger (1989). Contemporary attempts in a 
foundationist direction include Brower (1998), Campbell (1990: chs. 5 and 6), Castaeda 
(1975), Dunn (1990), Heil (2009), Fisk (1972), Lowe (2012), Mulligan (1998), and Simons 
(2010).
 Indeed, it was a step towards philosophical emancipation: ÔAll the arguments used by 8
Hegelians to condemn the sort of things dealt with mathematics and physics depended upon the 
axiom of internal relations. Consequently, when I rejected this axiom, I began to believe 
everything the Hegelians disbelieved.Õ (Russell 1959: 62)
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the fact that contemporary accounts of relationsÐwith honourable exceptionsÐ
take for granted the existence of external relations of distance or causation 
and offer a treatment of the category on a par with properties, simply by 
clarifying that relations have the peculiarity of being polyadic (Armstrong 
1997: ch. 6, Lewis 1983b, 1986a: 61Ð62), as if the existence of external 
relations were obvious, as if their difficulties were analogous to those of 
properties, and as if their difference with properties were reducible to a 
matter of ÔadicityÕ. But when one makes a pause it seems very clear that what 
is at issue in the ontology of relations is highly more problematic and crucial. 
First, the point is beyond the dispute between nominalism and realism about 
universals. Obviously, there are nominalistic impulses underlying the 
suspicions against relations, but the puzzles of relations persist even if one is 
an immanent realist about monadic properties. Relations are supposed to 
relate, to make somehow things hang together, and, ultimately, to account for 
coexistence in one common world, not two. Second, no matter how you treat 
properties, you can always at least recognise that some portion of reality is, 
for instance, yellow and square-shaped. That that precise portion of reality is 
yellow and square-shaped excludes that that precise portion of reality is red 
and triangular-shaped. Yet, as Sprigge suggests, you simply cannot grasp 
relations in that way, since there is no portion of reality in which they are 
clearly instantiated (Sprigge 1983: 164). In a way, you can grasp a portion of 
reality that is yellow and square-shaped, while you cannot grasp being two 
feet apart from without grasping something non-relationalÐat least not so 
obviously. But if relations are real and independent addition of being, i.e., if 
they are external to the relata, then one should be able to grasp them without 
involving something non-relational. Third, and more important, our views on 
relations seem to fix our views on many other philosophical issues. In a 
famous passage, Russell claimed: 
The question of relations is one of the most important that arise in philosophy, 
as most other issues turn on it: monism and pluralism; the question whether 
anything is wholly true except the whole of truth, or wholly real except the 
whole of reality; idealism and realism, in some of their forms; perhaps the very 
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existence of philosophy as a subject distinct from science and possessing a 
method of its own. (Russell 1956a: 333) 
This crucial point has been appreciated by philosophers raised within the 
analytical tradition, like the early Rorty did: ÔIt is perhaps not too much to 
say that a philosophersÕ views on internal relations are themselves internally 
related to all his other philosophical views.Õ (Rorty 1967: 126) But RortyÕs 
case is exceptional. Generally, the contemporary heirs of the analytical legacy 
do not exhibit the degree of self-consciousness exhibited by the founding 
fathers. My impression is that we stopped discussing the consequences of our 
views on relations because we simply assumed a new dogma, that one of 
external relations, which is one of the main ingredients, if not the one, that 
grounds the fragmented worldview. 
But we shouldnÕt accept dogmas unreflectively. What are the reasons for 
believing in the fragmented worldview and, in particular, for believing in 
external relations, the main ingredient that sustains it? To my understanding, 
there are three groups of reasons: (i) historical, i.e., the worldview accepts the 
cultural legacy of the analytical tradition; (ii) metaphysical, i.e., the 
worldview makes sense of things in the most general way; and (iii) empirical, 
i.e., the worldview is supported by scientific evidence and, ultimately, by 
evidence coming from our senses. 
In correspondence, we have at least three groups of reasons to reject such a 
view: (i) If accepting a cultural legacy involves reflective acceptance and not 
mere prejudice, then there are no reasons to accept the analytical legacy. In 
particular, there are no grounds to believe that those arguments were effective 
against BradleyÕs conception of relations. RussellÕs and MooreÕs arguments 
for external relations might well have been overestimated by the natural 
enthusiasm of those who start a new tradition. (ii) The ontology of external 
relations and self-contained plurals makes no good sense of things. When one 
stops to think about the implications of these types of constituents, one 
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cannot help to notice the force of various old puzzles that remain unsolved, 
puzzles that this ontology makes particularly intractable. (iii) The fragmented 
worldview is not supported by empirical evidence. In particular, it cannot 
make sense of the evidence coming from contemporary physics. All these 
reasons point against the indivisible package defended by the fragmented 
worldview: on one hand, the idea of self-contained plurals; on the other hand, 
the idea of external relations. 
The historical reasons will be examined in ch. 2, though I have said 
something already. To the metaphysical reasons against relations and against 
self-contained plurals, I turn now (¤1.4 and ¤1.5, respectively). In ¤1.6 I will 
discuss the empirical reasons. I hope that all these together will be enough 
motivation for rejecting the fragmented worldview or, at least, for 
considering as serious alternatives the ontologies that I will discuss later. 
1.4 Metaphysical puzzles about external relations     
1.4.1 LeibnizÕs puzzle: Relations in the void?  
One of the main reasons against the reality of relations was offered by 
Leibniz in his 5th Letter to Clarke: 
The ratio or proportion between two lines L and M, may be conceived three 
several ways; as a ratio of the greater L, to the lesser M; as a ratio of the lesser 
M, to the greater L; and lastly, as something abstracted from both, that is, as 
the ratio between L and M, without considering which is the antecedent, or 
which the consequent; which the subject, and which the object. And thus it is, 
that proportions are considered in music. In the first way of considering them, 
L the greater; in the second, M the lesser, is the subject of that accident, which 
philosophers call relation. But, which of them will be the subject, in the third 
way of considering them? It cannot be said that both of them, L and M 
together, are the subject of such an accident; for if so, we should have an 
accident in two subjects, with one leg in one, and the other in the other; which 
is contrary to the notion of accidents. Therefore we must say that this relation, 
in the third way of considering it, is indeed out of the subjects; but being 
neither a substance, nor an accident, it must be a mere ideal thing, the 
consideration of which is nevertheless useful. (Alexander 1956: 71) 
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According to Leibniz, the trouble with external relations is their locus of 
inherence. If they are individual accidents, then they must be treated so, i.e., 
as distinct individual accidents of each one of the individual relata and not as 
one ÔbipedÕ accident inhering in various individuals at once. On the other 
hand, when taken apart from the terms, as external to them, they can only be 
understood as creatures of reason or acts of comparison, since they cannot 
belong to no relata at all. As Heil suggests, if we donÕt accept them as 
individual accidents, then anti-realist impulses naturally arise and the 
temptation is to locate them in the mind, as ideas entertained by an individual 
(Heil 2009). According to Leibniz, all relations are creatures of reason. All 
relations, including the spatiotemporal ones, are grounded in the existence 
and monadic nature of unextended souls.  9
It is notorious how the contemporary relationalist about space-time doesnÕt 
care about this puzzle. LeibnizÕs relationalism is unproblematic because he 
was an idealist about the spatiotemporal order, something that the 
contemporary relationalist wants to avoid. But if the contemporary 
relationalist not only wants the spatiotemporal order to be out there, with 
independence of the mind, but also made up of external relations, then he has 
the burden of giving a response to LeibnizÕs puzzle: if not in the mind, if not 
as monadic properties in each one of the relata, where do external relations 
inhere? He cannot say: ÔIn spaceÕ! This is the substantivalist response. In 
sheer nothingness, then? Kant saw well the dilemma: either spatiotemporal 
relations are in the mind or Spinoza is right about them being attributes of the 
One substance.  10
 This passage is illustrative: ÔI do not believe that you will admit an accident which is in two 9
subjects at the same time. My judgment about relations is that paternity in David is one thing, 
sonship in Solomon another, but that the relation common to both is a merely mental thing 
whose basis is the modification of the individuals... .Õ (Leibniz 1989: 609) And so is this one: 
ÔTo be in a place is not a bare extrinsic denomination; indeed, there is no denomination so 
extrinsic that it does not have an intrinsic denomination as its basis. This is itself one of my 
important doctrines.Õ (Leibniz 1989: 526Ð27)
 Kant: ÔHence, if this ideality of time and space is not adopted, nothing remains but 10
Spinozism, in which space and time are essential attributes of the Supreme Being Himself, and 
the things dependent on Him (ourselves, therefore, included) are not substances, but merely 
accidents inhering in Him...Õ (Kant 1889: 196; cf. Schaffer 2009b: 136n, 2010b: 366).
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Finding a way out of LeibnizÕs puzzle seems to force an account of relations 
that treats them as ante rem universals, as Russell did.  This seems one way 11
to make relations independent beings. It is, at the same time, a way to give 
them objective status, against the nominalistic impulses of treating them as 
mere creatures of reason. The problem with relations when treated as Platonic 
entities is that they face the classical problem: how do they interact with the 
real world? How do concrete individuals participate in those Platonic forms? 
If they are abstract, then what is going on here, in this world, when we say 
that Plato is two feet apart from Socrates? It seems that you need, in addition, 
an imperfect pale version of that Platonic form in the concrete realm, a 
contingent and imperfect representative of it. But then LeibnizÕs puzzle arises 
again: if there is a concrete representative of it, where is it inhering? To whom 
it belongs something totally external to any concrete individual? A believer in 
external relations faces the tension of claiming that external relations can be 
somehow ÔconcreteÕ and ÔinstantiatedÕ while it seems very difficult to see how 
can an external relation be ÔconcreteÕ and ÔinstantiatedÕ if it doesnÕt belong to 
the nature of any concrete individuals, that is, when, as we may say, they live 
wholly outside the relata. After all, the externality of relations does seem to 
entail their free-floating character, their substantial yet abstract status. And if 
a world is totally built by self-contained individuals standing in external 
relations, then it should be possible for those individuals to be recombined 
and for those external relations to stand, as it were, alone. But how would 
such a world of pure external relations look like? Would it make any sense at 
all? 
 Russell: ÔRelations, obviously, do not exist anywhere in space.Õ (Russell 1956b: 107) And 11
elsewhere: ÔThere is no place or time where we can find the relation Ônorth ofÕ. It does not 
exist in Edinburgh any more than in London, for it relates the two and is neutral as between 
them. Nor can we say that it exists at any particular time. Now everything that can be 
apprehended by the senses or by introspection exists at some particular time. Hence the 
relation Ônorth ofÕ is radically different from such things. It is neither in space nor in time, 
neither material nor mental; yet it is something.Õ (Russell [1912] 1959: 98)
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There is an additional problem that underlies LeibnizÕs suspicions against 
relations, which is peculiar to asymmetric relations and their converses. Take, 
for instance, the proposition <Plato is taller than Socrates> and its converse 
<Socrates is shorter than Plato>. If we were to admit the reality of relations at 
all, then which of the relations should have the privilege of existence? If we 
accept one of them, it seems arbitrary which one; if we accept both of them, 
then one of them seems to be redundant. After all, it seems that these 
relational propositions are only two different ways of expressing the very 
same monadic configurations: that Plato is a certain height and that Socrates 
is a certain height.  12
1.4.2 BradleyÕs regress: Can relations relate?  
BradleyÕs regress also threatens the idea of relations being numerically 
distinct entities that exist outside there, with independence of the terms, or, as 
Heil puts it, the idea of relations being Ôshadowy substancesÕ that somehow 
hold between the relata (Heil 2009: 315). The regress was famously deployed 
by Bradley in Appearance and Reality (1930: chs. IIÐIII), and works as 
follows.  If a relation (R) is a real, external, independent being, that 13
somehow holds between two terms (a, b), then how can it be that R actually 
relates a and b, if R, a, and b remain all the way wholly distinct and separate 
beings, that is, if R does not enter into the nature of the terms? One may think 
that we need a new fresh relation, namely RÕ, in order to really relate a, b, 
and R. But if this new relation is also outside the terms, somehow between 
them, totally independent from them, we will need again a further fresh 
relation, namely RÕÕ, in order to relate a, b, R, and RÕ, and so on. Thus, Ôwe 
are hurried off into the eddy of a hopeless process, since we are forced to go 
on finding new relations without endÕ (Bradley 1930: 28). We need more 
 The discussion about this problem still continues. See Dorr (2004), Fine (2000), MacBride 12
(2007), and Williamson (1985).
 According to Weinberg (1965: ch. 2), similar regresses can be traced in the work of some 13
ancients and medieval philosophers that discussed the metaphysical status of relations (among 
them, Aristotle, Avicenna, Aquinas, and Scotus). 
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relations each time a new relation comes to the scene, but the moment of 
unity, connectedness or real relatedness never comes, since external relations 
are all equally impotent to achieve that goal. A well-known metaphor may 
express the idea underlying the regress: it is like trying to make a chain out of 
two loose rings by adding a third loose ring, and then a fourth one, and a fifth 
one, and so on. Obviously, since a mere heap of loose rings is not a chain, 
something completely different is required to unify those loose rings 
(Candlish 2007: 170). BradleyÕs point is precisely that external relations, just 
like loose rings, do not exhibit relating power. 
Of course the regress does not affect only relations between particular 
individualsÐwhich is the main concern of this workÐbut it also affects any 
account of predication that treats properties and particular individuals as 
numerically distinct entities somehow related (Bradley 1930: chs. IIÐIII, 
Candlish 2007: 37Ð40, Hylton 1990: 48, Mander 2009: 172Ð73).  So, pace the 14
nominalistic efforts deployed by Simons (2010), the regress cannot be avoided 
by thinking of relations as relational tropes, since neither of these relational 
ÔinstancesÕ is capable of relating better than relations understood as universals 
are (MacBride 2011).  In fact, in this respect, realism and nominalism in its 15
most salient variants are on a par, because, strictly speaking, BradleyÕs regress 
runs whenever we understand that properties/relations are numerically distinct 
from the things that have them, or whenever unity and complexity are 
understood relationally (Bradley 1935: 656, Candlish 2007: 171). Call it 
instantiation, or participation, or membership, or parthood, the problem is the 
 It is notorious how BradleyÕs regress still raises what seem to be insurmountable difficulties 14
to those who treat properties, relations and particular individuals as numerically distinct entities 
somehow ÔtiedÕ or ÔrelatedÕ by ÔinstantiationÕ (see Armstrong 1997: ch. 8, 2004: ch. 4, Basile 
1999: ch. 2, Vallicella 2002). As Joachim reasonably thought, relations were not a solution to 
the problem of the unity of the proposition, but just another name for it (Joachim 1906: 49), 
and this was something that Russell, like his heirs, never answered, although he, unlike his 
heirs, did recognise as a failure of analysis: once the unity of the proposition is destroyed, there 
is no copula that can bring it together again (cf. Russell [1903] 2010: ¤54, Gaskin 1995, and 
Hylton 1984).
 Not to mention if we think of relations as sets of ordered pairs. How can a ÔsetÕ actually 15
relate two existent individuals that are not sets? Via a ÔlassoÕ? But what kind of bondage is this 
one?!
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same one. BradleyÕs point is that once the having of a property is understood as 
a matter that holds between two distinct entities (particular and universal, thing 
and form, member and set, part and whole), then we cannot but understand 
their unity in relational terms. But the problem is that relations neither 
constitute nor can explain complex unity. By adding relations we merely 
increase the number of constituents in need of glue and a thing remains always 
alienated from its properties. For Bradley, it is the other way around: from 
complex unity we make Ôvicious abstractionÕ of terms and properties/relations; 
that is, we reject the idea that things and their properties/relations obey real 
distinctions: a given unity, a stupendous undivided whole, is the self-sufficient 
and complete explanation and ontological ground that relational and 
fragmentary thought attemptsÐin a fatally imperfect wayÐto express. For 
Bradley, Ô[r]elations and relational unity are intelligible only as abstractions 
from a more fundamental sort of unityÕ (Hylton 1990: 49). 
Someone may think that we shouldnÕt worry about BradleyÕs regress, because 
it is not a vicious one. For instance, one may think that BradleyÕs regress is 
analogous to the truth regress, which, though admittedly an infinite regress, is 
not considered harmful at all. Thus, when the proposition <p> is true, the 
proposition <<p> is true> is true, and the proposition <<<p> is true> is true> is 
true, and so on, ad infinitum. Infinity, yes; but no viciousness seems to be 
involved here. If a regress is supposed to be vicious, then it must be for some 
additional reason to that of being infinite. Why, then, should we worry about 
BradleyÕs regress if we donÕt worry about the truth regress? What is the extra 
bit that makes BradleyÕs regress vicious in a way that the truth regress is not? I 
think the reason is that, while in the truth regress there is truth in each one of 
the steps, in BradleyÕs regress none of the steps delivers what it promises. In 
the case of the truth regress, the truth of the proposition <<p> is true> does not 
pretend to explain the truth of the proposition <p>. If anything, it is the other 
way around: <<p> is true> is true because <p> is true, or so it seems. But when 
we ask how is it that the object a stands to its property F in a real unity, each 
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one of the relations that appear at each step of BradleyÕs regress is supposed to 
explain that fact. But none of them is really capable of unifying a and F, none 
of them puts together a and F. Because what each relation does is simply 
making the problem increasingly more difficult. A relation was meant to 
explain why the many are unified in one but all what it does is to add one more 
entity to the many that are still waiting to be unified. In the truth regress, there 
is truth at every step; in BradleyÕs regress, real unity of constituents is really 
absent at every step. 
Others may think that the business of relations is precisely to relate, so 
relations donÕt need relations to do the job of relating. But someone who 
admits the reality and numerical distinctness of both relations and relata needs 
to do more than saying that relations relate in order to show that they really 
work as unifiers. After all, everything indicates that the job of an external 
relationÐaccording to their own supportersÐis precisely to leave the relata 
Ôloose and separateÕ, that is, to leave them disconnected. If there are 
numerically distinct relations, then how is it that they really bring together two 
numerically distinct relata? Where is the unity that they are supposed to 
provide? What makes aRb different from a mere list of numerically distinct 
constituents? Those who think that the business of relations is to relate need to 
spell out how is it that a relation is capable of doing something more than what 
an additional loose link does when we add it to a heap of loose links, that is, 
they need to spell out how does the relating power of relations is deployed, 
something which, as far as I can see, is far from evident. The burden of proof is 
on them. 
Finally, just like in the case of supervenience, one might try to avoid BradleyÕs 
regress by removing instantiation (inherence, participation, parthood, 
membership, you name it) from the domain of absolute ontology and attempt to 
locate it in the domain of absolute ideology. Something like this move is what 
seems to be behind the allegations of those who ask us not to reify the ÔhavingÕ 
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of a property as a real relation. For instance, Armstrong (1978a: 108Ð111), to 
avoid the threat of BradleyÕs regress, attempts a defence of what he 
understands as a Ônon-relationalÕ form of immanent realism. As a name for the 
doctrine, it sounds promising: if we want to block the regress that threatens any 
real distinction between thing and property, then we need to avoid 
understanding the having of a property in relational terms. But a philosopher 
can call any relation a Ônon-relationÕ. We better see the philosopherÕs deeds. 
And, as far as I can see, ArmstrongÕs deeds go against his own words. Because 
he wants something that is incomprehensible or impossible to achieve. On one 
hand, he wants a sort of realism Ôwhich distinguishes the particularity from the 
properties of a particularÕ; on the other hand, he wants this very same realism 
to be involved in Ôdenying that the two aspects are relatedÕ (Armstrong 1978a: 
109). Armstrong wants to join Strawson ([1959] 2003) in the search of a Ônon-
relational tieÕ, but he prefers to avoid the word ÔtieÕ precisely because it seems 
to restate a relational idea. And to illustrate what he means, Armstrong appeals 
to Scotus' idea of a ÔformalÕ distinction, a distinction that is, allegedly, 
somehow the middle path between a ÔrealÕ or ÔsubstantialÕ distinction and a 
ÔconceptualÕ distinction. It is not conceptual because it is not projection, fiction 
or arbitrary abstraction but it belongs to things in themselves; it is not a real 
distinction since it doesnÕt pretend to distinguish two distinct things. As if this 
were not obscure enough, Armstrong regrets that our secular age prevents him 
from using the example with which Scotus used to silent his contradictors: the 
Holy Trinity (!), which is the paradigm of both unity and distinguishability. So 
he goes and uses a more secular example: the way in which the size and shape 
of a figure are unified (Armstrong 1978a: 110). Now, asking from us to 
consider how the size and the shape of a figure are unified is simply to restate 
the original problem once again, and the problem is as mysterious as the one 
Bradley saw in a lump of sugar, with its whiteness, hardness and sweetness, or 
the one that underlies the Holy Trinity: how can three entities be one and the 
same entity? If a Ônon-relationalÕ account of the idea of having a property is to 
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be ÔilluminatedÕ by examples like the Holy Trinity, I expect that the reader will 
agree with me that we have not made too much progress. 
Something similar can be said against LewisÕ (2002) move. Lewis, like 
Armstrong, accepts the power of BradleyÕs regress. He accepts that if we 
attempt to explain the ÔhavingÕ of a property in terms of a relation, then the 
explanation will never succeed. Although Lewis points to the fact that if we use 
a relational explanation of instantiation, Ôthe explanation we seek will never be 
finishedÕ (Lewis 2002: 6), this is not the worst part. As we saw, BradleyÕs 
regress is not harmful because it involves infinity but because it shows that 
relational glue is not glue at all. The point is also recognised by Lewis: he 
wants the thing that has properties not to be ÔalienatedÕ from its properties. And 
the problem with relational and with non-relational ties (which are, apart from 
their names, relational through and through), is that they involve the alienation 
of the thing from its properties. Realising how hopeless seems to be the task of 
understanding instantiation, LewisÕ proposal is simply to stop reifying it (!). 
But I do not think these relations can explain having simpliciter. Having 
simpliciter is not a relation, whatever grammar may suggest. What is it, then? I 
donÕt know what more can be said. It is all very well to say that the copula is a 
Ônon-relational tieÕ or that properties are ÔunsaturatedÕ and await completion by 
their bearers.These remarks at least have the merit of pointing away from the 
idea that having is relational. But they donÕt point toward much of anything. 
(Lewis 2002: 6) 
[I]t is all too obvious that ÔtiesÕ are relations in all but name. Relations in all 
but name will serve us no better than relations openly so-called. We can repeat 
Bradley's regress . . . . to show that we can never finish an attempted 
explanation of having simpliciter in terms of ties; and ties will alienate us from 
our properties no less than relations do. I conclude that reifying non-relational 
ties and giving an account of them is a thoroughly misguided thing to do. 
(Lewis 2002: 7) 
What kind of solution is this one? Well, it is not a solution. It is one thing to 
say that we shouldnÕt reify instantiation. It is another one (a quite different one) 
to solve the problem of unity, to really explain the non-alienation that is 
supposed to be involved in instantiation. True, without reifying instantiation 
BradleyÕs regress doesnÕt get started. But the problem of unity is still there. If 
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one is a realist about things and their properties and one wants real unityÐthat 
is, if one wants to avoid a sort of ÔhavingÕ that alienates the thing from its 
propertiesÐone still has the problem. BradleyÕs regress pretends to stop the 
relational solution. The problem is that anyone who understands the having of 
a property/relation in terms of an entity being in a suitable relation with another 
entity is threatened by a version of the regress. In this respect, the realist and 
the nominalist solutions that understand properties and things in terms of 
numerically distinct entities are on a par: they all think that the having of a 
property is a relational matter (cf. Armstrong 1978a: 16). Thus, the regress 
does not affect only a realist solution that understands the having of a property 
in terms of instantiation of universals or participation in Platonic forms, but 
also the nominalist solutions that understand the having of a property as a 
matter of membership, resemblance, parthood, etc., since what are all these if 
not relations between numerically distinct entities? A solution that consists in 
accepting both properties and things as numerically distinct entities (i.e., a 
solution that accepts predication in terms of real distinctions), and, at the same 
time, does the honest thing of admitting that no relational glue will do the 
work, is not a solution to the problem of unity. It is simply another way to 
recognise the problem and to recognise the power of BradleyÕs regress. How 
can we still have both predication based in real distinctions and real unity of 
these? Using again the ontology/ideology distinction, one might think that 
avoiding the reification of instantiation is another way of removing it from 
absolute ontology in order to place it in absolute ideology. But, if so, then the 
unity of the thing and its properties pertains also to ideology, and the thing is 
really alienated from its properties, just like each numerically distinct 
constituent is alienated from every other.  
Lewis, in previous writings (e.g., Lewis 1983b: 353ff), was already 
recommending us not to go into predication or instantiation. But LewisÕ advice 
is a prudential one, not a matter of principle. Why Lewis insists in 
recommending us not to go there? Because it is hopeless, because it is obscure, 
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because we will get involved in confusion, because we cannot do ontology 
without some form of non-relational ÔhavingÕ, etc. This is all true, but this 
doesnÕt mean that there is no real problem here, a problem that lies at the core 
of metaphysics and that haunts us since its very origins. It is prudentially wise 
to avoid going into instantiation (for the same reasons that it might be 
prudentially wise to stop doing philosophy), but this is not a categorical reason 
or a reason of principle for not going into it (nor for stop doing philosophy), 
nor a real solution to the problem. 
The real dilemma that BradleyÕs regress highlights is that one cannot have both 
real distinctions and unity of these at the same time. If one thinks that 
properties and the things that have them obey real distinctions (be these in 
terms of sets and their members, wholes and their parts, universals and 
particulars, etc.), then one has to account for their unity, and one cannot do this 
without being involved in a relational regress. One can say that what is needed 
is something non-relational. But how can one obtain such non-relational unity 
when one has accepted, from the very start, the numerical distinctness of the 
ÔthatÕ and the ÔwhatÕ, that is, when one has already started to account for the 
having of a property in terms of real distinctions? Saying that what is needed is 
something like a Ônon-relationalÕ glue, a glue like the one that makes the three 
persons of the Holy Trinity one and the same, is simply a covered attempt of 
explaining the obscure with the more obscure. Refusing to go into the mystery 
of instantiation is very convenient, but avoiding a problem is not the same as 
solving it. 
I will say more about the problem of instantiation and BradleyÕs conception of 
relations later (ch. 2). For now, we can say that BradleyÕs regress gives us a 
second reason for supporting the denial of external relations. If relations are 
somehow outside the terms related, then how does it become possible for 
them to actually relate the terms without losing their independence and 
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externality? Conversely, if there is already a non-relational or substantial 
unity, then why should we need ÔtermsÕ and ÔrelationsÕ to constitute it? 
1.5 Metaphysical puzzles about self-contained plurals     
1.5.1 Infinite descent  
The truth of Humean Supervenience depends on the existence of a 
supervenience base as the one described by it. The problem is that the very idea 
of there being such a base of metaphysical atomsÐcall them fundamental 
particles, space-time points, or how you likeÐis a pure act of faith. It rests on 
two prejudices: (i) that there is or will be a final and complete physics, and (ii) 
that such a physics tells or will tell the whole story in terms of a fundamental 
microphysical, atomic, base. Yet why should anyone believe in something like 
a final and complete physics? And even if it we were to have something like a 
final and complete physics, why should anyone believe that the story to be told 
by it will be in terms of fundamental particles, space-time points or other 
atomic terms and not in terms of plena? What evidence do we have in favour of 
these two related assumptions? If anything, we have evidence of their failure. 
First, the end and completeness of physics has been announced too many times 
across history, and, up to now, all of those predictions have failed.  We have 16
no reason for expecting other than ongoing, fallible and incomplete scientific 
inquiry. Second, the microphysical base has eluded us permanently. What once 
we thought were the real atoms of nature, turned out to be molecules, which 
were made out of electrons, protons and neutrons. And then we found more 
complexity: there were quarks and leptons and what you name. Why the 
persistence faith, then, in a microphysical base of fundamental particles 
capable of grounding all being? Inductive pessimism teaches us to abandon 
such hope. Similar worries arise with space-time points. If unextended, then 
 Schaffer (2003) gives various examples of this failure. A recent one is compelling: ÔStephen 16
Hawking, in his 1979 Lucasian Lecture, predicted that theoretical physics would be complete 
Òby the end of the centuryÓ on the basis of N=8 supergravity, a theory which is now 
defunct.Õ (Schaffer 2003: 503) 
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they cannot ground extension (in fact, think of how can something occur 
without taking more than an instant of time or how can something have spatial 
extension if it is made out of points with no extension). And if extended, then 
each space-time point is not a point but a region that surely has spatial and 
temporal parts, a left half and a right half, an earlier and a later part, that lacks 
the simplicity of an atomic Ôbuilding-blockÕ of reality, a grounding simple thing 
upon which everything else supervenes or out of which everything else is 
composed. Infinite mereological complexity threatens Humean Supervenience 
insofar as it deprives it of the metaphysical atoms that the base requires. It is 
not only that this would seem to entail mysterious infinite chains of 
dependence, but also that, without such atomic base, mountains, qualia and 
electrons would be ontologically on a par. Microphysics will enjoy no special 
status when compared to biology or geology. There will be no privileged base, 
because whichever layer you choose it will be based on some other. As 
Schaffer puts it, without such a fundamental level, Ôno level is special É
because everything is macroÕ (Schaffer 2003: 512, his emphasis). This kind of 
reasoning is behind the so-called argument from infinite descent or atomless 
gunk, which Schaffer has used against pluralism and in favour of his Priority 
Monism (Schaffer 2007, 2010a). But the puzzle is not an invention of 
contemporary analytic ontology. The apparent infinite complexity of matterÐ
with its apparent incapacity of offering metaphysical atomsÐis a puzzle as old 
as the labyrinth of the continuum. More on this later (ch. 5). 
1.5.2 Object and object: Causal influence  
Imagine a magnet standing one inch far from a nail. Suddenly, the nail is 
attracted by the magnet and gets attached to it. It looks like magic. After all, 
there is a spatial gap between the magnet and the nail. It seems to be exactly an 
instance of what physicists have always feared: Ôspooky action-at-a-distanceÕ. 
According to the general principle of spatiotemporal locality, common to 
physics and ordinary experience, causes must be spatiotemporally local to their 
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effects; that is, causal influence must be directly propagated from cause to 
effect by being the first one in contact with the second one, without 
spatiotemporal gaps. Spatiotemporal locality only tolerates Ôaction by contactÕ 
and bans Ôspooky action-at-a-distanceÕ for considering it intolerably 
mysterious. So if some cause here produces some effect over there, it can only 
be indirectly, through a continuous causal chain that connects them, a chain 
that avoids mysterious jumps and guarantees that the final effect has an indirect 
cause only because ultimately has a direct one. In contrast to the magnet/nail 
case, receiving a punch in the face seems to be a paradigmatic case of local 
causal influence: the fist of X is in contact with the face of Y when the 
punching occurs. Lange illustrates the difference between Ôaction by contactÕ 
and Ôaction-at-a-distanceÕ clearly: while it seems quite straightforward to 
understand why a dog barks here, after someone steps on its tail there, we are 
quite clueless when we try to understand why a shortwave radio receiver here 
gets the message transmitted by a radio transmitter there. After all, the dog is a 
single and connected dog, while the radios are two separate things that work 
wireless, as if pure magic were filling in the gap (Lange 2002: 1Ð3).  17
Are the cases of the magnet and the punch that different? I donÕt think so. In 
fact, I think they are metaphysically on a par. Much of this depends on what do 
we mean by the family of concepts ÔcontactÕ, ÔcontinuousÕ, ÔchainÕ, and on our 
understanding of space and time as dense continua. LetÕs illustrate the 
resemblance of the cases by first trying to explain away the mystery of the 
magnet. How can we do this? According to the principle of locality, only if we 
fill in the gap. So, if we were told that there is a real field of energy that 
literally fills the gap between the magnet and the nail, the interaction will look 
less magical. Because a field is wholly spread through space, and a change in 
the field propagates just like a wave in the sea. If the field is real, then the case 
of the magnet looks more like the punch in the face. Has the mystery being 
 The treatment of spatiotemporal locality and Ôaction by contactÕ vs. Ôaction-at-a-distanceÕ that 17
I offer in this sub-section follows the insightful treatment of Lange (2002: ch. 1). For the 
problems of boundaries, contact and continuity, I have also rested on Varzi (1997).
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dissolved? It doesnÕt seem so. After all, arenÕt the magnet and the field and the 
nail, just like fist and face, wholly distinct concrete individuals that donÕt share 
any point of their boundaries? If they donÕt share any point of their boundaries, 
then how is it that the magnet is in contact with the field and the field in 
contact with the nail? Or how is it, in the first place, that the fist touches the 
face? They both seem to differ from the case of the dog. The dilemma is the 
following. First horn: for two wholly distinct individuals being in contact, there 
must be no spatiotemporal gap separating them. They must touch. Yet how can 
they touch without sharing a point of their boundaries? And how can they share 
a point of their boundaries without ceasing to be wholly distinct? Second horn: 
for the individuals remaining wholly distinct, then they must share no point. 
Yet, if space-time is a dense continuum, then how can they remain wholly 
distinct without leaving a spatiotemporal gap between them? What is crucial is 
that in a dense space-time there is no way in which individuals can make 
contact Ôby occupying neighboring points since there are no neighboring 
points; between any two points there are infinitely many othersÕ (Lange 2002: 
7, his emphasis). If the two individuals donÕt share at least one point of their 
boundaries, then they are discrete and leave a spatiotemporal gap between 
them. And how can they be discrete and leave a gap, without influence between 
them being propagated as Ôspooky action-at-a-distanceÕ? We are worst than at 
the beginning. Now it seems that we are in front of two cases of Ôspooky 
action-at-a-distanceÕ.  18
If we were subsequently told that, in real terms, there is nothing like the 
magnet and the nail, or the fist and the face, but only more or less stable 
patterns in a continuous, gapless, field of energy, the mystery is again removed: 
now there is a real connection, it is the single extended field in itself who does 
 In the same spirit, Kline and Matheson have argued that it is impossible for two wholly 18
distinct objects to make contact in a spatial continuum. Their argument is as simple as 
beautiful: Ô(1) A collision between two bodies involves their touching. (2) If two bodies are 
touching, then they either occupy adjacent points in space or they spatially overlap. (3) Space 
is continuous. (4) No two bodies ever occupy adjacent points in space. (Since space is 
continuous, no spatial point is ever adjacent to another spatial point.) (5) It is impossible that 
two material bodies should spatially overlap. (6) Therefore, no two bodies ever touch. (7) 
Therefore, no two bodies ever collide.Õ (Kline and Matheson 1987: 509Ð10)
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the job, just like LangeÕs dog. The so-called ordinary objects are ripples or 
waves in a continuous sea of energy. Good, but this is important to be noticed: 
a field of energy, thus understood, is a substantial connection, not a relation. 
The ÔchainÕ metaphor is misleading, since it suggests discrete links somehow 
related; the image of a single rope (or a single dog) is more accurate: pull one 
of its extremes and you will see how influence is propagated from one extreme 
to the other without mediating any relation.  
However, if we are told that the continuous field must be understood in terms 
of a spatiotemporal arrangement of point-like individuals, each of them wholly 
distinct and independent from the others, standing in external relations to the 
others, we are again at the beginning, where nature seems to be discrete and 
influence seems to be propagated through mysterious jumps from one point to 
another. This is, in fact, the reductive way in which continuity is understood by 
the fragmented worldview, i.e., as ÔcomposedÕ by, and ÔdecomposableÕ into, a 
non-denumerable infinity of distinct points. This way of understanding 
continuity is heir of the Ôarithmetic traditionÕ, obsessed with the project of 
analysing the continuum into discrete notions. The uncomfortable result is that 
the most trivial propagation of influence seems to be a case of Ôspooky action-
at-a-distanceÕ. The ontology of self-contained plurals standing in external 
relations is the very denial of causal influence and continuity. In it, nature 
appears as broken into discrete and causally isolated pieces. 
I donÕt think that we can make sense of the gapless propagation of influence 
unless pluralism and the fragmentary way of thinking that animates it are 
overcome. As I will argue in ch. 3, the main reason why contemporary anti-
Humeans fail in making sense of causal influence is that they assume a 
pluralistic framework and then try to fix it at the level of properties. These 
attempts are contaminated with a relational and fragmentary understanding of 
causal phenomena. It is my impression that once a pluralistic framework is 
assumed, then no Ôcement of the universeÕ can do the trick. In particular, no 
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ÔrelationalÕ cement. In ch. 6, I attempt to overcome the discrete understanding 
of the continuum by defending a non-reductive and monistic account of it. 
1.5.3 Subject and object: Epistemic access to things-in-themselves  
If it is true that the world is just one little thing and then another, and those 
things have intrinsic natures and stand to each other in external relations, then 
each of those things is a thing-in-itself. If so, then we face KantÕs gap: how can 
we have epistemic access to them? 
Frank Jackson sees the problem: 
When physicists tell us about the properties they take to be fundamental, they tell 
us what these properties do. This is no accident. We know about what things are 
like essentially through the way they impinge on us and our measuring 
instruments. It does not follow from this that the fundamental properties of 
current physics, or of ÔcompletedÕ physics, are causal cum relational ones. It may 
be that our terms for the fundamental properties pick out the properties they do 
via the causal relations the properties enter into, but that at least some of the 
properties so picked out are intrinsic. They have, as we might put it, relational 
names but intrinsic essences. However, it does suggest the possibility that (i) 
there are two quite different intrinsic properties, P and P*, which are exactly 
alike in the causal relations they enter into, (ii) sometimes one is possessed and 
sometimes the other, and (iii) we mistakenly think that there is just one property 
because the difference does not make a difference (as the point is put in 
information theory). An obvious extension of this possibility leads to the 
uncomfortable idea that we may know next to nothing about the intrinsic nature 
of the world. We know only its causal cum relational nature. (Jackson 1998: 23Ð
24, his emphasis) 
Jackson talks about the nature of properties. But this talk applies to their 
bearers. If properties are intrinsic, then the individuals that have them have 
intrinsic natures. They are things-in-themselves. Jackson, like many others 
(e.g., Blackburn 1990, Esfeld 2004, Psillos 1995), takes the content of the 
empirical predicates and theoretical terms used by science to be purely 
functional or relational. JacksonÕs argument applies to all empirical predicates, 
so empirical knowledge is only another instance of it, though a crucial one: we 
know about the nature of things Ôthrough the way they impinge on us and our 
measuring instrumentsÕ. 
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The dilemma we face is this one: either individuals have intrinsic natures or 
they donÕt. If they do, then ÔKantian humilityÕ (Langton 1998) orders us to 
recognise that we may know Ônext to nothingÕ about them. If they donÕt, then 
how they relate to each other is all what we know (through how they relate to 
us), because finally that is all what there is to them.  
Thus, the possibility of radical ignorance can be taken either as a reason for 
epistemic humility or as a reason to abandon the metaphysics of isolated 
intrinsic natures. What it seems inconsistent is to defend Kantian humility and 
the ontology of Humean Supervenience at the same time. If Kantian humility is 
correct, then Humean Supervenience is ontology going wild while our 
epistemic faculties are on vacation. LewisÕ mistake is KantÕs: positing a 
noumenal world while admitting that there is no epistemic access to it. On the 
other hand, if all what science tells us about things-in-themselves is how they 
relate to each other (through how they relate to us), then this is a good reason 
for believing that this is all what there is to them. We avoid positing 
epistemically inaccessible natures. Sounds like verificationism. But 
philosophers that are fond of causal relations and dispositions, usually reject 
intrinsic properties combining epistemic and ontological considerations 
precisely on these lines: (i) properties whose nature is intrinsic threaten us with 
radical ignorance about them, and (ii) properties whose nature is intrinsic 
involve an implausible divorce between their nature and their causal role (Bird 
2007: ¤4.2, Black 2000, Dipert 1997, Esfeld 2004: ¤4, Ladyman and Ross 
2007: ¤¤2.4.1 and 3.4, Mumford 2004: ¤¤6.10, 9.5, 10.6 and 11.3, Shoemaker 
2003: 214Ð19).  
But is the relational path a good one? While I do think that a metaphysics of 
isolated things-in-themselves is threatened by KantÕs gap, it is doubtful that the 
move towards relational natures solves it. After all, relations seem to be as 
mysterious as things-in-themselves. Because if all that a thinking subject 
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comes to know about the world are the effects of it on him, then he only 
knows, as we can put it, one extreme of the relation. Thus, knowledge of the 
effects of things is neither knowledge of causes nor of the relation (causation, 
perception, or the like) itself. The point of KantÕs gap is precisely how can a 
thinking subject know something wholly distinct from him, something that is 
outside him, something that transcends him. The puzzle is not dissolved by 
saying that things are relationally constituted and so are subject and object, 
which live somehow related, because every relational account of things and of 
subject and object, of mind and world (whether through direct or indirect 
relations), accepts an ontological gap insofar as any relation presupposes at 
least two distinct individual terms. When we say that two things are related we 
admit that they are distinct, so we need to show how can relations close that 
gap. Answering that the gap gets closed Ôby relating the two termsÕ is not a 
solution but simply another way of stating the problem. Recall that it is the 
very relating power of relations what is under scrutiny here. 
I will criticise relational accounts of objects, properties, causation and doings 
(chs. 3 and 4), and show their failures and obscurities. In ch. 6 I will end up 
embracing the identification of subject and object of experience as the only real 
solution to KantÕs gap, since it transcends both pluralism of things-in-
themselves and relationally constituted things. Subject of experience and object 
of experience are better seen as a single non-relational ONE. The only real 
solution to an ontological gap is the admission of some form of non-relational, 
more substantial, form of unity. 
1.6 The ultimate challenge against fragmentation: Non-separability     
If you ask to a fan of the fragmented worldview why he supports it, he will 
probably answer: Ôbecause it is consistent with our best physicsÕ. Very likely, 
he will be unmoved by the metaphysical puzzles previously discussed. Under 
his conception, our best physics explains the constitution and evolution of the 
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world in terms of tiny self-contained individuals and external relations. Thus, 
he thinks he honours the basic meta-ontological commitments within which 
the Armstrong-Lewis program attempts to make sense of things, namely, 
naturalism, physicalism, and scientific realism (Armstrong 1997: ch. 1, Lewis 
1986b: xi).  
However, if we are to believe the reports of those who have good 
understanding of contemporary physics, one conclusion appears as 
uncontroversial: Ôour best physicsÕ simply does not support the fragmented 
worldview of Humean Supervenience. Quite the opposite, the world that 
describes our best physics is an entangled, non-separable, or undivided world. 
Persisting on the contrary is empirically unmotivated and dogmatic: it looks 
as metaphysics arbitrarily imposing an ontological inventory on scientific 
inquiry. Entanglement is in fact the most fundamental feature revealed by 
quantum physics (Schrdinger 1935: 555), and the non-separability of 
quantum entangled states reveals that an irreducible form of ontological 
holism must be accepted to make sense of it (Bohm [1980] 2002, Bohm and 
Hiley 1993, Esfeld 1998, 2001, 2004, Healey 1991, Schaffer 2010a, Teller 
1986). Crucially, entanglement appears to be not an exceptional feature of the 
world, restricted to a tiny region where weird things happen, but a pervasive 
one, which ultimately involves the whole world. 
Non-separability is clearly exemplified by the famous Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen (EPR) experiment. In this experiment two electrons are produced in an 
entangled state, the Singlet state. A pair of electrons in this state is always 
anti-correlated with respect to spin, i.e., if one of them is Ôspin-downÕ, then 
the other one is Ôspin-upÕ, while the total spin-value of the entangled state is 
always 0. A pure spin state cannot be attributed to the particles individually 
but only to the entangled system as a whole. Measurement outcomes of the 
entangled particles are subject to the following distribution of probabilities: 
there is a 0.5 chance of particle 1 having Ôspin-downÕ and particle 2 having 
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Ôspin-upÕ, and a 0.5 chance of particle 1 having Ôspin-upÕ and particle 2 
having Ôspin-downÕ. But the chances of measuring out both particles as 
having Ôspin-upÕ or both as having Ôspin-downÕ are 0. If one of the particles is 
measured as having Ôspin-upÕ, the spin state of the other one is fixed 
immediately as Ôspin-downÕ, and vice-versa. Importantly, this correlation 
obtains regardless the distance that holds between the particles (in fact, the 
position of the particles is unlocalised). The components behave as one 
single, non-separable, unit; and since the correlation obtains regardless the 
distance between the components, it seems to be magical, like Ôspooky 
action-at-a-distanceÕ.  19
This anti-correlation cannot be explained in terms of the intrinsic natures of 
the components of the entangled state plus their spatiotemporal arrangement. 
The reason is obvious: if Humean Supervenience were true, it would be 
possible to obtain a measurement of both particles having Ôspin-upÕ or both 
having Ôspin-downÕ. But the chances of that are 0. The entangled state 
contains information that cannot be explained in terms of the information of 
the intrinsic state of its components and their spatiotemporal arrangement. 
The loose and separate base of Humean Supervenience is simply incapable of 
fixing all the facts.  20
What the EPR experiment reveals is a pervasive feature. Because what is said 
about spin applies equally to other properties, like momentum andÐthis is 
crucialÐto position (Esfeld 2004: ¤2.1). Ultimately, as Esfeld puts it: 
These properties of the whole contain all that can be said about the local 
properties of the parts, and only these properties of the whole contain all that 
can be said about the local properties of the parts. (Esfeld 2001: 252, quoted 
also in Schaffer 2010a: 52) 
 This is a rough summary of the EPR experiment, close to the one offered by Schaffer 19
(2010a: 51Ð52). For more detailed explanations of it and of entangled states in general, see 
Maudlin (2007: 53Ð64) and Esfeld (2004). 
 Regardless the different ontologies that might be offered to make sense of entanglement, the 20
negative diagnosis against Humean Supervenience is fairly uncontroversial. See specially 
Maudlin (2007: ch. 2). In similar vein, Esfeld (2004), Healey (1991), Ladyman and Ross 
(2007: 149Ð51), Schaffer (2010a: 50Ð57), and Teller (1986).
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And what is said about an entangled state ultimately can be extended, without 
many difficulties, to the whole world, as Schaffer has argued: if the world 
started with a singularity, like the Big-Bang, where everything was entangled, 
and then has been evolving according to SchrdingerÕs equation, then the 
world is one vast entangled system. In fact, since SchrdingerÕs form of 
evolution not only preserves but also promotes entanglements, the idea of a 
vast entangled system is plausible even if that singularity never existed 
(Schaffer 2010b: 52). Anyway, whichever is the cosmological story, the idea 
that the world forms a vast entangled system seems to be the assumption 
under which physics actually works: it treats all physical systems as 
entangled. Ultimately, only the totality of entangled systems as a whole has a 
pure state (Esfeld 2001: 258). And if there were an oddity to explain, it would 
not be entanglement, but non-entanglement (Esfeld 2004: ¤2.1). In other 
words, only the whole entangled cosmos exhibits an independent or 
unconditioned nature; all of its fragments are interdependent and lack self-
sufficiencyÐincluding observers and measurement instruments. Every sub-
system, when taken in isolation, is not an independent and self-contained 
Ôbuilding-blockÕ with an intrinsic nature, but a more or less valid abstraction 
from the entangled whole in which it is actually embedded. 
One might try to make sense of entanglement within a pluralistic framework, 
by retaining particles and introducing a peculiar type of relations. Teller calls 
them Ôinherent relationsÕ (Teller 1986: 73). These relations are not captured 
by the contemporary dichotomy internal/external (¤1.2). Like external 
relations, they can be seen as non-supervenient on the intrinsic nature of the 
relata, not even on the relata taken together with their spatiotemporal 
relations. If anything, it is the other way around: the relata have the nature 
they haveÐeven the position they haveÐin virtue of being so related. Thus, 
unlike external relations, they play a constitutive roleÐand this puts them 
closer to internal relations, insofar as these make oblique reference to the 
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natures of the relata. This way of understanding relations was in fact one of 
the important senses in which internal relations were understood during the 
rise of analysis (in fact, this was MooreÕs understanding, as I said in ¤1.3 and 
as I will explore in more detail in ch. 2). The idea of a relationally constituted 
pluralism is defended by Esfeld (2004) and Teller (1986) for explaining 
entanglement. It receives a general support in the ontology defended by 
Dispositional Essentialism, according to which, roughly, the nature of 
properties is relationally determined. I will discuss the idea of internally 
constituted plurals in ch. 3, and reject it due to its internal difficulties, in 
particular due to the unstable character of Ôinherent relationsÕ: these seem to 
affirm and deny at the very same time the individuality of the relata, as 
Bradley used to argue. But, apart from internal difficulties, there is another 
reason to abandon the pluralistic framework: it is very dubious that there is 
any coherent way of making sense of these ÔparticlesÕ, the relata of those 
Ôinherent relationsÕ. Because there may be no qualitative way to individuate 
them, apart from positing a superfluous transcendental haecceity (Ladyman 
and Ross 2007: 152n, van Fraassen 2006: 290Ð91), and, at least in 
Relativistic Quantum Field Theory, even their number is undetermined 
(Halvorson and Clifton 2002, Schaffer 2010a: 54). These reasons offer a 
motive for abandoning particularism altogether and for embracing a wholly 
different ontology. Among these are those who embrace an ontology of pure 
relational structure. Here, the so-called ÔparticlesÕ are mere pragmatic posits, 
ultimately nothing but more or less stable patterns in a structure which is 
relations through and through. This view will be discussed and rejected in ch. 
4. For others, this whole mess speaks in favour of an ontology of pure fields. 
In fact, in Relativistic Quantum Field Theory there is no real support for 
particle-talk. A ÔparticleÕ is also a pragmatic posit, a convenient abstraction 
from a sea of energy. Just like in General Relativity, the idea of all-pervading 
fields seems to speak in favour of a monistic metaphysics. In chs. 5Ð6 I will 
try to make sense of the monistic alternatives. Due to internal difficulties of 
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Priority Monism (ch. 5), I will be forced to embrace a stronger version of 
monism, namely Existence Monism (ch. 6). 
1.7 What follows?    
I hope to have offered good reasons against the fragmented worldview and its 
main ingredients. I do not expect them to be conclusive reasons, but good 
enough to motivate suspicions against it and to motivate the exploration of 
alternatives. Yet, if the ontology of externally related and self-contained 
plurals cannot make good sense of reality, what sort of ontology can?  
I think it can only be one that combines foundationism and holism. On one 
hand, the classical difficulties about relations call for either monadic or 
monistic foundationism. On the other hand, the old difficulties of self-
contained plurals and the ultimate challenge of quantum entanglement call for 
a holistic ontology. I see three general holistic alternatives: (i) pluralism of 
interdependent individuals; (ii) structural realism without individuals; and 
(iii) a more substantial form of holism, i.e., monism. Of these three 
alternatives only (i) and (iii) can, in principle, offer non-relational 
foundations for relations. In contrast, alternative (ii) is relations through and 
through (although not external, but constitutive). 
In what follows I will argue for a non-relational monism as the most coherent 
and stable ontology. The argument is limited in its scope: non-relational 
monism appears as the best alternative when compared to the other 
ontologies that will be examined here as alternatives to the fragmented 
worldview. And the argument is basically negative and operates by default: 
the other alternatives examined here are too problematic.  
Before the assessment, I will revisit RussellÕs and MooreÕs arguments for 
external relations, show their failure, and vindicate BradleyÕs skeptical 
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conception of relations, the one that inspires this work. This re-examination 
will liberate us from some prejudices and will restore our confidence in 
monistic and monadic foundationism (ch. 2). Then I will examine the holistic 
alternatives following a progressive path, starting with the one that preserves 
more of the fragmented worldview and ending with the one which is its exact 
opposite. Thus, I will critically examine Dispositional Essentialism (ch. 3), 
Ontic Structural Realism (ch. 4), and Priority Monism (ch. 5). Due to the 
problems exhibited by these intermediate alternatives, I will be forced to fall 
into Existence Monism (ch. 6), where the everyday talk about things-in-
relations makes no real sense, though it might be accepted as a pragmatic 
tool. Echoing Bradley, I describe this individual as a non-relational ONE. 
Compared to the other holistic candidates examined here, a serious form of 
monism appears to be the best alternative. Not only seems consistent and 
well-supported by empirical and speculative reasons, but it also avoids, like 
no other ontology, the classical puzzles of pluralism and relations, and the 
challenge of non-separability. But, again, I will offer no conclusive reasons: I 
will exhibit its relative superiority and provide what I prefer to call ÔsignsÕ or 
ÔsymptomsÕ of its tenability. However, I retain reservations about my own 
preferred alternative. Yet my doubts make evident that the problem is not 
with Existence Monism itself, but with ontology in more general terms. I will 
leave the Epilogue to expose these doubts, offering a skeptical and open end 
to this work.  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2 Revisiting the dogma of internal relations      
As I said in the previous chapter (¤1.3), before the rise of the analytic tradition, 
relations were not taken with ontological seriousness. Monadic or monistic 
foundationism was the rule: something non-relational was thought to ground 
relational discourse. Ultimately, relations were thought to be nothing over and 
above monadic or monistic ways of being, or ideas entertained by one thinking 
subject. One of the most important steps in shaping the analytic tradition was 
precisely the rejection of foundationist treatments of relations and the parallel 
defence of external relations as serious ontological items. The arguments that 
Russell and Moore deployed against the so-called ÔdogmaÕ or ÔaxiomÕ of 
internal relations were thought to be an essential step for building a new logic 
and metaphysics, committed to realism (i.e., to the independence of object 
from subject), to pluralism (i.e., to the independence of object from object, 
constituent from constituent), and to the atomistic analysis of complexity as the 
right path to truth and reality. 
In this chapter I will discuss RussellÕs and MooreÕs arguments against the 
dogma of internal relations and vindicate BradleyÕs stance. In ¤2.1 I will 
discuss RussellÕs arguments and show how they fail. In ¤2.2 I will do the same 
with MooreÕs. In ¤2.3 I will vindicate BradleyÕs position. Finally, in ¤2.4, I will 
conclude by distinguishing three different understandings of internal 
relatedness that are relevant to what follows in the next chapters, including the 
Bradleyan understanding that guides my critical approach. 
2.1 Russell against the dogma     
Russell claimed that Ô[t]he fundamental doctrine in the realistic position . . . is 
the doctrine that relations are ÒexternalÓÕ, meaning by this that Ôrelatedness 
does not imply any corresponding complexity in the relataÕ and that Ôany given 
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entity is a constituent of many different complexesÕ (Russell 1911: 158). This 
idea was supposed to be the exact opposite of the dogma of internal relations, 
which, according to Russell, says that Ô[e]very relation is grounded in the 
natures of the related termsÕ (Russell 1907: 37; see also Russell 1910: 162). 
Russell took the dogma as saying that, strictly speaking, there are no relations, 
since they are always reducible to the complex natures of the relata. Once you 
have the relata, you have the relation. RussellÕs sense of internal relatedness 
seems to be the sense that Leibniz had in mind when he treated all individual 
accidents as monadic and intrinsic, and claimed that relations were Ôa mere 
ideal thingÕ (¤1.4.1). SpriggeÐI assume following LeibnizÐputs this sense of 
internal relatedness under the label of Ôideal relationsÕ (Sprigge 1979, 1983: 
180Ð87). It seems also the sense in which Armstrong (1997: 87Ð90) and Lewis 
(1986: 61Ð62) understand internal relations, that is, as ÔsupervenientÕ on the 
nature of the relata, where ÔsupervenientÕ represents no addition of being. 
Whether the relata are two or more complex terms, as in monadism, or only 
one complex term, as in monism, in both cases there are no relational 
differences without non-relational differences. 
No one deniesÐnot even the monistÐthat relational discourse is convenient to 
our descriptive machinery. The point under discussion is whether that discourse 
expresses real or essential distinctions. Our everyday talk is plagued with this 
type of utterances: Mexico is warmer than Alaska, yellow is lighter than red, 
Sally and Paul have the same mass and they are three feet apart, etc. All of 
them say that some terms are so and forth related. But is there really something 
like the relation of being taller than? Russell famously defended the 
affirmative answer, and he did so with particular force in the early stage of his 
career, after breaking up with idealism. He was convinced that relations do 
exist outside the mind, and that they are not grounded in the nature of the 
relata, that is, that they are real addition of being. Since his arguments were 
developed in detail in his Principles of Mathematics (Russell [1903] 2010: ch. 
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26), I will examine them as stated there, although he repeats them in other 
places (e.g., Russell 1910, 1956c: Lecture III, 1959: 54Ð64). 
2.1.1 Asymmetrical relations  
Russell starts his attack on the dogma of internal relations by distinguishing 
between monadism and monism and by saying how these two doctrines 
attempt to deal with relations: 
Given, say, the proposition aRb, where R is some relation, the monadistic view 
will analyse this into two propositions, which we may call ar1 and br2, which 
give to a and b respectively adjectives supposed to be together equivalent to R. 
The monistic view, on the contrary, regards the relation as a property of the 
whole composed of a and b, and as thus equivalent to a proposition which we 
may denote by (ab)r. Of these views, the first is represented by Leibniz and (on 
the whole) by Lotze, the second by Spinoza and Mr Bradley. (Russell [1903] 
2010: 223Ð24) 
RussellÕs first general argument tries to show that neither monadism nor 
monism are capable of giving a good account of asymmetrical relations. A 
relation xRy is asymmetrical iff xRy excludes yRx. Russell claims that the 
relation x being greater than y, and in general all asymmetrical relations, bring 
with them certain order, and they cannot be reduced to the monadic natures of 
each of the terms (monadism) or to the nature of a single complex term 
(monism). When we try to do so, order is supposed to be lost. 
(i) Against monadism. The monadic strategy, as construed by Russell, says that 
the relation x is greater than y is grounded in the monadic natures of x and y. 
According to him, in the first place, monadism cannot appeal to relational 
properties like being greater than y or being smaller than x to ground such a 
relation, mainly because the sense in which monadism understands that a 
property of y Ôinvolves some referenceÕ to x is, for Russell, simply 
ÔunintelligibleÕ (Russell [1903] 2010: 224). What Russell takes as plain and 
clear is that properties, like that of being smaller than x, are complexes which 
consist in a term, x, and a relation, that of being smaller than. His point 
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assumes, rather than proves, that a Leibnizian pluralism is untenable, because 
he takes as obvious that properties of relational appearance are analysable 
complexes that hold in virtue of relations and terms, but not the other way 
around (cf. ¤1.2). 
In the second place, RussellÕs objection says that the monadic strategy cannot 
work if it takes the monadic property of x as only being smaller than, leaving 
open the other term, since x is smaller than with respect to y, but it can also be 
greater than with respect to z. So, leaving aside these two alternatives, it seems 
that the best case that the monadic strategy can build is to claim that the 
relation x being greater than y is grounded in the precise magnitudes of x and 
y, say 20m2 and 10m2, respectively. RussellÕs main point is that this final 
monadic attempt of reduction is condemned to failure and to the ultimate 
recognition that relations cannot be avoided. His argument takes the form of a 
regress: if the monadist says that the foundations for the relation x being 
greater than y are xÕs and yÕs respective magnitudes, that is, 20m2 and 10m2, 
then why is he allowed to say that 20m2 is a greater magnitude than 10m2? 
RussellÕs response: because those magnitudes stand in the relation of being 
greater than already. It is the asymmetrical relation of order that holds between 
those very magnitudes what is instantiated by x and y. A relation seems to 
appear inevitably at every step of the analysis of asymmetrical relations. So, 
Russell concludes, relations should be recognised as an irreducible category 
(Russell [1903] 2010: ¤214).  
Surprisingly, this last move made by Russell puts him closer to a structuralist 
(cf. ¤2.4, ch. 4). The structuralist says that the nature of a term is exhausted by 
its relations to other terms. RussellÕs argument for the existence of 
asymmetrical relations is assuming precisely that there is nothing in the nature 
of a number to account for its greater or lesser value than its relations to other 
numbers. Thus, the nature of a number is relational. Compare with the 
characterisation of mathematical structuralism stated by Shapiro: 
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The structuralist vigorously rejects any sort of ontological independence among 
the natural numbers. The essence of a natural number is its relations to other 
numbers. . . . The number 2 is no more and no less than the second position in 
the natural number structure; and 6 is the sixth position. Neither of them has any 
independence from the structure in which they are positions, and as positions in 
this structure, neither number is independent of the other. (Shapiro 2000: 258) 
In other words, number 2 cannot be or be conceived without all the other 
natural numbers, since its nature is constituted by its relations towards them, 
and vice-versa. The ontology of this picture seems difficult to grasp outside the 
realm of mathematics. In fact, it is an ontology that ultimately must be rejected 
for reasons that I will explore later (chs. 3Ð4). However, it is still easy to see 
that, ironically, the relations that the structuralist posits seem to be internal in 
at least one of the senses of the dogma. Although here we donÕt find reduction 
of relations to monadic or monistic natures, the relations of the structuralist are, 
pace Russell, not external and contingent addition of being, but internal, 
insofar as they are essential to the relata, and this, as we will see, matches 
perfectly with MooreÕs understanding of the dogma (¤¤2.2, 2.4). The structure 
actually forms an interdependent or organic whole similar to some monistic 
pictures, where everything owes its place in the whole to the whole itself. Only 
that this whole is not thingy but structural. The relational nature of every term 
ultimately compromises the whole structure in which it is embedded: outside 
the relational whole, the term couldnÕt exist or be what it is. Only the whole 
structure has the unconditioned properties of being well ordered and internally 
rich or complex. 
To escape from this relational holism one has to reject the last step of RussellÕs 
argument and reconsider the monadic strategy, where order and difference in 
quantity is grounded in something non-relational. The monadic solution in fact 
can avoid the last step of RussellÕs argument, which seems to add relations 
where there was no need for them in the first place. As Campbell argues, if 
God creates x and y with their monadic properties (their respective sizes), his 
job is done: the relation x is greater than y holds without need of adding an 
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extra entity, namely the relation being greater than (Campbell 1990: 103Ð4). 
RussellÕs regress seems harmful only if one tries to eliminate relational 
discourse. But when one is skeptical about RussellÕs arguments for relations 
and holds that relations are grounded in the nature of the terms, one is only 
claiming that relations are no addition of being, i.e., that there are no relational 
differences without non-relational differences. Whether relational discourse is 
eliminable or reducible to subject-predicate discourse is a different story. 
(ii) Against monism. A second form of the argument based on asymmetrical 
relations tries to show that the monistic strategy also fails. According to 
RussellÕs reconstruction, the monistic strategy says that the relation x is greater 
than y, attributes diversity of magnitude to a whole composed by x and y. What 
is wrong with this strategy? Russell claims that the monistic strategy, just like 
monadism, fails to give an account of order. He claims that the asymmetry of 
the relation and a correct account of order is missing. By treating x and y as a 
whole that has difference of magnitude, the monistic strategy cannot express 
the difference between the relation x is greater than y and the relation y is 
greater than x, since these relations are both reduced to difference of 
magnitude within the whole xy; but then the different asymmetrical order 
expressed by each of those propositions is collapsed into one proposition where 
the direction of those different relations is lost. Or so he argues (Russell [1903] 
2010: ¤215). 
This second argument seems sound, but only because it oversimplifies monism. 
The monist can still preserve order by saying that what Russell treats as one 
and the same property, namely difference of magnitude in xy and difference of 
magnitude in yx, are really different properties of different objects. As it has 
been pointed out by Campbell, what is really happening here is that, for the 
monist, xy and yx are different wholes (Campbell 1990: 106), while RussellÕs 
error is precisely to take xy and yx as if they were identical. But this is because 
Russell basically takes the monist as endorsing a pluralistic account of 
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wholeness, like the one offered by the mereologist, which rests, evidently, on a 
pluralistic understanding of composites. But the monist always takes the word 
ÔwholeÕ in a more metaphorical sense, as comprising a more organic form of 
unity, and not as the ÔcompositeÕ made of loose and separate ÔpartsÕ that the 
mereologist has in mind. For the monist, xy and yx are obviously distinct 
wholes; each of them is a distinct object; only their grammatical labels give the 
illusion of plurality. While xy has a certain complex distribution of a certain 
magnitude (i.e., Reality is 20m2Ð10m2Ðish), yx exhibits the opposite complex 
distribution (i.e., Reality is 10m2Ð20m2Ðish).  As Bradley puts it: 21
[W]hen it is objected against me as a Monist that all that I as such have a right to 
is the terms and the whole, while the order or direction is in neitherÐmy answer 
is that no whole is really a simple whole, and in every whole are always 
conditions unexpressed and that in these conditions falls the difference required 
here, and here is the reason why ARB and BRA are incompatible... (Bradley 
1935: 672, his emphasis) 
The deepest disagreement between a pluralist like Russell and a monist like 
Bradley can be better expressed in linguistic fashion, as it has been done by 
Sprigge (1979). While the former thinks that there are logically proper names, 
the latter denies that. Indeed, Ôit is of the essence of monism to deny that there 
can be logically proper namesÕ (Sprigge 1979: 153). For the monist, a 
proposition like <the cat is on the mat> characterises a total organic situation 
where the cat and the mat figure as embedded, in a way that they are only ÔcatÕ 
and ÔmatÕ after being abstracted from that total organic situation. The 
proposition does not stand merely for two logical atoms and something like 
Ôbeing onÕ. When ÔcatÕ and ÔmatÕ are not logically proper names, then the 
proposition <the cat is on the mat> is very different from the proposition <the 
mat is on the cat>, since both attempt to describe two different total situations. 
So there is no point in making a difference between <a being on b> and <b 
being on a> if a and b have no other difference than that of one being on the 
 Thus, the monist might try to account for the qualitative complexity of the world by 21
appealing to distributional properties (e.g., being polka-dotted). See Schaffer (2010a), who 
follows the account of distributional properties developed by Parsons (2004). In similar sense, 
Cornell (2013), who uses distributional properties to rescue monism from SiderÕs suspicions 
(Sider 2007, 2008). 
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other. The asymmetry that so much worries Russell is correctly expressed by 
his external relations and their direction, but the need for them only arises 
when we treat the relata as bare terms being fully abstracted from the rich 
whole in which they are embedded. What a monist like Bradley denies is 
precisely that a proposition of the form aRb implies nothing but two referents 
devoid of all nature, and a direction from one referent to the other, since Ôin 
order to be related, a term must keep still within itself enough character to 
make it, in short, itself and not anything diverseÕ (Bradley 1935: 634). In sum, 
RussellÕs need for relations arises from his impoverished understanding of 
what counts as ÔtermÕ. And this is not surprising: our views on what may count 
as a relation are determined by our views on what may count as a relatum, and 
vice-versa. 
2.1.2 Resemblance and difference  
If qualitative and quantitative difference seem to be clearly supervenient on 
monadic or monistic natures, what about the relation of being different from? 
According to Russell, foundationist strategies fail because they have to 
recognise that at least the relation of difference exists (Russell [1903] 2010: 
¤425, 1910: 163). The same holds for resemblance. In order that three yellow 
birds get to resemble each otherÐRussell thinksÐit is not enough the yellowness 
of each bird, but also the relation of resemblance holding between those 
patches of yellow. Moreover, the case of resemblance is, for Russell, not only a 
compelling case for relations, but also one of the most compelling arguments 
for the existence of universals. Because if we have to admit the universal 
relation of resemblance then there is no more a general objection against 
universals (Russell [1912] 1959: 96Ð97, 1956b: 111Ð12). 
The answer to RussellÕs objection is that both resemblance and difference seem 
again to be obviously supervenient, since they will hold regardless the 
existence of a relation (Campbell 1990: 106). If you have three yellow birds, 
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you donÕt need something extra to ground the fact that they resemble in colour. 
Given their existence, why would you need the relation of resemblance for 
grounding their colour-likeness? What difference would it make? Three birds 
differ or resemble in colour in virtue of their monadic natures, i.e., their 
respective colours; and two colours differ or resemble in virtue of being the 
colours they are (Sprigge 1979: 162). And if objects are what they are in virtue 
of their monadic natures, then they differ of resemble each other just in virtue 
of being what they are. No relation of resemblance or difference is needed in 
addition. 
2.1.3 Instantiation  
RussellÕs ultimate argument for the existence of relations is directed against 
what he takes to be a common commitment of both monism and monadism. 
Russell thinks that even if the reduction of relations to the nature of terms were 
successful, there remains at least one relation that both monadism and monism 
must admit since it cannot be reduced or eliminated, namely the relation that 
holds between an individual object and its nature/properties (Russell [1903] 
2010: ¤216, 1910: 167Ð68). The question can be put in the form of a dilemma: 
either an object is distinct from its nature/properties or is identical with it/them. 
If they are distinct, then a relation between them must be admitted. And if they 
are identical, then 
É. it seems impossible to understand what we mean when we ask whether S has 
the predicate P. For this cannot be: ÒIs P one of the predicates enumerated in 
explaining what we mean by S?Ó and it is hard to see what else, on the view in 
question, it could mean. (Russell 1910: 167) 
So, the argument ends, both monadism and monism must accept at least the 
relation of instantiation. And if we must accept this relation, then there is no 
principled objection for not accepting other relations. 
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This argument has at least two central weaknesses. First, it takes the bond of 
instantiation as if it were an evident kind of relation. But this is very hard to 
swallow. How an object stands to its nature/properties is, without exaggeration, 
one of the most intriguing metaphysical puzzles, and has been haunting us 
since Plato. Thinking that a ÔrelationÕ solves the mystery straightforwardly is, 
to say the least, superficial. This was precisely the point of BradleyÕs regress: if 
instantiation is a relation between an object and its nature/properties (letÕs call 
it R), then it seems that an endless number of relations is waiting for us, since 
R also needs to be instantiated. What is worst, neither an infinite number of 
relations will be able to bring into any sort of unity what are admitted from the 
very start as loose and separate constituents. And besides BradleyÕs regress, at 
least the following doubts arise: is it possible, or at least conceivable, the 
existence of bare objects, on one hand, and numerically distinct properties, on 
the other hand? If yes, where are these two kinds of constituents, how can we 
have epistemic access to them, and how do they form genuine units? If not, 
then it seems that, necessarily, whenever there is an object, this has a 
determinate nature/properties, and, thereby, their unity cannot be accounted in 
terms of those loose and separate relations whose reality Russell was so 
interested to prove. Perhaps this is the main reason why so many authors leave 
instantiation as a primitive, or prefer to account for it in terms of an Ôinternal 
relationÕ or a Ônon-relational tieÕ (Armstrong 1997: ¤8.11, Simons 2010, 
Strawson [1959] 2003: 167ff). Of course, these last moves do not favour 
RussellÕs point. Nor they are real solutions to BradleyÕs regress, as we argued 
before (cf. ¤1.4.2). Quite the contrary: they are the very recognition of the 
power of BradleyÕs regress and of the fact that external relations cannot do the 
job; that the unity of a concrete individual and its nature/properties requires 
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something completely different than mere juxtaposition or external relatedness 
of what are taken to be distinct constituents.  22
The second weakness of the argument is its target. Absolute idealism was not a 
clear doctrine. It was obscurely formulated and presumably rested over weak 
logical bases. For instance, there was no unified and clearly stated doctrine of 
internal relations.  This is all true to a certain degree. But, and precisely 23
because of that, there are several differences between those who advocated it. 
Bradley, perhaps the main target of RussellÕs argument (along with Leibniz), 
was well aware of the point that was under discussion. So, at least since 
Appearance and Reality, he clearly rejected all the subject-predicate structure, 
and for reasons closely similar to those he used against relations. According to 
Bradley, subjects, predicates and relations are just a product of a process that 
he called Ôvicious abstractionÕ. This vicious abstraction might be useful to deal 
with the world in fragmentary and partial ways that might fit very well our 
pragmatic needs. The nonsense lies in trying to take the separateness that is 
created by that process of abstraction as a metaphysical truth about ultimate 
reality. His famous examples tried to denounce the confusion behind this 
strategy of description and partial knowledge. A lump of sugar comes as a 
whole and cannot be separated in hardness, sweetness and whiteness, only 
thought does this. A billiard ball is not actually apart from its context and 
position in the world, and the fact that we talk about a billiard ball as a separate 
and independent term does not communicate this character to the actual 
 One might be tempted to infer from the rejection of Russellian logical atoms that something 22
like FregeÕs account of objects and their properties/relations can restore the unity of the 
proposition. But this move is equally hopeless. Because even if one thinks that objects are 
saturated while properties/relations, qua concepts, are unsaturated, the problem of how object 
and concept get together in a unity still remains when one takes the ÔisÕ of predication as 
contingent. You can have a list of unsaturated items and a list of saturated items and you still 
need to put them somehow together to form a real unity. Thus, you can think of properties/
relations as __is red and __is lighter than__, but this doesnÕt solve the mystery of how two 
distinct x and y come to ÔfillÕ those blanks, going beyond a mere list or fusion of loose and 
separate constituents, like [x + __is red + x + __is lighter than__ + y] does. The list or fusion 
does not entail the propositional unity. See Gaskin (1995), Hylton (1984), MacBride (2005: ¤4) 
and Vallicella (2002: 13Ð14).
 For a detailed and illustrative treatment of the idealist doctrine of internal relations, see 23
Ewing (1934: ch. IV). EwingÕs catalogue, despite including ten (!) different meanings of the 
doctrine, is still incomplete: BradleyÕs understanding is missing.
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situation: the billiard ball abstracted from its context is just a ÔcharacterÕ. In 
fact, before abstraction, we cannot even distinguish the Ôbilliard ballÕ from its 
context as a distinct and separate existent. Instantiation does not disprove 
BradleyÕs monism. Because if we understand it in relational terms, it deserves, 
according to Bradley, no special treatment, and should be equally rejected, with 
all other relations, from ultimate metaphysical truth and reality: 
In short, far from admitting that Monism requires that all truths can be 
interpreted as the predication of qualities of the whole, Monism with me 
contends that all predication, no matter what, is in the end untrue and in the end 
unreal, because and so far as it involves always and ignores unexpressed 
conditions. (Bradley 1935: 672) 
There is an obvious sense in which BradleyÕs position might be taken as 
forming an Ôunholy allianceÕ with extreme nominalistic understandings of 
predication (I borrowed the expression from Armstrong 1997: 114). In fact, 
Bradley, with the extreme nominalist, would reject as non-sensical the idea of 
self-sufficient abstract modes of existence (whether these are constructed as 
universals, tropes, classes or sets it doesnÕt really matter). Both will reject, on 
one hand, the idea that properties are wholly distinct and independent beings, 
and, on the other hand, the idea that there is something out there that relates 
them to concrete individuals to form a unit (an idea that is needed only when 
the first step of fragmentation, the one that separates the lump of sugar from its 
sweetness, is admitted). Both ideas are simply the result of illegitimate 
hypostasis after a process of abstraction, and so it is the very idea of 
predication. Because, according to both Bradley and the extreme nominalist, 
when we say that a is F, there is nothing in the world that corresponds to F-ness 
(nor a universal, nor a class of tropes, nor a set, nor a mereological fusion).  
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Crucially, BradleyÕs point against instantiation (qua relation) also receives 
support from an Aristotelian point of view.  This is very clear, for instance, in 24
ScaltsasÕ understanding of AristotleÕs metaphysics: 
[F]or Aristotle, a universal form is not related to its subject by an ontological 
relation (e.g., by participation, communion, etc.), but it is separable from that 
subject by abstraction. The realist element in AristotleÕs account of universals is 
that the singling out of a form by abstraction is grounded in experience: thoughts 
about the abstracted universal form derive their truth conditions from thoughts 
about the substance that the form is abstracted from. Thus, the path from the 
substantial form in actuality (=the concrete substance) to the abstracted form 
(=the universal) is separation by abstraction, which has no ontological correlate, 
but is governed by the content of our experience. (Scaltsas 1994: 5, his 
emphases) 
AristotleÕs understanding is clearly in conflict with the Platonic account of 
Russell and his followers, who understand instantiation in terms of object and 
properties/relations somehow ÔtiedÕ together. (Note that Armstrong, despite 
claiming to be an Aristotelian about universals, accepts universals and bare 
particulars as actual, distinct and independent constituents of states of affairs; 
this is why, despite his rejection of abstract universals, his viewÐat least until 
his (1997)Ðis still trapped by the Platonic puzzle of instantiation and by a 
fatally relational way of understanding it, a way which is obviously exposed to 
 In fact, there is an obvious communion between the famous Hegelian idea of Ôconcrete 24
universalÕ as adopted by British idealism and the Aristotelian idea of substantial form. The 
unity and structure of the object cannot be provided by a mere bundling relation between 
properties (Hume), nor by the (relational) inherence of properties in a bare substratum (Locke), 
nor by the synthesis done by the thinking subject (Kant). Both Hegel and Aristotle would be 
together in defending a holistic understanding of concrete objecthood or individuality, and 
would claim that the unity and structure of a concrete individual can only be provided by the 
actual substantial form itself. (For an insightful treatment about this problem and a defence of 
the Aristotelian character of the Hegelian solution, see Stern 1990, 2007.) It is also very clear 
that Leibniz found himself accepting Aristotelian substantial form as the only possible source 
of the unity and indivisibility of a real individual (this is a recurrent theme in his 
correspondence with Arnauld; see Mason 1967), and ultimately accepted what Russell thought 
unbearable: that every predicate is contained in the subject, i.e., that when one says ÔRussell is 
XÕ, there is no metaphysical need to relate Russell with X, since Ô...is XÕ cannot but be true 
about Russell and only about Russell. In other words, by saying: ÔRussell isÕ, all the true 
predications about Russell come for free. Every substance enjoys the metaphysical status of an 
angel, since every substance has a unique essence or is one of a kind. Similarly, Descartes held 
that the distinction between substance and its attributes was not a real distinction, but only a 
distinction of reason (Descartes 1985: I.63), and so did Spinoza, who claimed that Ôthere is 
nothing outside the intellect through which a number of things can be distinguished from one 
another except substances, or what is the same (...), their attributesÕ (Spinoza 1994: IP4d, my 
emphasis). After all, an attribute is nothing but Ôwhat the intellect perceives of a substance, as 
constituting its essenceÕ (Spinoza 1994: ID4). The separation between the particular individual 
and its nature is of course also rejected by Bradley, who couldnÕt accept the ÔthatÕ without the 
ÔwhatÕ (Bradley 1930: ch. 15). 
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BradleyÕs regress. As we saw before (¤1.4.2), to accept universals and bare 
particulars as independent constituents and then claim that they are unified by a 
Ônon-relation tieÕ is just putting a non-relational name to what has been tacitly 
accepted as a relational problem from the very minute in which two wholly 
distinct and independent terms are taken to be constituents of states of affairs in 
need of any sort of ÔtieÕ.)  
Like Bradley and Hegel, and unlike Russell and his followers, Aristotle 
understood that one cannot have oneÕs cake and eat it, i.e., that one cannot have 
distinct, actual and independent constituents and, at the same time, a real unity. 
It is AristotleÕs most mature metaphysical realization that the unity of a substance 
is incompatible with the actuality of distinct components in the substance. . . Any 
division of the substance into components that are identifiable independently of 
the substantial whole is a generation of components that are not present in the 
substantial whole. . . For Plato the problem was how a universal could be in 
many different substances. For Aristotle the universal could not be even in a 
single substance, for the distinctness of the universal would destroy the unity of 
the whole. . . No element in a substance is primitively particular. By not 
introducing primitively particular items for the particularity of the substance, 
Aristotle avoids the division between the which and the what. . . Only the whole 
substance is particular . . . (Scaltsas 1994: 196Ð97, his emphases) 
The substantial whole precludes the identity of properties, but it gives us real 
unity, which is the substantial whole itself. Conversely, the identity of a 
property precludes the substantial whole, the real unity. 
Thus, there is an inverse relation between the identity and the actuality of a 
property: The closer we get to the propertyÕs actualized (instantiated), the further 
we get from the propertyÕs identity; the closer we get to the propertyÕs identity (in 
its definition), the further we get from its actualized state. (Scaltsas 1994: 4, his 
emphases) 
Aristotle sacrificed the real numerical distinctness of properties in order to 
achieve unity. What Bradley did was to take AristotleÕs insight about 
instantiation and extend it to the treatment of relations, following it up to its 
ultimate consequences. If relations are also supposed to be really instantiated, 
then they cannot obey real distinctions; they, just like monadic properties, can 
only be abstractions from a substantial whole, a real unity. But if real relations 
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are gone, then so does real pluralism, since how can we have a real plurality of 
individuals without having any sort of real relation holding between them? You 
can, again, attempt to locate relations in the domain of ideology and leave the 
plurality in the domain of ontology. But how can you do this move without 
being involved in an obvious ontological tension? You want a real plurality but 
you donÕt want real relations to accompany it. How can you have that package 
without being involved in contradiction? It seems that either you get real 
plurality with real relations between the plurals, or you accept the fact that 
locating relations in the domain of ideology involves accepting that pluralism 
is also in the domain of ideology. Because once the domain of ontology has 
been emptied from real relations, then it cannot contain real plurality. What 
Bradley does is to accept the consequence that is implicit in an extreme 
nominalistic stance that denies the mind-independent or objective reality of 
both properties and relations: its natural tendency to collapse the world into a 
seamless Parmenidean dough (monism), and to find no other solution than 
treating the heterogeneity and plurality exhibited by appearances as a form of 
mental fiction, abstraction or projection (idealism). As it becomes clear from 
the history of philosophy, nominalism (in its different variants) and idealism (in 
its different variants) have been always partners in crime (cf. Hochberg 2013). 
Once properties/relationsÐor, in more general terms, abstract forms of 
existenceÐare removed from the domain of the mind-independent reality, their 
function starts being performed by some ingredient in the domain of the mind-
dependent reality, the domain of ideas, fictions, abstractions and projections. 
I do not expect to put an end to the puzzle of instantiation by introducing these 
considerations in favour of a non-relational account of it. But I do think that 
they have sufficient force to show that RussellÕs last argument is far from being 
a knock-down argument and that there are good reasons for rejecting a 
relational treatment of this problem. A relational treatment of instantiation 
seems to be the only way open to those who think of concrete individuals and 
their properties as wholly distinct existents. But this way of making sense of 
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things introduces one of the most puzzling fragmentations of metaphysics. 
BradleyÕs regress still haunts that relational approach. Anyway, at least it is 
clear that Russell is wrong when assuming that a relational account of 
instantiation is the only one available. There are holistic alternatives, like the 
Aristotelian tradition proves. And, at any rate, what seems to be indisputable is 
that Russell totally missed the mark when attributing to Bradley a relational 
account of instantiation. Because BradleyÕs point was precisely that RussellÕs 
understanding of the copula was inadequate to express the unity of a thing with 
its properties (Candlish 2007: 38). Russell blamed the late idealists for 
confusing the ÔisÕ of identity with the ÔisÕ of predication. But by introducing the 
distinction, he also broke the unity of the proposition, and the link between a 
thing and its properties became totally loose and contingent. Of course, 
restoring the real unity seems to collapse the ÔisÕ of predication with the ÔisÕ of 
identity back again. We may now begin to understand that, inadequate and 
paradoxical as it appears, perhaps there is no better way to express the unity of 
a thing and its properties than recurring to something like the Hegelian notion 
of Ôidentity in differenceÕ. Yet, if we think, as it is also very natural, that this is 
a plain contradiction, then we also may begin to understand why Bradley 
thought that all predication was ultimately unintelligible, and that the unity of 
thing and quality is ultimately ineffable. 
RussellÕs arguments are not capable of defeating BradleyÕs skepticism. Firstly, 
from the fact that relational discourse is not reducible to subject-predicate 
discourse, it doesnÕt follow without additional premises that such relational 
discourse stands for any sort of Ôshadowy substancesÕ or real existents. 
Secondly, relations of resemblance and difference seem obviously to be 
nothing over and above the relata, as most contemporary pluralistic 
metaphysicians would accept. And thirdly, Bradley denied the reality of all 
relations, so RussellÕs last argument simply missed the mark when directed to 
him. Bradley wasnÕt committed to the defence of the subject-predicate relation; 
in fact, he firmly rejected it as depicting reality (Candlish 2007: 165Ð66). 
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Russell, at least after his Principles of Mathematics and before WittgensteinÕs 
influence, was convinced that relational expressions referred to independent 
constituents, so his arguments for the existence of relations rested on the 
assumption of a transparent grammar as a safe guide to ontology.  This 25
attitude, that was evident in the Principles of Mathematics, persisted during his 
career even after some skeptical doubts.  For Russell, if not ordinary 26
language, at least well analysed propositions were able to mirror the world. 
Bradley, in severe contrast, distrusted grammatical categories as a guide to 
ontology. Not only did he deny the existence of these shadowy substances, but 
also that the subject-predicate form reflected any kind of relation between an 
object and a property. In this sense, his attitude is closer to the nominalist and 
to the Aristotelian. Moreover, BradleyÕs stance on relations is also close to 
WittgensteinÕs.  The difference with Wittgenstein is that Bradley took terms to 27
be as unreal as relations (i.e., both were equally abstractions from the One), 
while Wittgenstein thought that logically proper names had the ability to refer 
to an object at least in the context of a proposition. This is a proof that, pace 
Russell, the real dispute is not as much on the reality of relations as it is on the 
reality and ontological status of terms. Yet BradleyÕs objections against terms-
in-relations Ôcannot be accepted with equanimity by those who wish to draw 
back from monismÕ (Candlish 2007: 172), i.e., by those who assume the 
 The story has been unfair to Bradley when describing his attack on relations, specially his 25
regress argument, as somehow assuming that the supporter of relations has a nave account of 
them that treats them as substances. Well, in fact, that was precisely RussellÕs account in the 
Principles of Mathematics, where he developed his main arguments for external relations. It 
can be appreciated clearly in the following sentence: Ô[T]he theory that there are adjectives or 
attributes or ideal things, or whatever they may be called, which are in some way less 
substantial, less self-subsistent, less self-identical, than true substantives, appears to be wholly 
erroneous, and to be easily reduced to a contradiction.Õ (Russell [1903] 2010: ¤49; see also 
¤¤46Ð48). An accurate reconstruction of the story of the early struggles that gave birth to the 
analytical tradition seems definitely to favour Bradley (Candlish 2007: ch. 6, Hylton 1990: ch. 
2; for contrast, see Griffin 1998). As I said before (¤¤1.1, 1.4), the contemporary ontologist 
also gives substantial status to external relations.
 Later on his career, specially after developing his theory of types and after receiving 26
WittgensteinÕs influence, Russell became more timid in his ontology. He kept defending the 
idea that relational propositions were irreducible to the subject-predicate form, but he stayed in 
silence about the ontology (cf. Russell 1956a).
 Recall when Wittgenstein says in the Tractatus: ÔInstead of, ÔThe complex sign ÒaRbÓ says 27
that a stands to b in the relation RÕ, we ought to put, ÔThat ÒaÓ stands to ÒbÓ in a certain 
relation says that aRb.Õ (Wittgenstein 1961: 3.1432, his emphases). For Wittgenstein, relational 
signs are not names, i.e., they donÕt stand for individual objects.
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legitimacy of pluralism from the start. Reaching the Absolute involves 
transcending grammar, thus transcending relational, fragmentary, pluralistic, 
and even subject-predicate ways of thinking, which are all inadequate to 
express the non-relational and should be thrown away altogether with the 
ladder.  28
In general terms, none of RussellÕs arguments for relations will impress today. 
That asymmetrical relations of comparison (of quality or quantity) and that 
relations of resemblance and difference themselves are no real addition of 
being seems to be a common place among contemporary metaphysicians, 
regardless their views on the precise nature of properties and relations. The 
pluralistic dominant pictures include monadic properties that are obviously 
capable of grounding those relations (cf. Armstrong 1997: 87Ð90, Lewis 
1986a: 61Ð62, Mulligan 1998, Simons 2010, Williams 1963). Russell wasnÕt 
capable of providing such monadic properties because he treated properties as 
one-place relations and all relations as external. This strategy leaves no place 
for non-relational natures, hence no place for a supervenience base for those 
relations. Strangely, none of RussellÕs arguments was focused on what today 
are regarded as the most plausible types of external relations, namely causation 
and spatiotemporal distance. Nowadays these are just assumed as forming an 
indivisible package with pluralism, but no further arguments are provided. This 
lack of arguments for external relations should at least raise some suspicions. 
The burden of proof is on those who postulate them as an extra ingredient. This 
involves demonstrating that the distinction external/internal is well-founded 
and capable of making ultimate sense of things, and providing a positive 
criterion of demarcation. And this task certainly involves much more than 
merely assuming the general contingency of predication or that heterogeneity 
or qualitative richness involves separability, independence and pluralism. 
 The extension of WittgensteinÕs metaphor to BradleyÕs metaphysical ascent was suggested to 28
me by Steve Barker in conversation.
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2.2 Moore against the dogma: Numerical and qualitative identity     
In ÔExternal and Internal RelationsÕ (1919), Moore tries a modest proposal: to 
show that at least some relations are purely external or, in other words, that not 
all relations are internal.  The dogma of internal relations, according to 29
MooreÕs interpretation, says that all relations are essential to their relata. Thus, 
he understood the dogma as making a claim of constitution with obvious and 
radical modal consequences. If a and b stand in a certain relation R, then a has 
the relational property of being R-related to b. This relation is internal in 
MooreÕs sense iff something that lacks the property of being R-related to b is 
different from a (Moore 1919: 47Ð48). Of course, claiming that every relatum 
stands in the relations it stands essentially, involves the rejection of the 
distinction between essence and accident. In fact, absolute idealists and monist 
philosophers have always found the distinction between essence and accident 
quite arbitrary, since no objective and sharp criterion of demarcation has been 
offered by anyone (Blanshard [1939] 2002: 452). 
According to Moore, the absolute idealistÐspecifically Bradley, to whom the 
article is mainly directedÐincurs in the error of confusing two senses of the 
expression ÔdifferentÕ used above. MooreÕs attack is based on distinguishing 
qualitative from numerical difference and on showing that the former doesnÕt 
entail the latter (Moore 1919: 48Ð53). His attack rests on a commonsensical 
distinction between essence and accident, and it works like this. There is 
qualitative difference and numerical difference. If a has the property of being 
R-related to b, then the relation R, from which that relational property is 
derived, is said to be internal to a in the following senses: (i) one can say that if 
an object lacks the property of being R-related to b, then that object is 
qualitatively different from a; and (ii) one can also say that a could not lack the 
property of being R-related to b without ceasing to exist or ceasing to be a, i.e. 
 As showed before, it is very plausible to attribute to Russell the view according to which all 29
relationsÐincluding the ÔrelationÕ of inherenceÐare external, at least in his Principles of 
Mathematics ([1903] 2010). MooreÕs proposal is evidently less radical.
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without being numerically different from a. The problem with the dogma, 
according to Moore, is that it understands those claims as if (ii) would follow 
from (i). Internal relatedness, in the sense attacked by Moore, says precisely 
that from qualitative difference follows numerical difference and, therefore, 
that all properties, including all relational properties, are essential to their 
relata. And this is the idea that Moore finds unacceptable on the grounds of 
common sense, because for sure, he thinks, there are at least some relations that 
are purely external, i.e., there are at least some relations that give place to 
relational properties that are accidental to the terms that have them. Thus, for 
sure a might have existed or could have been numerically identical with itself 
without being R-related to b. Therefore, although it might be true that a is 
being R-related to b, it also might be false that if x were to lack the property of 
being R-related to b, then x would not be a. 
These two propositions, the one which I admit to be true (1) that if A has ¿, and x 
has not, it does follow that x is other than A, and the one which I maintain to be 
false (2) that if A has ¿, then from the proposition with regard to any term x that 
it has not got ¿, it follows that x is other than A, are, I think, easily confused with 
one another. And it is in fact the case that if they are not different, or if (2) 
follows from (1), then no relational properties are external. For (1) is certainly 
true, and (2) is certainly equivalent to asserting that none are. It is therefore 
absolutely essential, if we are to maintain external relations, to maintain that (2) 
does not follow from (1). (...) To maintain external relations you have to 
maintain such things as that, though Edward VII was in fact father of George V, 
he might have existed without being father of George V. But to maintain this you 
have to maintain that it is not true that a person who was not father of George 
would necessarily have been other than Edward. (Moore 1919: 52, his emphases) 
If from qualitative difference follows numerical difference, then all relational 
properties, hence all relations from which those are derived, are internal. If, on 
the contrary, from qualitative difference doesnÕt follow numerical difference, 
then at least some relational properties, hence some relations from which those 
are derived, are external. 
What can be said in BradleyÕs favour? First, that MooreÕs objection is grounded 
on a distinction between essence and accident that allows qualitative difference 
without entailing numerical difference, but he offers no reasons for the 
objectivity and reality of such distinction and, more important, no criteria for 
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deciding when does a property counts as essential or as accidental. In fact, for 
him it is just obvious and evident that at least some relational properties are 
accidental. But no argument is provided: 
It seems quite obvious that in the case of many relational properties which things 
have, the fact that they have them is a mere matter of fact: that the things in 
question might have existed without having them. That this, which seems 
obvious, is true, seems to me to be the most important thing that can be meant by 
saying that some relations are purely external. (Moore 1919: 51, his emphases) 
But I have gone further and asserted that some relational properties certainly are 
not internal. And in defence of this proposition I do not know that I have 
anything to say but that it seems to me evident in many cases that a term which 
has a certain relational property might quite well not have had it: that, for 
instance, from the mere proposition that this is this, it by no means follows that 
this has to other things all the relations which it in fact has. (Moore 1919: 60, his 
emphases) 
What it is obvious and evident is that nothing becomes obvious and evident 
only by saying that it is so. One can agree that there are many things that enjoy 
evident status. But if there is anything that is not evident at all is whether there 
is any real distinction between the essential and the accidental, the internal and 
the external; and even if this were the case, it is still less evident where is the 
boundary that separates one realm from the other. 
Secondly, of course Bradley can be seen as the hyper-essentialist that Moore 
had in mind. But this is only true if one oversimplifies BradleyÕs thought. 
Certainly Bradley denied the sharpness and objectivity of the internal/external 
distinction and, consequently, the sharpness and objectivity of the essential/
accidental distinction (Bradley 1930: 23). In claiming that those distinctions 
are in some sense arbitrary and ultimately based on pragmatic reasons, he 
certainly is not alone: a great part of the analytical tradition has been suspicious 
about them. Thus, while an absolute idealist will allow no sharp line to draw 
the difference between the essence and accident of an item (since for him all 
properties/relations are important in some degree), an analytical skeptical will 
allow whatever words are useful to pick out an item (since for him no property/
relation is essential, and the only important task is to find the right predicates 
and conventions to describe an item). According to the analytical skeptical, if a 
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thing looses some properties, then, trivially, some descriptions will not pick it 
out (Rorty 1967: 125Ð26). Reasonably, Bradley insisted in many places that 
those distinctions were perfectly fine for practical purposes and that they could 
give us relative or partial truth; his point is that we shouldnÕt take them as 
giving us ultimate or metaphysical truth. 
Mere internal relations, then, like relations that are merely external, are 
untenable if they make a claim to ultimate and absolute truth. But taken 
otherwise, and viewed as helpful makeshifts and as useful aids in the pursuit of 
knowledge, external and internal relations are both admissible and can be 
relatively real and true. [...] Still in practice, and for a limited purpose, you can 
divide your individual term, and take one part as what you call ÔessentialÕ. And 
so far as this division is made, the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
relations will hold. Wherever that part of your term which you select as its 
essence remains outside of some relation, into which the individual term enters, 
the relation so far is extrinsic. And on the other hand, where the entrance of the 
term includes, and carries into the relation, the essence also as in one with the 
whole, the relation here is intrinsic. But no such distinction, if I may repeat this, 
can have more than relative validity. (Bradley 1935: 645Ð46, my emphases) 
BradleyÕs skepticism against the distinction between external and internal 
relations, and consequently against the distinction between essential and 
accidental properties, is grounded in his fidelity to immediate feeling and 
experience as the departing point of inquiry. To my judgement, he correctly 
thinks that from the fact that we find difference or heterogeneity, we cannot 
legitimately infer intrinsicness, separability, independence, self-sufficiency or 
modal freedom. Bradley in fact can be interpreted as saying: ÔOne is not 
entitled to assume of something which is always experienced in combination 
with something else, that is capable of existing uncombinedÕ (Candlish 2007: 
36, his emphasis; in a similar sense, Sprigge 1983: 268Ð69). The distinction 
between external and internal relations, or between essential and accidental 
properties, makes precisely that assumption. Taking BradleyÕs example 
(Bradley 1930: Appendix B), we can experience a total situation that embraces 
a place with a man and a billiard ball. We may start talking about how the man 
or the billiard ball could be unaffected by a change of place, but BradleyÕs 
point is that while we do so, we start talking not about something that actually 
exists but about an abstraction or, as he puts it, a ÔcharacterÕ. If we, on the 
contrary, accept our immediate experience, then we simply cannot assume the 
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man and the billiard ball as self-sufficient, as independent from, or as 
unaffected by, their place, background or context. When we experience a total 
situation in which a man and a billiard ball are embedded, and we start talking 
about how the man or the billiard ball might have existed in a different place, 
background or context, then we are talking about a very similar man or billiard 
ball, but not of that very same man or that very same billiard ball, which, as 
existents and not as characters, are embedded in an all-embracing totality. 
When we take the billiard ball as a term that is wholly independent or 
externally related to its place and background, 
. . . an important if obvious distinction seems here overlooked. For a thing may 
remain unaltered if you identify it with a certain character while taken otherwise 
the thing is suffering change. If, that is, you take a billiard-ball and a man in 
abstraction from place, they will of courseÐso far as this is maintainedÐbe 
indifferent to changes of place. But on the other hand neither of them, if regarded 
so, is a thing which actually exists; each is a more or less valid abstraction. But 
take them as existing things and take them without mutilation, and you must 
regard them as determined by their places and qualified by the whole material 
system into which they enter. And, if you demur to this, I ask you once more of 
what you are going to predicate the alterations and their results. The billiard-ball, 
to repeat, if taken apart from its place and its position in the whole, is not an 
existence but a character, and that character can remain unchanged, though the 
existing thing is altered with its changed existence. Everything other than this 
identical character may be called relatively external. It may, or it may not, be in 
comparison unimportant, but absolutely external it cannot be. (Bradley 1930: 
517Ð18) 
BradleyÕs rejection of external relations has the obvious consequence that there 
is no trans-world identity or that everything is world-bounded. Better said: we 
have no reasons to think that things might have been otherwise, mainly because 
our very referent of ÔthingÕ or ÔtermÕ is here under suspicion. 
2.3 Vindicating Bradley     
Besides the internal weaknesses that affect MooreÕs and RussellÕs arguments, 
which I already discussed, there are at least three reasons that vindicate 
BradleyÕs position. 
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First, it seems clear that RussellÕs and MooreÕs arguments against the dogma of 
internal relations do not touch BradleyÕs position. In fact, a careful reading of 
the sources shows that Russell and Moore, when directing their attacks against 
Bradley, were discussing with an imaginary enemy. They both wrongly 
attributed to Bradley the view that all relations were internal, but Bradley 
didnÕt defend the dogma of internal relations, neither in the sense attributed by 
Russell nor in the sense attributed by Moore. It is certainly true that for Bradley 
no relation was purely external. But the denial of the reality of external 
relations doesnÕt entail the idea that all relations are internal. As it has been 
convincingly shown, accusing Bradley of supporting the idea that all relations 
are internal is historically wrong (Candlish 1998, 2007: ch. 6, Hylton 1990: ch. 
2). The truth is that Bradley denied the reality of all relations, external and 
internal, and rejected them with similar force (see specially Bradley 1914: 
237Ð40, 1930: Appendix B, 1935: 641Ð46, 665Ð68). According to Bradley, no 
relation, neither internal nor external, is ultimately real, since Ôneither can 
succeed in attaining the non-relational unity which is fundamentalÕ (Hylton 
1990: 55). A relation Ôis always an abstractionÕ and Ôis not the entire fact of the 
relational situation, as actually experienced, but in every case omits and 
ignores more or less of what there is containedÕ (Bradley 1935: 648). In the 
end, all relations and all relational ways of thinking must be transcended in a 
more comprehensive unit that embraces all what we, as finite centres of 
experience, treat as separate terms in relations. It is true that internal relations 
were thought by Bradley to be more true or closer to reality than external 
relations, but both of them were ultimately regarded as appearance. In the end, 
all relations Ôare unmeaning except within and on the basis of a substantial 
wholeÕ (Bradley 1930: 125), all of them Ôare the inadequate expression of an 
underlying unityÕ (Bradley 1930: 522), and ÔÒinternalÓ relations, though truer 
by far than ÒexternalÓ, are . . . not true in the endÕ (Bradley 1914: 312). It is 
also true that Bradley recognised some relative value to the distinction between 
internal and external relations, but that was only for practical purposes 
(Bradley 1935: 645Ð46, Candlish 2007: 43). The fact is that Bradley rejected 
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the very legitimacy of the distinction. As long as it remains useful for ordinary 
purposes, we can defend it; the error lies in attributing to it some ultimate, 
absolute or metaphysical validity. Relational thinking helps us to characterise 
the world under partial and limited consideration, but at the price of distorting 
non-relational reality. And the plurality that is entailed by those relations is also 
another distortion. BradleyÕs point is that neither terms, nor properties, nor 
relations can be understood apart from the total and all-embracing whole  in 30
which they are embedded: 
Plurality and relatedness are but features and aspects of a unity. (Bradley 1930: 
125) 
Nothing in the whole and in the end can be external, and everything less than the 
Universe is an abstraction from the whole, an abstraction more or less empty, and 
the more empty the less self-dependent. Relations and qualities are abstractions, 
and depend for their being always on a whole, a whole which they inadequately 
express, and which remains always less or more in the background. (Bradley 
1930: 521) 
Second, regarding internal relations in particular, these were not part of 
BradleyÕs metaphysics, since for him they were not adequate for achieving a 
self-sufficient, unconditioned or independent unit. In fact, in the context of a 
metaphysical tradition that attempts to make sense of reality in terms of self-
sufficient units of being,  the idea that a plurality of things is internally 31
related, in the sense that all the relations into which one of those things stands 
to the rest of things are part of its very nature, is evidently fragile or unstable 
(Bradley 1914: 239Ð40, 1935: 643Ð45, Candlish 1998: 133Ð34, 2007: 159Ð61, 
Hylton 1990: 54Ð55). Qua relations, they work assuming or affirming the 
existence of a plurality of distinct relata; qua internal, they deny their 
 It would be a serious mistake to take the expression ÔwholeÕ, when used by Bradley and 30
other idealists, as having always the same meaning. The use is often metaphorical and, anyway, 
the expression itself is way too neutral and general to infer any resemblance. Still worst 
mistake would be to think that there is anything in common between BradleyÕs use of ÔwholeÕ 
and the use of contemporary mereology. To understand what someone means by ÔwholeÕ, one 
needs to pay attention to the consequences attributed to the concept, not to the labels. As we 
will see, this applies with special force to SchafferÕs Priority Monism (ch. 5). 
 As it is obvious, this metaphysical tradition is simply the history of standard metaphysics. It 31
includes not only BradleyÕs project, but also the different historical developments around the 
notion of substance (Aristotle, the scholastics, the rationalists), RussellÕs own logical atomism, 
and the building-blocks posited by such different metaphysical projects like those of 
Whitehead, Lewis, Armstrong and van Inwagen, to name a few.
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individuality and self-sufficiency. If a and b are internally related, then being 
so related is part of aÕs and bÕs nature, i.e., neither a nor b could exist or be 
what they are without being so related, because a thing (a), as if by magic, 
seems to be constituted by something else (b) that lies outside it. Self-
sufficiency or independence could only be achieved by a higher non-relational 
unity that transcends, transforms and absorbs both a and b. While external 
relations are the very negation of that higher non-relational unity, internal 
relations recognise it but reveal their own impotence to achieve it. Of course, 
when pushed to choose between internal or external relations, Bradley held that 
internal relations were closer to reality, since at least they recognised the lack 
of self-sufficiency of fragmentary relata and pointed to the existence of an all-
embracing unity. But internal relations attempt to achieve such a self-sufficient 
unity by means that are supposed to be transcended in that very process. 
Ô[Internal relations] point to a higher consummation beyond themselves and 
beyond all relations. But, at least in the end, they cannot . . . be thought 
consistentlyÕ (Bradley 1914: 240). Something that depends on conditions can 
only achieve independence, self-sufficiency or intrinsic character, when is 
taken together, as a unit, with those conditions. So while Russell, in the end, 
achieved independence by getting rid of all the complexity present in ordinary 
objects, reaching absolutely simple logical constituents that took the place of 
traditional substance (Russell 1956c: 201Ð2), Bradley achieved independence 
by unifying all complexity in an all-embracing non-relational substantial 
whole, which is independent because there is nothing else there capable of 
conditioning it. In any case, it must be noticed that neither of these solutionsÐ
RussellÕs or BradleyÕsÐhas common sense on its side: both solutions reject in 
equal terms that ordinary objects are the building blocks of reality, and they 
both need to offer some pragmatic solution for our ordinary ways of speaking 
and thinking. Thus, regarding this inadequacy, they seem to be on a par: pace 
Russell, his atomism is as incredible as the monism of absolute idealism, and 
his ordinary truths and objects seem to be as false and unreal as ordinary truths 
and objects were for absolute idealism (Candlish 2007: 162Ð63). Because there 
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is nothing in common sense that speaks more in favour of an extreme atomism 
than of an extreme monism.  Common sense only helps Moore, at the price of 32
introducing the problem of where to draw the line between essential and 
accidental, between internal and external, without arbitrariness, and, once that 
line is drawn, the problem of how the accidental/external stands, or is related 
to, the essential/internal. 
Third, as I have insisted, underlying this debate on relations was a radically 
different attitude towards the package grammar/ontology. Russell and Moore 
trusted grammar as a guide to ontology. Their categories of term, property and 
relation were grammatically based. Bradley, in contrast, distrusted grammar in 
a radical way as a guide to metaphysical truth.  Bradley arrives to a non-33
relational Absolute by remaining loyal to what he thinks is the first datum of 
experience or feeling. Experience or feeling exhibits a non-relational character 
that remains fatally ineffable, since our ways of thinking and talking do exhibit 
a relational and abstract character which is obviously very ill suited to express 
what has non-relational and concrete character. Immediate experience and 
feeling exhibit unity and variety but no relations, since there are no wholly 
distinct terms there to be related. And so with a term and its qualities. Simple 
constituents are mere abstractions from the complex and unified whole which 
is experienced reality. Think in what is present in your visual field. It is like a 
moving landscape, a unity with internal variation and complexity. Primarily, 
there is not even a distinction between subject and object, scheme and content, 
 Schaffer (2010a: 46Ð50) has even suggested that monism finds more support in common 32
sense than an extreme pluralism (atomism), since common sense approaches the cosmos as an 
integrated whole. I am not sure if Schaffer is right on this, but it seems clear to me that monism 
at least must enjoy the same privileges, since towards some ordinary things we behave as 
monists while towards other ordinary things we behave as pluralists. Compare our approach 
towards a living organism with our approach towards a heap of sand.
 Again, BradleyÕs position reminds us the contrast between Wittgenstein and Russell. While 33
Wittgenstein said: ÔDistrust of grammar is the first requisite for philosophizingÕ (Wittgenstein 
1979: 106), Russell said: ÔThe study of grammar, in my opinion, is capable of throwing far 
more light on philosophical questions than is commonly supposed by philosophersÕ (Russell 
[1903] 2010: ¤46).
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the process of experiencing and the content of experience.  We can abstract 34
the subject from the object, then the sun from its context, or the yellow colour 
from the yellow sun, but they donÕt present themselves as separated elements 
in relations. The tools of our thought (concepts, propositions) and language 
(nouns, adjectives, verbs) are fragmented and relational, and they can only 
work by paying partial attention to some object (we somehow share JonahÕs 
position, who simply cannot fully understand the whale that he inhabits from 
his precarious perspective and position). They are useful for our everyday 
purposes, and they may well be preserved as long as they pay us such service 
and as long as they fit into a maximally coherent and comprehensive system of 
thought. But experience doesnÕt present itself as fragmented, as terms in 
relations, and there is an evident sense in which no relational tools can give us 
a taste of reality better than feeling or experience. In the end, dualisms like 
those of experiencing subject and object of experience, or appearance and 
reality, must be transcended. If experiencing subject and the object of 
experience, or appearance and reality, were separated realms, we would be 
looking for relations between them, and this is something that Bradley would 
not accept as a final solution. Reality, the Absolute, must consist in an all-
embracing, supra-relational, unit. In a sense, this supra-relational unity 
recovers the unity of pre-relational experience, which relational thought breaks 
 Philip Percival (personal communication) points to me that BradleyÕs account of immediate 34
experience (as unstructured and non-conceptual) might be victim of what Davidson (1974) 
identified as the Ôthird dogma of empiricismÕ. I disagree. Those empiricists that were the target 
of Davidson did accept the duality between world and conceptual scheme, the world waiting to 
be organised and the organiser. But Bradley is not a traditional empiricist. He would have also 
rejected the dualism between world and conceptual scheme that underlies DavidsonÕs criticism. 
For Bradley, the very division between subject of experience and object of experience, is 
already an arbitrary division within the non-relational. The real disagreement between someone 
like Davidson and Bradley is about reality in itself, about whether reality is thought-like or 
experience-like, relational or non-relational, plural or singular. Bradley is consistent and 
accepts the consequences of his metaphysics: since reality is one and enjoys experiential 
character it cannot be expressed in relational thoughts. BradleyÕs point is somehow indirectly 
acknowledged by Davidson when he says: ÔWe cannot attach a clear meaning to the notion of 
organizing a single object (the world, nature etc.) unless that object is understood to contain or 
consist in other objects. Someone who sets out to organize a closet arranges the things in it. If 
you are told not to organize the shoes and shirts, but the closet itself, you would be bewildered. 
How would you organize the Pacific Ocean?Õ (Davidson 1974: 192). IndeedÐBradley would 
answerÐa single object resists organisation, and any attempt of organising it cannot have a clear 
meaning; yet you better be bewildered, because reality is just like the Pacific Ocean. 
!79
down into pieces and is incapable, by its very fragmentary nature, to restore or 
express (Bradley 1914: 194, 230Ð31, Hylton 1990: 57, Mander 2009). 
The problem behind the dispute on the dogma of internal relations was not 
much that Bradley rejected the reality of relations, but that for him the category 
of ÔtermÕ or ÔrelatumÕ, at least in its ordinary use, was also under suspicion. But 
both Russell and Moore built their arguments using ways of thinking and 
talking that were the very object of BradleyÕs skeptical challenge; and, on the 
other hand, Bradley couldnÕt formulate his objections without making use of 
the very same ways of thinking and talking that he was challenging (Candlish 
2007: 153Ð54). Because we can start talking about external and internal 
relations only when we think of terms in abstraction from a total situation, 
when we divide a total situation into terms and their background. If we reject, 
with Bradley, that that very process of separation of terms by abstraction can 
ever give us metaphysical truth, then the question of relations doesnÕt take 
place. In contrast, if we accept, with Russell and Moore, that that very process 
of separation of terms by abstraction is a metaphysically reliable tool, then of 
course some relations will appear as totally external to some term; yet Ôas an 
argument for the externality of some relations, this appeal to common sense is 
plainly circularÕ (Candlish 2007: 154). The problem that affects the dispute is 
that there seems to be no vocabulary shared by both parts, because talking 
about ÔmanÕ and Ôbilliard ballÕ is already to involve oneself in vicious 
abstraction. The problem is that BradleyÕs objection is ineffable, it cannot even 
be said, because Ôwe simply have no words for a billiard ball, or a man, taken 
not Ôin abstraction from placeÕ (or some other background)Õ (Candlish 2007: 
153, his italics). 
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2.4 Varieties of internal relatedness     
As a way of concluding this chapter, we can distinguish various senses of 
internal relatedness. First, we have the foundationist sense employed by 
Russell. LetÕs call it internal-Russell: 
Two terms, x and y, are internally-Russell related iff the relation is 
grounded in the intrinsic natures of x and y. 
This sense of internal relatedness affirms that relations are nothing over and 
above the relata. It assumes relata with rich or complex intrinsic natures, 
capable of grounding relational thoughts and discourse. I equate this sense of 
internal relatedness with the one employed by Armstrong and Lewis when they 
say that internal relations are ÔsupervenientÕ on the intrinsic natures of the 
relata, where ÔsupervenientÕ entails no ontologically serious consequences. 
When all relationsÐincluding spatiotemporal ones, and those between 
experiencing subject and object of experienceÐare internal-Russell, the result is 
monadism, like in LeibnizÕs system. However, this sense of internal relatedness 
does not entail monism, unless one assumes from the very start that the plural 
terms that appear as distinct relata stand somehow obliquely for One complex 
and rich term in the relevant sense. But this is problematic. Such a One cannot 
be a mere aggregate or mereological sum of relata with distinct intrinsic 
natures, since this conception of wholeness is precisely the pluralistic 
conception, where self-contained units somehow concur to ÔcomposeÕ a whole, 
a whole which exhibits no substantial oneness, insofar as it is nothing over and 
above an aggregate of plurals. But we should try to make reasonable sense of 
monism before rejecting a trivial version of it. I will try to do so later (chs. 5Ð
6). For the moment, letÕs assume that monism endorses a more organic or 
substantial understanding of wholeness. If so, then monism does seem to entail 
that relations are internal-Russell, but then we are no longer speaking as if we 
were in presence of distinct terms standing in internal relations but, in fact, as 
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if we were in presence of One organic term with a rich and complex intrinsic 
nature. I conclude that internal-Russell relations do not entail monism without 
assuming it from the start. At most, they entail monadism. 
Second, there is MooreÕs sense of internal relatedness. LetÕs call it internal-
Moore: 
Two terms, x and y, are internally-Moore related iff it is essential 
to x and y to be so-related. 
MooreÕs sense, like RussellÕs, also assumes a pluralistic framework of distinct 
relata standing to each other in some way. In fact, when such a pluralistic 
framework is assumed, MooreÕs and RussellÕs interpretation of the dogma 
might well said to be coincident. This is in fact the case when we take MooreÕs 
interpretation as saying that ultimately all relations are nothing over and above 
rich and complex monadic essences, equating MooreÕs expression ÔessenceÕ 
with RussellÕs expression ÔnatureÕ. I think this understanding of MooreÕs claim 
is very plausible; but it is also very uninteresting, insofar as it is a mere 
repetition of RussellÕs understanding.  
There is a second way in which we may understand MooreÕs claim. This is the 
way in whichÐas we saw aboveÐthe mathematical structuralist understands the 
nature of numbers. When the structuralist says that there is nothing to the 
nature of a number except its relations to other numbers, instead of positing 
very rich intrinsic natures, the mathematical structuralist prefers to take the 
path of relational constitution. As we can see, MooreÕs interpretation is 
ambiguous, since it tolerates to be understood as expressing monadic 
foundationism of relations and also as expressing relational constitution of the 
relata. Since foundationism was unequivocally the sense in which Russell 
understood the dogma, in what follows I will use the label Ôinternal-MooreÕ as 
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expressing relational constitution.  This sense commits us to a sort of 35
relational holism, but not to a substantial form of monism, at least not without 
additional premises. As it is obvious, the relational constitution reading and the 
monadic foundationism reading mirror each other: while the first one can be 
understood as treating terms as points of fission, the second one can be 
understood as treating terms as points of fusion. While the first reading exalts 
the constitutive role of relations and excludes the constitutive role of intrinsic 
natures, the second one excludes the constitutive role of relations and exalts the 
constitutive role of intrinsic natures. Yet in both cases every term, somehow, 
mirrors or expresses the whole system in which is embedded. 
Third, and finally, there is what we might call BradleyÕs sense of internal 
relatedness. LetÕs call it internal-Bradley: 
Two terms, x and y, are internally-Bradley related iff the relata 
and the relation are mere abstractions from an all-embracing, non-
relational, substantial unity.  36
BradleyÕs sense is the very denial of relational or non-substantial forms of 
existence. It is the expression of what Russell only could express defectively 
under the head of what he understood by monistic foundationism, since he 
assumed a pluralistic understanding of wholes (i.e., as composites of plural 
terms). BradleyÕs sense does entail monism, but only in an uninteresting or 
trivial sense, since monism is the very point of departure in pre-relational 
experience (we reach it once again, in a higher form, after transcending 
relational thought). Internal-Bradley relatedness can be seen as conservative or 
neutral in modal matters (Sprigge 1979: 166, Sprigge 1983: 268Ð69, Candlish 
 This understanding of internal relatedness seems very close to the one defended  by T. H. 35
Green. See Basile (1999: ch. 1), Dunham, Grant and Watson (2011: ch. 9), and Hylton (1990: 
ch. 1).
 This sense of internal relatedness is close to the one that Sprigge treats under the head of 36
Ôholistic relationsÕ, which are also meant to express a Bradleyan understanding of internal 
relatedness (Sprigge 1979: 164, Sprigge 1983: 187ff). 
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2007: 36, 154). It does not rest on any strong idea of necessary (or other 
modal) connections between distinct existents. Of course, it can also be read as 
endorsing a necessitarian or hyper-essentialist picture of reality, insofar as it 
rejects to take any properties or relations more relevant to the nature of a term 
than others. But this is because what this conception really does is to deny the 
legitimacy of the process in which the very idea of Ôdistinct existentsÕ is based 
upon, the very legitimacy of the distinction between what is external to a ÔtermÕ 
and what is not, the very legitimacy of abstracting a ÔtermÕ away from its 
surroundings and then say that it has such and such intrinsic nature or essence. 
Division by abstraction was rejected by Bradley, and is precisely what Russell 
and Moore accepted and used against the dogma. Talking about a ÔtermÕ as 
distinct from its surroundings, is already to accept Ôvicious abstractionÕ, and 
treat as ÔexistentÕ what is only a ÔcharacterÕ, treat as independent, 
unconditioned or self-sufficient what actually exists and presents itself 
embedded in an all-embracing context. Rejecting division by abstraction might 
be seen as a denial of contingency but it can also be seen as a way of rejecting 
necessity, when necessity is based in a fragmentary understanding of terms 
with clearly distinct essences. It just says that we shouldnÕt assume distinct 
existents and modal freedom if we donÕt experience isolation and self-
containment of the partial aspects of the total and all-embracing situation in 
which they are embedded. For practical purposes, the division is perfectly fine; 
for metaphysical purposes, its legitimacy has not been proved. 
Here is a crucial question: how are we supposed to understand the word 
ÔabstractionÕ in the definition of internal-Bradley relatedness given above? The 
answer is that we should understand it as meaning exactly what Lewis puts 
under the head of ÔThe Way of AbstractionÕ in his (1986a). That is, Ôabstract 
entities are abstractions from concrete entities. They result from somehow 
subtracting specificity, so that an incomplete description of the original 
concrete entity would be a complete description of the abstractionÕ (Lewis 
1986a: 84Ð85). This Bradleyan and traditional sense of ÔabstractionÕ is not the 
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sense in which a universal, a trope, a Fregean thought or a set might be said to 
be abstract. It is the sense in which Ôthe standard EnglishmanÕ, as used in a 
sociological study, might be said to be an abstraction. Thus, Ô[t]he inevitable 
hypothesis is that they [abstractions under ÔThe Way of AbstractionÕ] are verbal 
[or mental] fictionsÕ (Lewis 1986a: 85).  
The Bradleyan understanding of internal relatedness is the one that animates 
my critical approach to recent holistic ontologies. In what follows, I will try to 
show its relative superiority. 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3 Dispositional essentialism: The active and connected      
plurality 
In this chapter I will discuss and criticise our first holistic alternative, namely: 
Dispositional Essentialism (DE). DE is the metaphysics according to which all 
sparse properties are dispositions. Basically, what I will try to show here is that 
the promise of DE, of bringing into the scene a causally active and connected 
plural world, is not fulfilled. Although there are empirical considerations that 
count against DE qua pluralistic ontology (¤1.6, ch. 6), the critique offered here 
is only internal: it pretends nothing but showing that DE fails due to its own 
insufficiency or incoherence. 
In ¤3.1 I present DE, its motivation and its two most salient versions. In ¤3.2 I 
criticise the first version, Ôrelational essentialismÕ, according to which the 
nature of a disposition is determined by its relations to other properties. In ¤3.3 
I do the same with Ômonadic foundationismÕ, according to which a disposition 
is identical with a monadic categorical property. Both versions of DE offer a 
different way of fixing the identity of properties but they both equally fail in 
explaining how dispositions can be the source of causal activity and 
connection. This is so because the reality of causal activity and connection 
cannot be explained by the nature of dispositions. I share with DE the idea that 
causal activity and connection cannot be understood as basically inexistent 
(Lewis)  or as brutal ingredients imposed from the outside (Armstrong) but as 37
something grounded in the nature of things; however, unlike DE, I donÕt think 
that the nature of dispositions is sufficient to do that job. In ¤3.4 I attempt to 
make a sketchÐand nothing but a sketch, since a full development would 
require much more detailÐof a possible solution to the problem of causal 
activity by presenting a different approach to properties. Though this 
improvement may work as a supplementary help for DE, it leaves the problem 
 I say ÔinexistentÕ precisely because this is what in the end is entailed by the deflationary 37
understanding of ÔsupervenienceÕ defended by the Armstrong-Lewis program (¤1.1).
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of connectedness untouched. In ¤3.5 I continue working on my sketch of a 
solution, showing that to solve the problem of connectedness we need to move 
from the level of properties to the level of objects. In ¤3.6 I show that the 
problem of how two distinct active objects can causally connect has no real 
solution under a pluralistic framework, since pluralism, even including causally 
active objects, is the very denial of transeunt causation. This is not surprising: 
as we saw before (¤1.5.2), plurals cannot even touch each other. The main error 
of DE lies in thinking that pluralism can be preserved and the world be 
causally active and connected by providing the plurals with dispositions. What 
I show here is that dispositions cannot bring causal activity to the world, and 
even if they were reformed in order to be so, they couldnÕt connect the world, 
since the source of connectedness is the object itself. Once a pluralistic 
metaphysics is assumed, nothing that we add to it can bring the world together 
again in a non-brutal manner. 
3.1 Dispositional essentialism: Properties as dispositions     
As we saw in ¤1.1, the world as described by the thesis of Humean 
Supervenience has some salient features. It is a radical pluralism of individuals. 
There are no irreducible continuants and no irreducible processes, but only 
point-like, unextended and durationless individuals. These tiny things have 
intrinsic properties and stand to each other in external relations of distance. 
These properties and relations have a purely categorical nature, they are what 
they are in virtue of brutal distinctness, regardless their causal or nomic role, 
i.e. they are quiddities (Black 2000). This worldview is, according to its critics, 
the contemporary heir of the old mechanistic view held by Newton, Descartes 
and others, to whom nature was analysable in terms of primary qualities like 
shape and size, that is, a worldview that sees nature in purely geometrical 
terms, as an odourless, colourless and dead machine, devoid of any intrinsic vis 
viva, causally impotent, whose behaviour is determined by external laws (Ellis 
2001: ¤¤1.9, 3.2Ð3.3). Not surprisingly, within the thesis of Humean 
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Supervenience, causal talk is not ontologically serious or does not refer to 
anything fundamental. Thus, for Lewis, causation is neither an internal (in any 
of the different senses distinguished in ¤2.4) nor an external relation, since we 
need more than a pair of relata in order to get it: we need to make sure that 
there is a regular pattern across the whole spatiotemporal arrangement of 
particular matters of fact. Causation has a totally derivative and non-
fundamental character. To have it, first you need regularity; and to have 
regularity, first you need the mosaic. For Armstrong, a moderate anti-Humean, 
causation is still an instance of a law, but for him a law is a second-order, non-
supervenient, external relation of irreducible nomic character. Something that 
doesnÕt emerge from the first-order pattern but that is meant to govern it from 
above. Still externality. The problem is that these laws have nothing to do with 
the nature of the first-order states of affairs that they are meant to govern. 
Insofar as it comes from the outside of things, such constraint remains 
mysterious and brutal. 
As we also saw, the fragmented world-view, in its different variants, has 
various troubles. These troubles have motivated the development of more 
holistic alternatives, DE being one of these. By DE I understand the 
metaphysics according to which all sparse properties are dispositions. I take 
the expression ÔdispositionÕ as having the same meaning as Ôcausal powerÕ, 
ÔpotencyÕ or ÔcapacityÕ, and I include under the label of DE the accounts of 
properties defended by Bird (2007), Hawthorne (2001), Heil (2003), Mumford 
(2004) and Shoemaker (2003).  I take DE as having two variants, which I put 38
under the labels Ôrelational essentialismÕ and Ômonadic foundationismÕ. 
According to relational essentialism, all properties are dispositions, and the 
identity of a disposition is determined by its relations to other dispositions. 
 There are also metaphysicians who defend the coexistence of both kinds of sparse properties, 38
dispositional and categorical (e.g., Ellis 2001, Molnar 2003). For reasons of space I will not 
treat this mixed view here. I am afraid that this mixed viewÐas many eclecticismsÐis a vicious 
rather than a virtuous synthesis, insofar as it suffers from the problems of both categoricalism 
and dispositionalism. The critical considerations that dispositionalism has against 
categoricalism can be applied to the subset of categorical properties, while my critique to 
dispositionalism can be applied to the other subset.
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According to monadic foundationism, all properties are at the same time 
categorical and dispositional, i.e., every monadic categorical quality is identical 
with a disposition. 
The general aim of DE is to provide an ontology that satisfies what Bird 
declares to be the aim of his book: Ôto account for the cement and motor of the 
universe (potencies and the laws that supervene on them)Õ (Bird 2007: 8, my 
italics). Dispositions are supposed to be the metaphysical ingredient that both 
brings the world back together and provides it with causal impulse, the very 
features that are denied by the fragmented worldview. This different account of 
properties leaves pluralism untouched: the world is still a plurality of 
individuals, but now they are supposed to be causally powerful and bonded in 
virtue of the new account of properties introduced. What DE rejects is the 
causal impotence of categorical properties and the idea that what holds the 
world together is nothing grounded in the nature of things. The external 
arrangements offered by Armstrong and Lewis leave the world loose and 
separate. Something different, something thicker, seems to be needed to do the 
trick. Thus, DE attempts to offer not more externality but an immanent 
solution. This time, allegedly, the cement and motor of the universe is not 
coming from the outside of things, but is written in their nature. So the way 
things stand to each other is neither a metaphysical coincidence nor due to 
external laws, but somehow grounded in their nature. In particular, causation is 
meant to arise from within, or be grounded in, the very nature of properties.  39
LetÕs see whether it works. 
3.2 Relational essentialism: The way of relations     
According to the first variant of DE, all natural properties are dispositions, and 
the identity of a disposition is fixed by the relations into which it stands to 
 Of course, this is not a new adventure. With relevant differences, a central claim of some late 39
idealists was the rational ideal that the world was causally connected in a way that effects were 
entailed by their causes in virtue of their very nature, i.e., that causal necessity was just like 
logical necessity. See Blanshard ([1939] 2002: ch. 32), Ewing (1934: ch. 4) and Rorty (1967).
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other dispositions. In BirdÕs words, Ôall there is to (the identity of) any property 
is a matter of second-order relations to other propertiesÕ (Bird 2007: 43). Each 
property is a concrete potency with a relational essence. Typically, these 
second-order relations have the general relational pattern of Disposition-
Stimulus-Manifestation (D-S-M). Take, for instance, the property of fragility 
(for the sake of the argument, assume that it is sparse). According to the 
relational essentialist, the essence of fragility (D) is given by the second-order 
relations into which this property stands to other properties, e.g., the properties 
if it were hit (S) and it would break (M). That is, when fragility is actually 
instantiated by a vase, its essence involves other non-instantiated properties, a 
non-actual hit and a non-actual breaking (Bird 2007: 6). Of course, the role that 
a property plays is relative to its position in the second-order pattern: towards 
some other properties, fragility stands in the M role, and to still other 
properties, in the S role. The idea is that properties conform a vast Ôpower-netÕ, 
and only once you have fixed the second-order power-net you can fix the 
identity of a monadic disposition. In a way, each disposition that belongs to the 
power-net exhibits a Leibnizian feature: it mirrors the whole power-net from its 
own perspective. I take Bird (2007), Mumford (2004) and Shoemaker (2003) to 
be the most salient contemporary representatives of this variant of DE. 
Although the essence of a disposition is fixed or determined by its second-
order relations to other properties, a disposition is still a monadic property, and 
Ôits existence has no ontological dependence on those propertiesÕ (Mumford 
2004: 171). This is crucial for understanding the content of relational 
essentialism. One of the main points stressed by relational essentialism is that 
dispositions can be instantiated even if their manifestations and triggers are 
never instantiated. Thus, a disposition can be instantiated and have being or 
reality (i.e., be a concrete potency), without those other properties that 
contribute to fix its identity ever being instantiated, just like a grain of salt 
instantiates the property of solubility even if it never gets placed in warm water 
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and even if it never gets dissolved, or just like a vase instantiates fragility even 
if the properties of being hit or being shattered are never instantiated. 
Critics of DE have objected that: 
(i) If all properties are dispositions, then Ôno property can get its identity 
fixed, because each property owes its identity to another, which in turn 
owes its identity to yet anotherÐand so on and on, in a way that, very 
plausibly, generates either a vicious infinite regress or a vicious 
circleÕ (Lowe 2006: 138, his italics). 
(ii) What properties do when manifested is not clear, since in a world of pure 
powers the bearers seem Ôto be always re-packing their bags as they 
change their properties, yet never taking a journey from potency to act. 
For ÔactÕ, on this view, is no more than a different potencyÕ (Armstrong 
1997: 80). 
(iii) In a world of pure powers, what these do when not manifested is also 
unclear, since it seems that they are doing nothing but ÔpointingÕ to its 
manifestation (Psillos 2006b). 
I donÕt see any of these objections as compelling. Objection (i) confuses the 
first-order of dispositions with the second-order of relations between 
dispositions. Once these two orders are distinguished, the threat of a regress 
disappears, as Bird has argued (Bird 2007: ch. 6.3). First-order monadic 
properties can get their identity fixed by second-order relations just like the 
nodes of a graph can get their position fixed by the graph itself.  A quite 40
different thing is what that second-order relational structure is and if it is 
consistent to say that something can be relationally constituted without 
collapsing into the second-order structure itself (more on this soon). Objections 
(ii) and (iii) confuse instantiation with manifestation, as Barker (2013: ¤3.1) 
has shown. The idea that the instantiation of potencies does not require any 
 The graph itself needs to satisfy certain conditions of asymmetry, but this is not important 40
here. How relations themselves can provide identity conditions has also been shown by Dipert 
(1997) and Holton (1999).
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manifestation is coherent. This might sound mysterious for those who think 
that all that is real is actual, but there is no contradiction in positing the real 
existence of potencies: the being of a potency consists simply in its 
instantiation, and its instantiation only brings to the world the potency for other 
potencies being instantiated. LetÕs not dismiss the idea just for being 
mysterious; before that, letÕs see how much it delivers. 
The fact that all properties are dispositional and not categorical is what, 
according to DE, makes the world causally active and connected. Allegedly, 
these features arise from the very nature of properties. This passage is 
representative of the spirit that animates DE: 
The essentialistÕs world is therefore not one in which all events are loose and 
separate. On the contrary, it is a world dominated by causal powers in which 
events activating these powers necessitate other events that are their 
displays . . . . The essentialistÕs world is therefore a bound and connected world. 
(Ellis 2001: 287, my italics; similarly, Mumford 2004: 168, 182Ð3)  
But here is the crucial question: how is it that dispositions can connect the 
world and make it causally active? How is it that these features arise from the 
very nature of dispositions? 
As we saw, the essence of a disposition is determined by second-order 
relations. Yet what is the nature of the second-order relational structure, the 
power-net, that fixes the identity of dispositions? First, it is clearly not a 
disposition. If it were, then its identity would be determined by third-order 
relations, and the identity of these by fourth-order relations, and so on, in a way 
that the regress-objection presented in (ii) above would in fact undermine DE. 
Second, it is not causation. The essence of a disposition is relational, insofar as 
it is determined by its relations to other properties. But these other properties 
need not be instantiated: when fragility is instantiated it stands in a second-
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order relation to non-actual properties (i.e., if hit by a stone, it would shatter).  41
When a disposition is instantiated, it mirrors the whole power-net from its own 
perspective; but the other nodes of this higher-order structure need not be 
instantiated: they are ontologically independent, the instantiation of one of the 
nodes neither is nor contains nor necessitates the instantiation of the others. Yet 
causation, if it is real at all, surely takes place when something actually occurs. 
In order to be, all of it must somehow take place in the flux of this concrete 
world. Third, it is not an external relation, a non-supervenient addition of 
being that has nothing to do with the nature of the relata, like LewisÕ relations 
of distance or ArmstrongÕs nomic relations. Without the relational structure, 
dispositions wouldnÕt be what they are. Fourth, it is not an internal-Russell 
relation, since it is not grounded in the intrinsic nature of the non-relational 
relata. In fact, the relata of this particular case (i.e., the first-order dispositions) 
are of relational nature (i.e., they are relationally constituted), and it seems that 
if anything has ontological priority here is the second-order relation itself: the 
identity of a first-order property depends on the existence and identity of the 
second-order relation. Only once you have the power-net, you can have its 
nodes. Fifth, it is not an internal-Bradley relation, since there is a plurality of 
relata-in-relation, and not an all-embracing substantial unity from where both 
relata and relations can be said to be mere abstractions. In sum, the important 
bit is that a property is what it is in virtue of standing in a certain relation to 
other properties. In other words, in a world where properties conform a vast 
power-net, this power-net is an internal-Moore relation: it is of the very 
essence of the terms related (the first-order properties) to stand to each other in 
the way they stand; they wouldnÕt be what they are if they were not so-related. 
The label applies with an important qualification: while DE is talking about the 
essence of properties, the relata that Moore had in mind were concrete 
 Thus, the most consistent path for the dispositionalist is to defend the existence of ante rem 41
universals; otherwise, the idea that a disposition can be instantiated and not manifested, or the 
idea that a disposition can be instantiated and its identity fixed by how it is related to non-
instantiated properties, cannot be sustained with internal coherence. Bird (2007: ¤3.2.2) 
defends the Platonic path explicitly.
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individuals.  And if the second-order relational structure is an internal-Moore 42
relation, i.e., an essential or constitutive relation, then the essence of a 
disposition is just being what it is. As Barker claims, the second-order 
relational structure can only be a quiddity (Barker 2009: 248). Thus, in a world 
where every property is a disposition, at least one non-dispositional property 
needs to be recognised. 
Having in mind that dispositions are relationally constituted, how is it that from 
this relational essence something like causal activity and connectedness can 
arise? Well, it cannot. Or better: it could, but in a way that would remain as 
mysterious and brute as in ArmstrongÕs case. Because nothing like causal 
activity or connectedness follows from such second-order relational essence. 
The second-order relation does not need any occurrent casual activity or 
connection in order to be what it is. Here is important to keep in mind 
MumfordÕs claim: that despite having a relational essence, the actual existence 
of a disposition is ontologically independent from the actual existence of other 
dispositions. This is so because, though the essence of solubility is relational, 
solubility can be instantiated by a grain of salt even if this grain of salt is never 
dissolved or never placed in warm water. That is, any disposition can be 
instantiated without any kind of actual and concrete causal activity or 
connection taking place. 
Dispositions are not sufficient to bring any concrete causal activity or 
connection. First, as it will be admitted by any dispositionalist, it is clear that a 
single disposition cannot bring causal activity and actual causal connections to 
 In fact, Bird explicitly follows the ontic structuralist strategy that Dipert developed with the 42
help of graph theory (Bird 2007: ch. 6.3, Dipert 1997), but applies it to a different target. What 
the ontic structuralist says about the identity of objects is just what Bird says about the identity 
of properties, namely that they are relationally constituted, that their identity is determined by 
their position in a relational structure. It is also the way in which the mathematical structuralist 
accounts for the nature of numbers (cf. Shapiro 2000: 258, quoted in ¤2.1.1 above). Yet it is 
difficult to see how structuralism about properties doesnÕt collapse into structuralism about 
concrete objects. Unless concrete objects have a transcendental principle of individuation, they 
are what they are in virtue of their properties, and if these properties are what they are in virtue 
of their relations to other properties, then it seems that the internal-Moore structure somehow 
swallows or dissolves all individuality into the structure itself. This is, in fact, the picture 
embraced by ontic structural realism. More about this in ch. 4.
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the world. After all, doing X is a reality that goes beyond the (relational) 
essence of being disposed to do X, because the essence of being disposed to do 
X can be instantiated without doing X being instantiated. Being ontologically 
independent from other properties, the instantiation of a disposition can take 
place with independence from the instantiation of other dispositions. Thus, 
neither causal activity nor instantiations of other properties nor actual causal 
connections can arise from the very nature of a disposition, because no further 
instantiation of anything else arises from, or is necessitated by, the instantiation 
of a disposition. In fact, an instantiated disposition cannot even manifest by 
itself; this already goes beyond its essence; to be triggered, it requires 
something else to be instantiated, something external to it. And we cannot 
bring into the scene a self-manifested disposition or a continuously-exercised 
disposition: if the former, then an infinite chain of dispositions capable of self-
manifestation is needed to make sense of the idea, central to DE in all its 
versions, that it is essential to a disposition the possibility of being instantiated 
without manifesting; if the latter, then we are in front of something which is 
not a dispositionÐsince, again, a disposition by its very essence can remain 
unmanifested (Psillos 2006b: 139Ð41). 
But the previous objection is something that generally doesnÕt worry the 
dispositionalist. In fact, as I said before, the dispositionalist would be happy to 
admit it, since he believes that properties do not work alone but as a team. So 
letÕs grant the dispositionalist the initial conditions that he needs. LetÕs take a 
pan with boiling water and throw a pinch of salt into it. If we wait a little bit, 
we will have salted water. The salt has the disposition to get dissolved in 
boiling water and boiling water has the disposition to dissolve salt. Allegedly, 
these Ôreciprocal partnersÕ dispositions are stimulated by putting the salt into 
the boiling water, and together they manifest as salted water. Once the salt is 
placed in the boiling water, all that the dispositionalist needs for the 
manifestation is in place. But this is clearly not enough. The problem is that all 
the process of dissolving, all the causal activity itself, is right in the middle: it 
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takes place after the triggering and before the manifestation. All the causal 
activity and connectedness is in the process itself of salt and water becoming 
salted water. Yet this process is not captured by the relational pattern of 
dispositions (D-S-M), nor by any relational pattern that assumes the actual 
existence of relata standing in some causal or spatiotemporal relation, because 
in the becoming bit there are no distinct relata to relate. Only after the salt is in 
contact with the water, and only before we have salted water, we have salt and 
water on the way of being salted water. Salted water does not exist yet. The 
truth is that neither having the disposition D to M if triggered by S, nor being 
manifested as M after triggered by S, are the same as becoming M. Neither the 
pattern of wholly distinct events standing in cross-temporal or causal relations 
nor the relational pattern of dispositions can capture the actual going on, the 
actual process that is involved in causal activity. Thus, causal activity and 
connectedness is not explained by dispositions. If anything, it seems to be the 
other way around: from the existence of causal activity and connectedness we 
derive the relational ideas of dispositions, counterfactuals, and the like. 
Since actual causal activity and connectedness are not captured by the 
relational pattern of dispositions, in a way we face have the same mystery that 
we have in ArmstrongÕs case. In ArmstrongÕs case, it is a mystery how his 
higher-order external relations of nomic character communicate causal activity 
or connectedness to lower-order states of affairs whose nature is ontologically 
independent from those laws. Now, in the case of relational essentialism, we 
get closer but not close enough: how is it that the instantiation of dispositions 
with relational essence can bring about causal activity and connectedness? 
Only by introducing a distinct brute fact! But the brutal route is open to 
anyone; it is not a better ontological explanation than the one offered by any 
fragmented worldview. All necessity that does not arise from essence is, after 
all, brute addition of being. 
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3.3 Monadic foundationism: The way of identity     
One might try a different route. One might claim that dispositions are simply 
identical with categorical properties. This is the position defended by Heil 
(2003), who rests on ideas that have been defended by Martin (1994, 1997) and 
on a particular interpretation of LockeÕs stance on how primary and secondary 
qualities are supposed to stand to each other.  Under this view, the Lockean 43
labels of primary qualities (categorical properties like the microstructure of a 
red rose) and secondary qualities (dispositional properties like the power of 
that microstructure to produce the visual experience of seeing red) are 
understood as two different modes of presentation of the very same property. 
If P is an intrinsic property of a concrete object, P is simultaneously 
dispositional and qualitative; PÕs dispositionality and qualitativity are not aspects 
or properties of P; PÕs dispositionality, Pd, is PÕs qualitativity, Pq, and each of 
these is P: Pd = Pq = P. (Heil 2003: 111, his italics) 
In an obvious sense, Heil, like relational essentialists, holds that all properties 
are dispositions. We just need to add the important qualification that all 
properties are, as well, categorical or, in HeilÕs terms, qualities. The sphericity 
of a ball is both a categorical property of the ball, i.e., its shape, and a 
disposition of the ball, i.e., its disposition to roll. 
In principle, it seems that HeilÕs theory does not face the common criticisms to 
relational essentialism presented above. The identity regress is blocked from 
the very start. Since all dispositions are also qualities, there is no need for a 
second-order relational structure to fix their identity. Second, the doubts about 
what are dispositions when manifested or when not manifested donÕt arise. 
Though, as I said, these objections confuse instantiation with manifestation, 
now, in HeilÕs theory, it is clear that instantiated properties, either manifested or 
not manifested, qua qualities, they simply are what they are. But these three 
 It is also the position defended now by Tugby (2012), as a response to the challenge raised 43
by Barker and Smart (2012) against pandispositionalism. Mumford also proposed an identity 
theory in his (1998), before embracing the relational essentialism deployed in his (2004).
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difficulties, as we saw, are only superficial. With its own resources, the 
relational essentialist can also give proper answers to them. 
Heil claims that the temptation of thinking of dispositions as relationally 
constituted comes from the fact that for characterising them we might well 
appeal to conditionals that refer to their manifestations and stimulus conditions 
(Heil 2003: 81Ð82). But a way of characterisation is not necessarily a way of 
constitution. There is more to the nature of properties than relations, and 
objects might be seen as enjoying some real intrinsic nature by being the nature 
of their properties also intrinsic. Those who support the way of identity like to 
think that they have introduced powerful objects in their own right. Naturally, 
they are also tempted to take their view as providing monadic foundations for 
causal relations. Immanent causation would be a matter of the same object 
instantiating one monadic quality-disposition after another monadic quality-
disposition. Transeunt causation would be a matter of this object instantiating 
one monadic quality-disposition and that object instantiating another monadic 
quality-disposition. That is, in general terms, causation would be a matter of a 
dispositional property reacting to its Ôreciprocal disposition partnerÕ (Heil 
2003: 83). It is the solubility of salt with the dissolving capacity of warm water 
that produces salted water. This seems to suggest that causation could be 
considered as an internal-Russell relation: if you have objects with this type of 
nature, then causal relations could be said to be grounded in the monadic 
natures of the terms (in fact, Campbell 1990: ch. 5 and Heil 2009 both suggest 
something along these lines). And if relations of distance are the product of the 
causal order, then the prospects for a general monadic foundationism seem 
promising.  
Unfortunately, the identity theory lacks sufficient resources for all this. And 
this is so because the mysteries of causal activity and connectedness still 
remain untouched. These are not less obscure if someone says that one 
property-instantiation is followed by another property-instantiation because 
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they are Ôreciprocal disposition partnersÕ, like the power of solubility and the 
power to dissolve. Before having salted water, salt must be dissolving. Just 
saying that this property has the disposition to dissolve, while that property has 
the disposition to be dissolved, and after (somehow!) getting together, they 
manifest as salted water, doesnÕt give us much more light than the explanation 
offered by the Humean: one instantiation is followed by another instantiation. 
Now how can qualitative-dispositional properties as those proposed by Heil 
can bring causal activity to the world? How can these properties provide a 
cement for the universe? Again, we have a similar problem that the one 
exhibited by relational essentialism: how is it that causal activity and 
connection can arise from properties whose essence is fixed or determined with 
independence of those activities or connections taking place, i.e., when these 
features are far more addition of being than the one present in a pair of 
qualitative-dispositional properties? 
Take causal activity. An example might be helpful. Think of yourself as a God 
that happens to endorse HeilÕs theory of properties. Create a plurality of things 
and bestow them with this kind of qualitative-dispositional properties. For the 
sake of example, bring into existence a couple of things in your world, a stone 
and a vase. The stone has mass and solidity, which are, allegedly, identical with 
the disposition to break fragile things; and the vase has certain microstructure, 
which is, allegedly, identical with the disposition of fragility. You have your 
Ôreciprocal dispositional partnersÕ there. There is fragility and there is the 
disposition to break things, both instantiated by distinct objects. Grant the 
identity-theorist the necessary initial conditions (huge concession!) and 
actually throw the stone to the vase. Luckily, the stone hits the vase and then 
the fragile vase breaks. We have the manifestation: a broken vase. But as I said 
before against the relational essentialist, all the real action is not captured by 
these Ôreciprocal disposition partnersÕ nor by the stimulus nor by the 
manifestation. All the causal activity, all the real process of breaking takes 
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place after the stone hits the vase yet before the vase is broken. What happened 
there, right in the middle? No answer.  
Something similar happens with the problem of connectedness. Under HeilÕs 
conception, dispositions are identical with first-order monadic intrinsic 
qualities. Of course it is tempting to think that one has found monadic 
foundations for causal relations, in a way that these would be internal-Russell 
relations. But if properties still enjoy ontological independence, i.e. if they can 
exist and be instantiated without causal connections actually obtaining, what, 
then, apart from a brute nomic fact, can really connect one instantiation with 
another one? We are again in the dark. And looking to the monadic 
foundationist picture closer, it seems that even if qualitative-dispositional 
properties were really capable of providing complete foundations for causation, 
you still cannot have both monadic foundations and a bonded or connected 
world. This is, in fact, a dilemma for any pluralist that looks for monadic 
foundations for causal relations: if transeunt causation has monadic 
foundations, then it seems that the connection is merely apparent, like a 
choreography of individuals, since how can two monadic properties inhering in 
distinct individuals connect? How can two distinct individuals even touch each 
other without ceasing to be wholly distinct (¤1.5.2)? Leibniz was at least 
consistent: his monads were active objects; but, as he well realised, if the 
plurality of monads gives foundations for relations, then they, in fact, do not 
influence each other, they do not connect in any relevant way: they, at most, 
can be coordinated.  44
The identity theorist faces the same dilemma that the relational essentialist: 
how is it that dispositional-qualitative properties bring causal activity and 
connectedness if their essence does not contain enough to explain these? In 
short, what the monadic foundationist offers is only a different way of fixing 
 Lotze, like Leibniz, was also consistent. Founding unbearable the causal isolation of 44
monads, he ended up embracing monism by merging all his monads into his ÔMÕ. Cf. Russell 
(1937: ¤78).
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the identity of properties. But the problems of causal activity and 
connectedness still remain in the dark. We need to look elsewhere. 
3.4 Filling in the gaps (I): From disposition to activity     
As far as I can see, causal activity cannot occur unless it is accepted as 
something independent from, or at least more basic than, dispositions. In the 
following sections I will offer the sketch of what I think is a more promising 
approach to causal activity and connectedness. And if it is not promising, at 
least it has the virtue of highlighting the points where DE fails. 
The problem up to now is that most of the contemporary debate on properties, 
causation and law, assumes that the dichotomy categorical/dispositional is 
exhaustive. So, on one hand, the categoricalist commits the mistake of 
reducing the realm of occurrent properties to causally inert quiddities, having 
in his mind, as paradigmatic examples, geometrical properties such as size and 
shape, and taking their essence to be totally divorced from any causal activity. 
On the other hand, the dispositionalist commits the mistake of trying to ground 
the realm of actual causal activity in the inactive realm of dispositions, making 
the rise of occurrent causal activity a total mystery. Both miss the mark. The 
distinction categorical/dispositional is simply not a dichotomy because it is not 
exhaustive. Following a tradition that traces back to Aristotle and Leibniz, we 
can introduce occurrent properties of causal nature. These properties are 
usually called activities. I take activities to be the properties of essentially 
active objects, in the sense defended by Adams (2007) and Dumsday (2012), 
and in very close agreement to the understanding of Hornsby (2013). As 
Adams puts it, 
An activity is an action whose present reality does not consist merely in 
producing, or tending to produce, effects distinct from the action itself. The 
content of an activity, accordingly, should not need to be completed by the 
content of an effect distinct from it. (Adams 2007: 45) 
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An activity is neither an event nor a causal relation, nor, by its essence, a 
relatum of any other sort of relation. It is a process, and as such, it does not 
need to achieve any result distinct from itself to be what it is. When an object 
engages in an activity there is a concrete ongoing process. The standard, 
atomistic, conception of processes takes them to be somehow the result of 
particular events standing in causal or cross-temporal relations. When this is 
done, all the apparently dynamic character of a process is lost. On the contrary, 
when one starts with process as basic, one reaches the idea of events-in-
relations after abstractions are made from process. An event is a dated, well-
bounded, completed and unrepeatable particular, which finds its natural place 
in a tenseless or eternal view of reality. Events are reported in sentences like 
Ôthe vase broke after the stone hit itÕ, Ôthe Titanic sunkÕ, ÔPeter cooked a stew 
yesterdayÕ. There is nothing properly dynamic about these events, just like 
there is nothing dynamic in a sequence of still photographs that tries to capture 
a horse race. Events, like still photographs, are simply countable happenings 
indexed to times. In contrast, a process is essentially tensed and cross-temporal 
relations are the very denial of that tensed character (Sellars 1981). The 
sentence ÔPeter cooked a stew yesterdayÕ cannot report it, while the sentence 
ÔPeter was cooking a stew yesterdayÕ does. When Peter is cooking a stew 
something is going on, and it goes on as long as it goes on. The activity of 
cooking a stew is something in which Peter is engaged in at any time when he 
is cooking a stew. Since an ongoing activity or process doesnÕt need a result 
distinct from itself, Peter can be cooking a stew for ages without ever finishing 
to cook it (he might take life easy or he might find cooking very relaxing), or 
he might decide to quit or suspend the process right after finishing chopping 
the onions (he realised that it was time for his favourite TV show), yet it is still 
true that Peter is not merely disposed to cook a stew, nor having cooked a stew, 
but that he is actually cooking a stew. As Hornsby (2013: 4Ð5) rightly argues, it 
is meaningful to ask how many events of a certain type (e.g., world wars) there 
were, but it is meaningless to ask how many of ongoing activity there is (was). 
One cannot ask meaningfully how many PeterÕs cooking a stew there is (was). 
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Since ongoing activity is not a countable particular, the proper question would 
be for how long has been (was) Peter cooking a stew. For a day? Until he 
finished it? Until he got bored?  
Activities are neither categorical nor dispositional nor an identity of both. On 
one hand, activities cannot be instantiated and remain unmanifested: it is of 
their very essence to be occurrent. Peter cannot be cooking a stew without 
being cooking a stew. On the other hand, the nature of activities is not impotent 
or inert, as categorical properties such as ÔshapeÕ might suggest. An activity is a 
doing: cooking a stew. Accepting the existence of activities involves resisting 
two temptations. We have to resist the categoricalist temptation of shrinking 
every activity into dead mechanism, into something that can only be 
instantiated within the inert, breathless and unextended dimension of a 
geometrical point; and we also have to resist the dispositionalist temptation of 
reducing occurrent activity into the relational, potential and static realm of 
dispositions. 
It is not surprising that Leibniz, who strongly believed that activity was the 
mark of being, carefully distinguished between occurrent exercise of force and 
a pure disposition, potency or capacity. According to him, it was quite clear 
that only occurrent and actual force could bring real activity to the world, and 
pure powers were just abstractions from actual and occurrent forces. Causal 
powers are not dynamic nor they can bring activity to the world. They are 
ÔdeadÕ: 
By force or power (puissance), I do not mean the capacity (puovoir) or mere 
faculty, which is nothing but a near possibility of acting, and which, being as it 
were dead, never produces an action without being stimulated from without, but 
I mean something which includes an effort, an act, an entelechy, for force passes 
of itself into action, in so far as nothing hinders it. Wherefore I regard force as 
constitutive of substance, since it is the principle of action, which is the 
characteristic of substance. (Leibniz in Russell 1937: ¤18; cf. Leibniz 1989: 433) 
Spinoza held a similar view to that of Leibniz, though, of course, in a monistic 
variant: by power of an object he understood its actual striving; moreover, the 
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very essence of an object was given precisely by its striving or conatus, i.e., its 
actual persevering in being (Spinoza 1994: IIIP6ÐP8). So an activity is not a 
potency, nor a frozen categorical state, nor a relation, nor a free-floating chain 
of loose and separate events, but the ongoing process in which an object is 
engaged in. We can also understand activity, striving or conatus as actual 
effort.  While categoricalism chops down the instantiation of properties into 45
impotent, breathless and unextended instants, and DE takes activity to 
mysteriously arise from properties that in themselves are frozen structures, 
activity or striving involves an occurrent exercise of force with indeterminate 
duration: as long as the active (striving) individual object exists (Spinoza 1994: 
IIIP8). No wonder that when one reads Leibniz and Spinoza it is hard to 
distinguish between the individual object and the process, because the essence 
of an individual object is its striving, to be is to strive (Rescher 1996: ch. 1, 
2000: ch. 8, Basile 2012). Thus, ÔSocratesÕ and ÔSocratesÕ strivingÕ are like two 
names for the same thing: while one puts the emphasis on the persister, the 
 Steve Barker (personal communication) has suspicions against expressions like ÔactivityÕ or 45
ÔstrivingÕ. He claims that they are too closely associated with agency and panpsychism. Thus, 
he suggests the use of a word like ÔpropensityÕ. I think he is right in claiming that expressions 
like ÔstrivingÕ are associated to agency and often linked to forms of panpsychism. But I see the 
connection with agency and panpsychism as a source of clarity and virtue, not as a source of 
obscurity and failure. First, because I donÕt see how the word ÔpropensityÕÐwhich is used by 
philosophers like PopperÐis any more clear than my preferred expressions, which have the 
advantage of being more rooted in the philosophical traditionÐancient, medieval and modern. 
On one hand, ÔpropensityÕ is often misinterpreted as suggesting causal power, so this means no 
progress; on the other hand, when we try to differentiate a propensity from a causal power, it is 
not clear that we can avoid my preferred expressions. Admittedly, we are sailing in obscure 
waters, but I donÕt see how causal concepts that are distant from agency can be any more clear 
than those that are closer to agency. It is like pretending that the existence of colourless 
particles is more evident, serious and ontologically respectable than the existence of the 
colourful landscape offered by immediate experience simply because those particles are more 
detached from the perceiving subject (when it is precisely this very detachment what makes 
them more distant and obscure). Second, I am happy to be considered a panpsychist. Later on it 
will become more clear why panpsychism is an option to be considered seriously. Here is a 
hint: I take the existence of agency as more or less evident: it is hard to see how could there be 
any causal activity without agents; in other words, surely there is at least one object that acts 
without being caused to act by something else. So the question is not whether there is any 
agency, but up to what extent agency is present in nature. Now, if nature is seriously undivided, 
if it is seriously one, then it is quite arbitrary to restrict agency to some well-bounded proper 
part of it, because there is nothing like a well-bounded proper part of it. Anyhow, if you think 
that ÔpropensityÕ produces in your head more clear ideas than the words ÔstrivingÕ, ÔconatusÕ, or 
ÔeffortÕ, then feel free to read ÔpropensityÕ where I write ÔstrivingÕ, ÔconatusÕ, or ÔeffortÕ. 
Perhaps the word ÔforceÕ can be accepted as a way of compromise. But again, if you ask what 
does ÔforceÕ mean, it is doubtful that we can avoid in our explanation the temptation of falling 
back into dead causal powers or of introducing something that acts without being caused to act, 
i.e., an agent. When we get to these expressions it is quite obvious that we have reached rock 
bottom.
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other puts the emphasis on its ongoing activity. But there is nothing really 
ÔparticularÕ in Socrates qua persister; he is more like a ÔuniversalÕ, because 
what persists through a process is a certain substantial form. Call it 
Socrateshood, if you want. In fact, as a British idealist would say, the concrete 
individual is more like a Ôconcrete universalÕ, a concrete single form that 
persists through the many properties and stages that can be obtained through 
abstraction from its continuous unfolding.  The word ÔSocratesÕ works just 46
like the word ÔriverÕ, which designates a single dynamic form undergoing 
change. (By the way, it is not correct to say that one can never step twice into 
the same river. The correct way to put the idea is the following: one can step 
many times in the same river, as long as the river-form exists; but never, not 
even once, in the same waters.) 
The introduction of activities might help us to have an active world. But what 
connects one activity to another activity? Apparently, nothing. After all, the 
essence of an activity does not necessitate other activities. And if the essence of 
an activity does not necessitate any other activities beyond itself, then an 
activity by itself cannot determine the occurrence of other activities, so it will 
be very difficult to see how could two different activities be connected in a 
non-brutal way. If all what there is out there is activity after activity, then we 
might well be Humeans that accept a sparkling world, i.e. an active but loose 
and separate world, where all activities hang together due to pure metaphysical 
coincidence. This is not surprising. When looking for immanent (as opposed to 
external) connections, DE, by putting the attention in the nature of properties, 
is looking in the wrong place. To find immanent connections we need to look 
elsewhere: in the object itself. 
 Thus, I am with those who think that the particular/universal distinction is somehow 46
arbitrary and certainly not always enlightening because it is not an exclusive and exhaustive 
dichotomy into which objects can be classified (MacBride 2005, 2009, Ramsey 1925). In this 
case, as in so many others, grammar bewitches us. For an account of the origins and different 
uses of the Hegelian term Ôconcrete universalÕ, adopted in an idiosyncratic way by British 
idealism, see Stern (2007). 
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3.5 Filling in the gaps (II): From activity to active object     
The key point is that activities do not float around freely, because Ô[a]n activity 
is something an object doesÕ (Dumsday 2012: 55). An activity, unlike a mere 
happening, is something that someone does. Moreover, activities cannot be 
done by any kind of object, but only by an active object. A mere activity does 
not act and a non-active object does not act; an active object acts. Of course, 
prima facie, being x and y distinct active objects, xÕs activity does not 
necessitate yÕs activity, but xÕs activity clearly is necessitated by x if x is an 
essentially active object. What provides connection to a series of activities, 
then, can only be the object itself: only an essentially active object can 
necessitate a certain succession of activities. As Leibniz used to argue, 
activities can only arise from the objectÕs own depths or nature.  
As for me, as far as I believe myself to have grasped the notion of action, I hold 
that most received philosophical dogma, that actions belongs to subjects (esse 
suppositorum), follows from it, and is proved by it; and I think that this principle 
is so true that it is also reciprocal, so that not only whatever acts is a single 
substance, but also that every single substance acts without intermission. 
(Leibniz in Russell 1937: ¤21; cf. Leibniz 1989: 360, 457) 
Actual numerical distinctness of activities (e.g., PeterÕs cooking, PeterÕs 
running) can only be obtained through abstraction from the active object itself, 
from its continuous striving, conatus or effort. They are obtained through 
arbitrary cuts within the continuous unfolding of an essentially restless object; 
they are not distinct stages or discrete parcels somehow in need for 
metaphysical glue.  
The idea of a body exerting actual force gets close to what an essentially active 
object is (in this sense, Dumsday 2012: 46, 47, 51, with references). Think in 
the gravitational field of a massive body. It cannot but be in constant exercise 
as long as the massive body exists. It does not need any external triggers, nor 
any effects beyond it. It does not and cannot exist unmanifested, so it does not 
even make sense to distinguish between it and its exercise. Its being is its 
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exercise; it ceases to be only after the massive body is annihilated. This 
occurrent force escapes from the usual suspicions of Humeans: they are not 
hidden to our senses like occult powers or pure potentialities or mysterious 
causal relations are. Actual gravitational force is felt and experienced. And one 
extreme of a field is not a wholly distinct existent from its other extreme: there 
are no gaps within it and the influence is propagated in a continuous, unbroken 
and direct way, so no mysterious nomic relations are required to make 
connections (¤1.5.2). 
(An analogy might be illustrative. Activities stand to an essentially active 
object in the way voluntary body movements stand to the will according to 
Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein. First, a voluntary body movement is not a 
mere happening but something that someone does. Second, a voluntary body 
movement does not stand to the will in the way in which effects stand to causes 
or manifestations to dispositions; nor the movement is bring about by any sort 
of transcendental ego, a bare point somehow mysteriously standing beyond its 
actions. Will and action do not stand as relata-in-relation. Willing is acting, to 
will to raise my left hand is to raise it, the act of the body is the act of the will 
(cf. Schopenhauer 1966: 100, Wittgenstein 1979: 4.11.16, 2001: ¤615).) 
With the incorporation of activities and the recognition of essentially active 
objects as their ground, what is immanent causation might be more clear. It 
cannot be a relation of any sort that somehow mysteriously connects different 
stages, or successive activities, of an individual object. An essentially active 
object cannot be reduced to separated stages or different activities in need of 
metaphysical glue. If we accept essentially active objects, then what we take to 
be cause and effect within the career of a single essentially active object, are 
nothing but imperfect abstractions from the continuous, unbroken and 
ceaseless activity of an object whose essence is striving, conatus or effort. The 
expression Ôimmanent causationÕ is only an inadequate, relational and discrete 
mode of expressing what is really the continuous unfolding, the ceaseless 
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striving, of a singular object, the only genuine source of unity and activity. An 
essentially active object necessitates certain active unfolding because it is of its 
very essence to do so: its essence is to unfold in a certain way and it wouldnÕt 
be what it is if it were to unfold in a different way.  Of course, not being God, 47
such an object is not a necessary being. The necessity to which an essentially 
active object like this gives place is the necessity entailed by its essence; the 
contingency that it enjoys is the contingency of its own existence. But granted 
its existence, it cannot but unfold according to its own essence. If such an 
active essence comes to existence, it simply cannot but strive according to its 
immanent program, restlessly, until its annihilation. For it, to be is to 
continuously exercise force, and to cease to be is to stop striving. 
DE wrongly focuses on dispositions as the key ingredients, forgetting that the 
answer to the mysteries of connectedness and activity might lie elsewhere: in 
the objects themselves, as long as we understand them as essentially active 
objects. You might question the existence of activities and of essentially active 
objects, but that is another story. What I am trying to show is that for 
guaranteeing a really active world we need activities and that activities are only 
guaranteed if we have essentially active objects. What connects a series of 
activities is not a relation that holds between them, but something non-
relational: the essentially active object itself. Thus, immanent causation is not a 
relation between different stages of an object, but an abstraction from the 
objectÕs unfolding. E.g. if an acorn is an essentially active object, then 
immanent causation is the unfolding of the acorn-form according to its essence, 
not a cross-temporal relation between an acorn at t1 and an oak tree at t2. In this 
picture, immanent causation can be qualified as internal-Bradley: terms and 
relation are better understood as abstractions from an underlying more 
substantial unity. And once we have a choreography of two or more essentially 
 Essentially active objects can be seen as realising an immanent law or blueprint, as Leibniz 47
and Lotze conceived them (cf. Leibniz 1989: 360, Russell 1937: ¤20). I am not claiming that 
necessity grounds essence. On the contrary, if anything, it is essence, i.e., what a thing is, what 
eventually gives ground to de re modality (Fine 1994). I am just offering objects with a very 
rich and particular essence.
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active objects, transeunt causation can be seen as internal-Russell: it is 
grounded in the non-relational nature of the relata. 
3.6 Gaps that cannot be filled: Transeunt causation     
Think of yourself again as a God. Create a simple world with two or three 
essentially active objects. They are immanently active, unfolding their program 
of behaviour in a continuous and restless manner. Striving until their complete 
annihilation. You create them and, as soon as they come into existence, they 
start to unfold according to their immanent program. No need for triggers or 
stimulus conditions or external laws. Your objects are essentially active, and 
they cannot exist but in striving, and they donÕt need nothing extra for 
connecting their own activity, since there are no gaps to be filled within each of 
them: they are the source of their own activities and of their gapless unfolding. 
Immanent causation is nothing but the restless striving of a single essentially 
active object. Add, for the sake of simplicity, the condition that each program 
of unfolding, each blueprint, is fully deterministic. 
Think, again, in familiar objects to fulfil that role: your friend telling you some 
story while you pay him full attention; you observing a red rose which is 
slowly opening after receiving some sunlight. In this active and plural world 
we still have a problem, which DE also promised us to solve through causal 
powers. And the problem persists even if causal powers are replaced by the 
improved ontology that I have offered in the previous sections. We need more 
metaphysical glue; we need to fill in the gap that exists whenever there are two 
distinct individuals (¤1.5.2). Can two or three essentially active objects make 
any sort of causal connection? If so, in what sense they are ÔconnectedÕ? If you 
and your friend, you and the rose, the rose and the sun, are wholly distinct yet 
essentially active objects, is there any causal connection making some real 
bondage, i.e. something that makes your friendÕs words get into you, or the 
sunlight somehow make happen or influence the unfolding of the red rose? If 
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not, what explains the fact that these distinct activities appear to be somehow 
magically coordinated? 
The answer that DE gives falls under what we can call, in general terms, the 
way of influence. The way of influence is old and it has its most salient 
contemporary representatives in supporters of the so-called transference 
theories of causation of physicalist inspiration, where transeunt causation is 
understood as transmission of certain physical quantities (Aronson 1971, Dowe 
2000, Fair 1979, Salmon 1994). The answer of DE falls under this head, since 
transeunt causation is understood by it as a case of influx, a transference of 
properties from one object to another object. For instance, Mumford and 
Anjum present causation simply as a matter of Ôpassing powers 
aroundÕ (Mumford and Anjum 2011: ch. 1), and they explicitly endorse a non-
reductive ÔtransferenceÕ theory of causation, where what is transferred are 
causal powers (Mumford and Anjum 2011: 102). 
The problem is the following. Transference is supposed to be transference of 
first-order dispositions of monadic inherence. Yet monadic properties, whether 
you conceived them as immanent universals or as tropes, cannot survive an 
actual transference from object to object, since they cannot exist uninstantiated. 
They are ways of being of some object, so their existence is bonded to the 
object. Perhaps there is a sense in which it might be said that properties, when 
conceived as immanent universals, are ÔtransferableÕ, but this is the coarse 
modal sense in which it is said that this red rose could have been a different 
way, say white, like that rose. I must recognise my complete incapacity for 
understanding this. First, this way of thinking assumes the contingency of 
predication. And the contingency of predication can only take place, as far as I 
can tell, under a relational understanding that takes it to be an external, 
contingent link. But the relational understanding of instantiation is not 
plausible: no genuine unity can arise by ÔrelatingÕ a bare object with a property 
in such a loose way. Again, I must insist in a non-relational account of 
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inherence, where unity is restored but the price to pay is to stop treating 
properties as numerically distinct entities, since their numerical distinctness is 
lost in the substantial whole. There is no division between a bare substratum 
and some ways of being, since the only numerically distinct entity, the only 
individual object, is the substantial whole itself (¤2.2.3). This is still more clear 
in the case of the activities of an essentially active object, since what an 
essentially active object x does is, and cannot but be, the unfolding of its own 
nature, not of yÕs. Of course, you and me can both engage in the activity of 
experiencing, but if you are an essentially active object, then your experiencing 
cannot be but yours, i.e., what you experience. Second, even if the contingency 
of predication were accepted, this coarse modal sense of ÔtransferenceÕ is not 
the one applicable to the sort of transference of properties that allegedly takes 
place in an actual transeunt causal interaction. In this second sense, 
transference would entail that the redness of this rose actually stops inhering in 
this rose, somehow Ôflies awayÕ alone for a little while, and, after ÔlandingÕ, 
starts inhering in that rose. And this is simply incoherent, whether we think of 
properties as tropes or as immanent universals, because they cannot survive 
such a transference (pace Ehring 1997). Because their very existence is bonded 
to the fact of being instantiated, and a transference of it cannot take place 
unless there is an instant where the property is not instantiated in neither of the 
objects. The only way in which properties can exist uninstantiated is when they 
are understood as transcendental, ante rem, universals. But if so, it is still 
doubtful that transeunt causation can be understood as transference of 
properties. In the first place, it is obvious that in such an abstract realm there is 
probably nothing like causation or influence between distinct forms. They are 
perfect, unique, self-sufficient and out of the causal traffic. In the second place, 
because we still need pale representatives of those perfect forms for accounting 
for the ways of being of concrete objects, and we still need to explain how is it 
that those pale concrete representatives of those perfect forms actually get 
transferred from object to object. Of course, the mystery is not the survival of 
the ante rem property. This exists even if it is not instantiated. The problem is 
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what happens with the in rem pale representatives of them in a concrete 
transference from this object to that object. We are again facing the same 
problem. What it may happen is that a new representative of the ante rem 
property starts inhering in the second object. Still, no transference. The 
problem for the Platonic is the one of participation itself: how something there, 
which is numerically one, can be here, inhering in many concrete individuals; 
how something there, in the atemporal heaven of abstract forms, has 
participants of it here, in the concrete realm, where transeunt causation surely 
takes place if it takes place at all. 
It is notorious how this issue is completely avoided by Dowe in his (2000), 
perhaps the last and most comprehensive work within the physicalist program 
of transference theories of causation. In fact, although Dowe recognises that 
Ô[t]he difficulty arises if we wish to say that the effect receives the same 
quantity as the cause gave upÕ (Dowe 2000: 111, his italics), he says that his 
theory is ÔnoncommittalÕ on that point. But that is precisely the crucial point! If 
we want to have real transuent influence and not just a brute fact, then it must 
be the same property-instance the one that is transferred. If object S1 posses a 
certain conserved quantity and that very same quantity is not the one that is 
transferred to object S2 when they collide, then there is no such thing as 
transference or influx. We can observe that S1 and S2 seem to collide. We can 
measure the conserved quantities of S1 and S2 before and after the collision. 
We can tell that before the collision S1 had x amount of a conserved quantity 
while S2 had x-1. After the collision, we observe that S1 has x-1 and that S2 
has x. But with this information we simply cannot tell whether the new 
conserved quantity that S2 has is the very same one that S1 lost. We just have a 
correlation of values, but the ÔtransferenceÕ is missing. It remains a mystery 
what is going on between S1 and S2 when a ÔtransferenceÕ is allegedly 
happening.  
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One might think that there is no such thing as transference of an identical 
property in a case of transeunt causation. For instance, Mumford and Anjum 
say: 
It is not, however, always the same power that is passed on from cause to effect. 
In the case of heat and momentum, the same power in the cause is passed on to 
the effect, which acquires the power. But in many cases the change brought 
about in the effect is acquisition of a different set of powers to the powers of the 
cause. [...] We have a fragile glass that manifests its disposition when it is 
dropped and breaks. [...] The effect is that the glass is broken into many pieces. 
The glass (or at least its pieces) now has a power, to cut, for instance, that it did 
not have before the causation occurred. Then the glass had a different power Ð to 
hold liquid Ð which it no longer has now that it is broken. Now its pieces have 
sharp, rigid edges. Some new properties are instantiated, and older ones 
relinquished, at the time of causation. And with the appearance of new 
properties, for the dispositionalist, there arise new powers. The case can be 
understood as new, different powers being passed from cause to effect. 
(Mumford and Anjum 2011: 6Ð7) 
The key problem of the idea of transference deployed in the quoted paragraph 
is in the use that Mumford and Anjum make of ÔinstantiationÕ. Different 
properties being instantiated is not the same as transference of properties. The 
glass, while unbroken, has the power to hold liquid. It looses that property 
when broken into pieces, i.e., when it is no longer a glass. The pieces of the 
glass now instantiate the power to cut. But this is just a case of different 
dispositional properties being instantiated by different individual objects (if a 
glass and its pieces are individuals at all, then they are distinct: the initial one 
glass is now many separated pieces). No transference, no passing around, is 
happening here. This is because the very nature of monadic properties is 
inconsistent with their actual transference. 
The previous case against transeunt causation can be better understood if we 
think in some example involving secondary qualities. Think in a red ball. The 
primary qualities of the ball are identical or at least give grounds to the causal 
power that it has to produce red sensations in human observers under suitable 
conditions. Now, is the red ball really red? Common answer: ÔIt is really-really 
spherical, but it is not really-really red, since it is spherical but not red when 
unobserved, that is, it is spherical but not red in itself. Yet it does have the 
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causal power to produce the sensation of red in human observers under suitable 
conditions. And it has this causal power even when unobserved.Õ This is very 
confusing. We might object to this position all what we have already said 
against the two versions of DE, but letÕs push a little bit more to really 
understand what is supposed to be taking place in an actual case of transeunt 
causation. I could ask again what goes on between the ball that has the causal 
power of causing me to see red and my seeing red when I am actually 
observing it. Probable answer: ÔWell, there is transference of certain powers; 
perhaps various little objects called photons help with this transference. 
Properties are passed around and then, after a final transference, they land in 
your retina, and then you see red.Õ I could insist asking what is going on 
between the last photon and the surface of my retina before seeing red. To say 
that some object has some active properties and the other object has the 
reciprocal partner passive properties doesnÕt solve the mystery. The problem is 
precisely what is happening when the magic bringing about is taking place. 
Nor is it helpful to claim that the process of influence is smooth and 
continuous. I think this kind of move is close to what Mumford and Anjum 
have offered more recently by rejecting the dominant two-events model of 
causation. As they put it: ÔCausation should not then be understood as a 
relation between two events, but rather as what makes an event 
occur...Õ (Mumford and Anjum 2011: 23), where a cause is Ôdepicted as 
merging into and becoming the effect through a natural processÕ (Mumford and 
Anjum 2011: 107). Mumford and Anjum realise how problematic is to find 
metaphysical glue between cause and effect once these are understood as two 
wholly distinct relata, so they prefer to see causation as an actual and 
continuous process (similarly, Huemer and Kovitz 2003). I think this 
processual model of causation is far more illuminating than the relata-in-
relation model. But the problem is that Mumford and Anjum still hold that their 
basic inventory of properties is of dispositional nature, that the inherence of 
these is monadic, and that they inhere in a plurality of things. So, even if DE 
were reformed in order to include real immanent activity, which unfolds in a 
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non-relational but processual and continuous way, there is an obvious tension 
here that has its origin in their commitment to pluralism (see my 2012). If we 
have two wholly distinct things, then at some point the continuity and 
smoothness of the process is broken and interrupted by the boundaries of these 
distinct things. As I have argued, pluralism cannot but accept gaps between the 
plurals and that the most trivial case of transeunt causation is a case of action-
at-a-distance (¤1.5.2). Two distinct objects, no matter how active they are, 
seem to live in two different worlds. They donÕt make contact; they donÕt 
touch; their boundaries do not share any point. What is scary is that the 
problem affects all type of transuent influence, not only that one which 
involves secondary qualities. It affects the way in which we understand also 
our sensations of primary qualities, other minds and, in general terms, the 
external world. The mystery of how two distinct things exert influence over 
each other is pervasive, and there is no easy road to explain such transuent 
influence in plausible and coherent terms. This is probably why Leibniz, a 
convinced pluralist and a firm believer in immanent activity, rejected transeunt 
causation with such a strong conviction:  
The way of influence is that of the common philosophy. But since it is impossible 
to conceive of material particles or of species or immaterial qualities which can 
pass from one of these substances into the other, the view must be rejected. 
(Leibniz 1989: 460) 
If there is no transference, what can be the source of the apparent connection 
between two distinct essentially active objects? We are again at the beginning. 
One option is to be Humean regarding transeunt causation, and take it as an 
instance of a regular pattern in the general behaviour of essentially active 
objects. If this is so, then their position with respect to other essentially active 
objects is just a metaphysical coincidence. There is nothing in their very nature 
that compels them to behave in such a coordinated way. There is no more 
explanation to the apparent choreography than the brute and contingent fact of 
some external relations of distance actually holding between them. Since they 
are externally related, none of them acknowledges in its intrinsic nature the 
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unfolding of the others. The choreography is a brute fact: they just happen to 
be coordinated. But it could have been otherwise. Each of them could have still 
been an essentially active object in a different world, with different world-
mates, with the only condition of there being enough free space for each of 
them to unfold their own selfish career. Another option is to rescue Nomic 
Realism, and include an external, higher-order, nomic relation that compels 
things to be coordinated as they appear to be. This brings all over again the 
objections against this mysterious determination: if we have to choose between 
brute facts, why donÕt we stay with the brute non-nomic cosmic coincidence of 
the Humean? What difference does this higher-order, nomic and external 
relation can really make? A third option is the Leibnizian way, that is, to make 
still more rich the essence of active objects, and include in their program of 
unfolding a complete acknowledgement of the unfolding of other active 
objects, in a way that their relative position also becomes an essential feature to 
all of them, because the unfolding of each one of them essentially mirrors the 
unfolding of all the others from its own perspective. A world like this would 
still require at least an initial miracle of bringing into existence the plurality in 
such a coordinated way. If this is not a divine intervention, then it is also a 
brute fact. Whichever is the option, in neither of these cases is there any real 
transuent influence.  
The best scenario for those who are looking for an immanent source for causal 
activity and connections is the Leibnizian response. The world looks connected 
if inhabited by various disconnected but active objects each of which is 
subjected to an individual law of unfolding that is coordinated with the rest. In 
this case, we can still say that transeunt causation is an internal-Russell 
relation, since it is grounded in the monadic activity of distinct objects and 
their perspectival essences. But, again, in this picture there is no real 
connection between you and me, and to say that there is, adds nothing: when 
there is coordination between your activity and my activity, we just look as 
connected, but nothing is really going on between you and me. The source of 
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these coordination is in each of our own individual essences, but there are no 
bridges between you and me. This response is grounded in one of the most 
coherent metaphysics ever imagined, yet also one of the most fantastic. Being 
monads completely windowless and containing each of them a full 
representation of their own world, one might wonder what other reason, apart 
from an alleged divine preference for infinite cardinality, gives support to this 
plurality. What is clear is that, once there is pluralism, there is no way to fill in 
the insurmountable gap that arises between object and object. In particular, no 
relation is able to do such job. Internal-Moore and internal-Russell relations, as 
the two variants of DE show, are unable to do the job. And external relations, 
as revealed by LewisÕ relations of distance and by ArmstrongÕs laws, are just a 
different name for the gap. 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4 Ontic structural realism: Relational world-making      
We have seen the mysteries of self-contained individuals and external relations, 
the core ingredients of Humean Supervenience. We also saw that the attempts 
to improve this loose and separate ontology by adopting a different conception 
of propertiesÐDE in its two versionsÐdonÕt dispel the mysteries but, quite the 
contrary, they bring some new ones to the scene. We are now in position to 
examine a holistic ontology much more radical than DE in its commitment to a 
form of internal-relatedness and in its rejection to self-contained plurals. In 
fact, according to this ontology, the world is exclusively made of relations. I 
am talking about the metaphysics defended under the labels of ÔExclusive 
RelationalismÕ (Dipert 1997) or as ÔOntic Structural RealismÕ (French and 
Ladyman 2003a, 2003b, Ladyman and Ross 2007). Following the 
nomenclature of the latter, I will call it OSR. 
In ¤4.1 I will introduce OSR and distinguish it from other similar positions. In 
¤4.2 I will discuss the reasons that seem to motivate it. In ¤4.3 I will argue that 
OSR makes little sense (if any), because if relations are already mysterious in 
the presence of relata, then the idea that there are relations without relata is 
doubly mysterious. In ¤4.4 I argue that OSR only makes sense as a sort of 
exclusive Platonism, and this must be rejected if we want to make good sense 
of certain undeniable concrete features of reality. In ¤4.5 I conclude that we 
must, somehow, restore the concreteness that OSR gives away with no good 
reasons. The main point of my objections is the following: the reasons that 
motivate OSR might be good reasons to reject certain ontologies where self-
contained individuals play a central role, but those reasons are not enough to 
give away the non-relational. The holistic picture to which OSR is committed 
is also desirable and well motivated, but relations are not the only, and 
certainly not the most adequate, mean to obtain it: the problem of overcoming 
fragmentation, of how can we transcend mere juxtaposition and achieve 
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connectedness or interdependence, might well rest, as Bradley thought, in 
accepting the world as an undivided, indivisible, self-sufficient, non-relational 
unity. The relata-in-relation talk might well be just an imperfect way (perhaps 
the only way available) to express such unity (a unity that, ultimately, might 
well be ineffable). 
4.1 Varieties of structuralism     
Call OSR the ontology according to which the world is exclusively constituted 
by relational structure. In the slogan of two of its advocates: ÔThere are no 
things. Structure is all there isÕ (Ladyman and Ross 2007: 130). As it is 
obvious, OSR stands on the opposite side of monadic or monistic 
foundationism, since it is eliminative about self-contained individuals (either 
one or many) and embraces full-blown relationalism. Thus, it incarnates in its 
maximal expression all the mysteries that we have raised against the category 
of relation. In its favour we must say that OSR embraces a relational holism 
that also represents a rejection of the external relatedness embraced by Humean 
Supervenience. Because the pervasive relations of OSR are neither external 
(since they donÕt leave the world loose and separate), nor internal-Russell 
(since there are no non-relational relata that may give monadic foundations to 
them), nor internal-Bradley (since there is no non-relational unity from which 
relata and relations can be said to be imperfect abstractions). The relational 
structure of OSR is real addition of being and makes of the world not a heap 
but an interdependent whole of relational nature in which everything owes its 
existence and identity to its place in the whole relational structure. Hence, the 
relations of OSR are internal-Moore, but with two provisos: (i) these relations 
are, at least partly, modal in character, and (ii) there are no concrete individuals 
with intrinsic natures standing as relata. As Ladyman and Ross put it: 
ÔIndividual things are locally focused abstractions from modal structure. By 
modal structure we mean the relationships among phenomena . . . that pertain 
to necessity, possibility, potentiality, and probabilityÕ (Ladyman and Ross 2007: 
!119
153Ð54). OSR is eliminative about individuals and their intrinsic natures. 
These are seen as pragmatic posits that do not carry any ontological weight 
since they are really nothing but invariant patterns in a relational structure. As 
Dipert (1997) prefers to put it, the world of OSR is like a huge graph and its 
holistic character obtains because the conditions of existence and identity of 
every subgraph are fixed by the whole graph. 
The view of metaphysics I propose is relational and holistic: the concrete world 
is a single, large structure induced by a single, two-place, symmetric relation, 
and thus best analyzed as a certain sort of graph. Every concrete entity ÒinÓ the 
world is a part of this structure and is a structure (subgraph) in its own right. 
Such entities are individuated (and hence contemplated) solely by their graph-
theoretic structural features. (Dipert 1997: 329) 
OSR must be distinguished from another metaphysics, which I would like to 
call Moderate Ontic Structural Realism (MOSR). According to MOSR 
relations require non-relational relata, so the world is not only structure. But 
those relata do not need to have intrinsic natures: all what there is to them is 
the relations in which they stand to each other. Assuming that this idea makes 
sense at all, there are individuals but their natures are purely relational; apart 
from their relations, they are naked. This position is the one defended by Esfeld 
(2001, 2004), Esfeld and Lam (2008), and, at least to some extent, by Teller 
(1986), who speaks in favor of Ôinherent relationsÕ. These Ôinherent relationsÕÐ
which I prefer to call Ôinternal-Moore relationsÕÐplay a crucial role in the 
constitution of quantum ÔparticlesÕ and, through entanglement, they give place 
to a pervasive form of relational holism. But these internal-Moore relations do 
not exclude individuals. MOSR can be seen as a conservative reaction to the 
evidently radical ontology offered by OSR. As we will see soon, the apparent 
moderation of MOSR is not sufficient to rescue OSR.  48
OSR should also be carefully distinguished from Epistemic Structural Realism 
(ESR). ESR, in Kantian vein, is simply an epistemology of science according 
 Although I presume that contemporary ontic structuralists would not be happy to be 48
associated with British idealism, we can find clear antecedents of a similar type of relational 
constitution and relational holism in the work of T. H. Green. See Basile (1999: ch. 1), 
Dunham, Grant and Watson (2011: ch. 9), and Hylton (1990: ch. 1).
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to which all we can know about the world is its relational structure. Individuals 
and their intrinsic natures remain always hidden to our observational apparatus 
so we better not claim knowledge about them. This view is a just a humble 
version of scientific realism. It says that mature and successful scientific 
theories tell as the truth about the structure of an external and mind-
independent world; that this structure belongs or is had by something; and that 
we can only claim knowledge about the structure, not about what has the 
structure, because this, whatever it is, remains forever hidden: a noumenon to 
which we have no epistemic access. In principle, ESR is obviously compatible 
with a wide range of ontologies (monistic or pluralistic, materialist or idealist, 
Humean or anti-Humean, etc.), as long as these ontologies are capable of 
giving support to the same observable structure. Allegedly, if there is a 
knowable structure, then ÔsomethingÕ must exist that supports it; it just happens 
that we cannot know that ÔsomethingÕ, whatever it is. OSR, in contrast, is 
straight scientific realism, only with a weird ontology. The epistemic bit is 
simply a consequence of the radical metaphysics embraced by OSR: if 
structure is all what what there is, then structure is all what can be known. 
4.2 Why OSR?     
Why would anyone embrace the radical ontology offered by OSR? Despite its 
prima facie implausibility, there are a number of good reasons in favour of it. 
Here are the main ones: 
(i) Individuality in common sense. The individuality of everyday individuals, 
like tables and oranges, like football matches and wars, is metaphysically and 
epistemically elusive, and it gives us a hint of what occurs in fundamental 
physics. Even if there is ample agreement that an individual must have 
determinate identity-conditions and countability, it is difficult to tell whether 
there are any entities that fit the bill, and certainly more difficult in the realm of 
common sense. In particular, the diachronic and synchronic boundaries of the 
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posits of common sense seem totally undetermined. It is very hard to tell where 
this commonsensical individual starts or where that one ends without falling 
into arbitrariness or paradox. Dipert (1997) argues that all traditional monadic 
ways of individuation collapse into relations. This seems fairly obvious in the 
case of the spatiotemporal position of a common-sensical individual, which 
seems to obtain due to its relations to other individuals. Though less evident, it 
also seems to be the case of properties which are usually considered intrinsic. 
Just try to find an example of these. Is ÔmassÕ intrinsic, when we seem only to 
understand what it is through its relations to other properties, like acceleration 
or forceÐas the functional character of the laws in which all these properties 
figure seems to suggest? And what about ÔshapeÕ? IsnÕt it just Ôa set of spatial 
relations albeit ÒinternalÓ to the objectÕ, as Dipert (1997: 339) suggests? If so, 
we are back again with the problem of what counts as an ordinary individual 
object. And these, like intrinsic properties, seem also to be grasped in purely 
relational ways. Take, for instance, the case of a banana. How can we even 
perceive a banana as a distinct individual if not because it makes a genuine 
contrast against a background (e.g., a green plant, a white fridge)? Yet what is 
Ôcontrast againstÕ if not a relation? 
(ii) Individuality in Quantum Mechanics (QM). It is not only the case that QM 
posits a crucial challenge to the metaphysics of Humean Supervenience due to 
the fact that this latter thesis is simply incapable of explaining entanglement 
(¤1.6). In addition, quantum particles seem not to be individuals in a traditional 
sense. Traditionally, we can say that an individual satisfies the Principle of the 
Identity of Indiscernibles (PII), because at least one of its properties or its 
spatiotemporal position/trajectory makes it discernible from others; otherwise, 
they are identical. But PII simply fails for quantum particles. As Ladyman and 
Ross argue, particles in an entangled state, say the Singlet state, may share all 
of their monadic properties, and their spatiotemporal position/trajectory (which 
is, by the way, unlocalised!). Moreover, each of the so-called monadic 
attributes is identified in purely relational terms (e.g., mass is just that property 
!122
m with which something will satisfy certain complex relation, namely m=F/a, 
given a force F and an acceleration a, etc.). The only restriction is that the 
entangled ÔparticlesÕ must have opposite spin-state, because the whole 
entangled system has a spin value of 0. Yet this says nothing about which is the 
ÔparticleÕ that has spin-down and which is the ÔparticleÕ that has spin-up. 
Nothing can be said about the spins of the particles except that they are anti-
correlated. What we can say for sure is that the whole entangled system has a 
spin-value of 0. What is also clear is that the description of the Singlet state 
includes no property of one particle that cannot be attributed to the second one, 
and that a permutation of the ÔparticlesÕ cannot be counted as a distinct state 
because the total spin-value will be the same, namely 0 (Ladyman and Ross 
2007: ¤3.1). This suggests a tetralemma. First horn: PII is true and entangled 
particles are not distinct individuals since they are not discernible. Second 
horn: PII is false and entangled particles are distinct individuals in virtue of 
some transcendental and empirically superfluous principle of individuation that 
somehow mysteriously escapes from entanglement, i.e., a thisness, haecceity or 
bare substratum that transcends everything that can be expressed by the 
description of the phenomenon. This is the move favoured by MOSR, which 
appeals to relata devoid of intrinsic natures in order to avoid the spooky 
ontology of OSR. Third horn: PII is true but only in a very weak form, which 
makes quantum particles individuals also in a very weak form. Quantum 
particles do not have any intrinsic nature or any position/trajectory that can 
help us discern one from another, but they do satisfy a two-place irreflexive 
relation: <__is anti-correlated with respect to spin to__>. This is the move 
favoured by OSR. Under this solution quantum particles turn out to be nothing 
but pragmatic posits of internal-Moore relations, since their ÔindividualityÕ is 
grounded in nothing more than relations (OSR simply refuses to take the step 
into the transcendental individuality that MOSR takes). Fourth horn: this whole 
mess is a sign that quantum particles are neither distinct individuals nor mere 
placeholders of relations but something completely different, which is the 
move that I favour. 
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(iii) Individuality in General Relativity (GR). Ladyman and Ross also argue 
that there are good reasons to prefer OSR about space instead of relationalism 
or substantivalism (Ladyman and Ross 2007: ¤3.2). Roughly, according to 
relationalism, space is the result of individuals standing in certain relations 
(external, in ArmstrongÕs and LewisÕs cases; internal-Russell, in LeibnizÕs case) 
in such a way that space would not exist if there were no individuals. 
According to substantivalism, space exists in its own right, with independence 
of the existence of individuals occupying it.  Ladyman and Ross take that GR 49
gives good reasons to reject relationalism, since it attributes to space itself 
certain properties with independence of the existence of material ÔoccupantsÕ, 
like its topology and its propensity to influence and be influenced by matter. 
Yet they also take that GR gives good reasons to reject substantivalism, since, 
according to Ôthe hole argumentÕ (Earman and Norton 1987), space-time points 
are indiscernible in such a way that it would make no relevant difference to 
swap them as long as spatial structure is preserved; thus, one could have 
equivalent structures that are satisfied by swapped points, in such a way that 
the substantivalist seems forced to accept, without any empirical motivation, a 
form of radical indeterminism. The identity and individuality of points is either 
transcendental (i.e., a thisness, haecceity, or bare substratum) or solely 
determined by structure. Since the transcendental way is empirically 
unmotivated, then it better be the case that space is nothing but real relational 
structure, yet this relational structure, pace relationalism, exists in its own right, 
with independence of the existence of individuals instantiating it: it is simply 
internal-Moore relatedness without individual relata supporting it. What a 
spatial point/region is is determined solely by its relations to other points/
 It seems obvious to me that the contemporary relationalistÐthe one who accepts spatial 49
relations as external relationsÐmust accept that these relations can exist without individual 
objects acting as relata (hence, that they could exist by their own). After all, this is what entails 
the fact that those relations are wholly external to the nature of the relata: that they do not 
depend on them, that they enjoy substantial status (not much progress since Russell). How this 
external relationalism without individuals is supposed to work and how a space like this would 
look like are questions beyond my understanding. I am only bringing to the light what it seems 
to be an obvious implication of the externality of relations. I presume that each relation could 
have a thisness in order to be distinguished and that they all could be swapped without making 
any relevant difference to the nature of space.
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regions: it is nothing but a position in a relational structure. There is nothing 
intrinsic to it. To be precise, there is no it apart from structure.  50
(iv) Realism vs. Antirealism. For reasons of space and scope I will not discuss 
in depth one additional argument given in support of OSR as a particular 
species of scientific realism. This argument says that OSR, as a philosophy of 
science, is capable of making sense of the major argument for scientific realism 
(i.e. PutnamÕs Ôno-miraclesÕ argument; Putnam 1975: 73) and the major 
argument against it (i.e. the pessimistic meta-induction argument based on 
constant theory changes), giving us Ôthe best of both worldsÕ (Worrall 1996). 
According to OSR, we should be realists about structural components of 
scientific theories and anti-realists about the rest, since although there are 
countless ontological losses across theory changes, structure is always 
preserved. Ladyman and Ross give their verdict: ÔIn sum, we know that well-
confirmed relations among phenomena must be retained in future 
theoriesÕ (Ladyman and Ross 2007: 157, my emphases).  
I donÕt think that any of these reasons builds a compelling case for OSR. 
Admittedly, they are good considerations against standard ÔparticularistsÕ 
ontologies, but OSR is not the only alternative to them.  
Against reason (i)Ðaccording to which even the most basic individuation 
requires relations, like the one of Ôcontrasting againstÕ certain backgroundÐwe 
can reply what Bradley would reply. Dipert is only half right. Because grasping 
relations, like that of Ôcontrast againstÕ, is as difficult as grasping terms with 
intrinsic natures. We can only do it if there is a whole undivided situation. But 
that total situation in itself is not a relation. Both the idea of what counts as a 
ÔtermÕ of the relation Ôcontrast againstÕ and the very idea of Ôcontrast againstÕ 
 Esfeld and Lam (2008) support MOSR about space: they argue that both points and structure 50
come together as an indivisible package, since neither points nor relational structure make 
sense without each other. I cannot see how the inclusion of points may improve things: the 
world certainly is not pure geometry. More on this soon.
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can only be obtained from a whole undivided situation that enjoys qualitative 
richness, e.g., a landscape.  
Against reason (ii), we simply need to embrace the path suggested by the 
fourth horn. The whole mess about individuality of quantum particles does 
speak in favour of something different, and this Ôsomething differentÕ are 
nothing but fields. This path will be defended in ch. 6.  
Against reason (iii) we can say that the structuralist solution indeed emerged as 
an answer to the Ôhole argumentÕ that Earman and Norton (1987) raised against 
manifold-substantivalism. But OSR is not the only solution. One may well 
reject the idea that substantivalism is simply manifold-substantivalism. In fact, 
when one defends a thicker version of substantivalismÐby saying that space is 
not merely a manifold of bare points but that it is simply identical with the 
metric field, or by saying that space not only is identical with the metric field 
but also with the energy/matter field, as Einstein arguedÐthe Ôhole argumentÕ 
doesnÕt work, since swapping spatial points is a move that is no longer possible 
without making a very relevant difference (Dorato 2000, Hoefer 1996, Maudlin 
1988). The question is whether these thicker versions of substantivalism are to 
be interpreted as giving support to structuralism or to supersubstantivalism. As 
I will argue in this chapter, bare structure is simply incomprehensible; and as I 
will argue in the next chapters, there are good metaphysical and empirical 
reasons in favour of a ÔthickÕ supersubstantivalism; after all, the mere addition 
of bare points to the structure doesnÕt help too much if we are not explained 
how can there be naked individuals that get to ÔinstantiateÕ a structure. As 
Maudlin (1988) shows, the Ôhole argumentÕ not only works against manifold-
substantivalism but also against any metaphysics according to which the names 
of things refer to bare substrata or logical atoms of which all predication is 
contingent. The alternative to bare substrata, of course, is embracing some 
form of essentialism, where the subject of predication is simply identical with 
certain nature, or, as Leibniz would say: the predicates are contained in the 
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subject. I, with Bradley, find the notion of a bare substratum or logical atom Ôin 
relationÕ to a determinate nature as spooky as it gets (thus, as he would put it, 
existence and content, the ÔthatÕ and the ÔwhatÕ, are indivisible aspects of 
anything real), and the distinction between essence and accident as arbitrary as 
it gets (Bradley 1930: 23, 143, 148Ð49). If this leads, indirectly, to a form of 
hyper-essentialism and to a kind of monism, so be it. I think that all attempt to 
analyse singular predication into numerically distinct elementsÐsuch as a bare 
particular that it is somehow related (!) to numerically distinct propertiesÐis 
doomed to failure, because no copula can put Humpty Dumpty together again. 
Finally, we can say that reason (iv) is not an argument but simply a dogmatic 
postulate. Whether theoretical losses concerning structural elements occur or 
not, and to what extent, is not something to be decided a priori or by 
postulation, so Ladyman and Ross shouldnÕt say with so much confidence that 
they ÔknowÕ that structural components ÔmustÕ be preserved. This is an 
empirical matter to be settled by science itself or by the history of science. If 
we are to remain open to the possibility of novelty and discovery, of failure and 
error, then we ought to allow that theories, including their structural elements, 
can lose adequacy. To be clear, it might well be the case that the world, 
necessarily, has a certain structure that may be discovered a posteriori, just like 
Water=H2O might be a necessary identity which can be discovered a 
posteriori. But the central question is whether we are justified in claiming that 
we actually ÔknowÕ that our current mature scientific theories do get that real 
structure right and that we also ÔknowÕ that future scientific theories will and 
ÔmustÕ retain that structure (analogously, the question is whether we have any 
reason for believing that our current theory of water does get the essence of 
water right). And the answer to this question seems to be negative. After all, 
there is empirical evidence that shows that theory changes occur not only at the 
level of the individuals posited by scientific theories but at every level, 
including the level of structural components. LaudanÕs report is compelling:  
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Copernican astronomy did not retain all the key mechanisms of Ptolemaic 
astronomy (e.g., motion along an equant); NewtonÕs physics did not retain all (or 
even most of) the Ôtheoretical lawsÕ of Cartesian mechanics, astronomy and 
optics; FranklinÕs electrical theory did not contain its predecessor (NolletÕs) as a 
limiting case. Relativistic physics did not retain the aether, nor the mechanisms 
associated with it; statistical mechanics does not incorporate all the mechanisms 
of thermodynamics; modern genetics does not have Darwinian pangenesis as a 
limiting case; the wave theory of light did not appropriate the mechanisms of 
corpuscular optics; modern embryology incorporates few of the mechanisms 
prominent in classical embryological theory. [...] [L]oss occurs at virtually every 
level: the confirmed predictions of earlier theories are sometimes not explained 
by later ones; even the ÔobservableÕ laws explained by earlier theories are not 
always retained, not even as limiting cases; theoretical processes and 
mechanisms of earlier theories are, as frequently as not, treated as flotsam. 
(Laudan 1981: 39; in the same sense, Kuhn 1996 and Stanford 2003.) 
So if mature scientific theories have always lost structural components in the 
past, on what grounds can we claim that the structural components of our 
current mature scientific theories do map the real structure and must be 
retained in future theories?   51
The fact that scientific theories suffer constant replacement doesnÕt mean that 
there is no scientific progress, as long as you donÕt have too high expectations 
of what Ôscientific progressÕ means. There is scientific progress whenever a 
new scientific theory is capable of explaining why an old theory was 
empirically adequate and ceased to be so, and how it [the new one] is more 
empirically adequate insofar as it is capable of saving both the old as well as 
the new phenomena, those phenomena that the old theory did save and those 
that it couldnÕt save (van Fraassen 1980: ch. 3, 2006: 298Ð99). The error lies in 
taking science as giving us ultimate truth, that is, as giving us a complete 
metaphysics. Science offers us a good point of departure to the enterprise of 
making sense of reality, but certainly is not the best place to stop. Because 
 Two additional considerations should be added against the idea that structure is preserved 51
while other theoretical components are lost. First, that there seems to be no sharp way to 
distinguish between the ÔformÕ from the ÔcontentÕ of a scientific theory, so they cannot be 
abandoned by separate. After all, the ÔstructureÕ and ÔnatureÕ of the physical entities described 
by scientific theories seem to form an indivisible continuum (Psillos 1995, 2001). Second, that 
if one is a committed naturalist, as Ladyman and Ross claim to be, one should be open even to 
abandon mathematical and logical knowledge if the tribunal of experience demands it (Quine 
1951b: 39Ð43). As Quine thought, those disciplines are at the very centre of our web of 
knowledge, and we are very reluctant to revise them if something less central can be sacrificed 
instead. However, they are not untouchable, and even the law of excluded middle maybe 
subjected to revision. Thus, if neither logic nor mathematics are untouchable, why then the 
scientific models constructed using those very tools must be immune to theoretical change?
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science is not all the insight, since, after all, it is bounded by what is 
observable. And what is observable is context-dependent and does not exhaust 
reality. As Bradley would say:  
[T]he object of natural science is not at all the ascertainment of ultimate truth, 
and its province does not fall outside the phenomena. The ideas, with which it 
works, are not intended to set out the true character of reality . . . The question is 
not whether the principles of physical science posses an absolute truth to which 
they make no claim. The question is whether the abstraction, employed by that 
science, is legitimate and useful. (Bradley 1930: 250Ð51) 
As far as I can see, neither of these reasons is sufficient to make a positive case 
for OSR. In what follows I will try to show that even if these reasons were a 
powerful argument in favour of OSR, they are insufficient for its acceptance, 
since OSR is an internally incoherent and unstable ontology that is incapable of 
making sense of things in a general way.  
4.3 Relations without relata?     
As Psillos has argued, one of the most important difficulties that OSR has to 
confront is to make sense of the idea that there are relations without relata 
(Psillos 2006a; in similar sense, Chakravartty 2003). Within the foundationist 
tradition (pluralist and monist), relations are not entities in their own right: all 
the world-making is done by either one or many individuals with very rich 
intrinsic natures. The Armstrong-Lewis program, following the path of Russell, 
moves a huge step away from that tradition by accepting external relations and 
by giving them substantial status: their existence and identity is not dependent 
on the existence and identity of one or more relata, nor the existence and 
identity of these relata depend on the existence and identity of external 
relations. For me, this conception of external relations is already 
incomprehensible: I cannot perceive relations without perceiving a total 
situation that transcends them, I cannot point to external relations without 
pointing to something non-relational, I cannot conceive them without 
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conceiving something non-relational, and I cannot understand how can they 
allegedly relate if they are wholly external to their relata. 
In fact, the very idea that external relations are allegedly ÔinstantiatedÕ by some 
relata, seems to be just a contradiction in adjecto, since how can an external 
relation ever be ÔinstantiatedÕ by some relata yet, at the same time, remain 
numerically distinct and wholly external to them, without ever forming part of, 
or entering into, their very nature? That is, how can those relata be related by 
that relation, without their nature being affected by being so-related? DonÕt say 
Ôwell, just by being instantiatedÕ. The central point is that ÔinstantiationÕ is of 
no help if you understand it as another external relation (BradleyÕs regress 
strikes again). DonÕt say Ôwell, they are part of the extrinsic nature of the 
relataÕ, since this is another name for the same problem: how can something be 
part of the nature of something yet at the same time be extrinsic to it? I cannot 
but share all of BradleyÕs (and LeibnizÕs) worries against relations and extrinsic 
denominations. 
How can we make sense of the Ôexclusive relationalismÕ of OSR? If the 
external relations of the Armstrong-Lewis program are already suspicious 
entitiesÐsince their being obtains outside the relata, in sheer nothingnessÐhow 
can we make sense of a world constituted solely by relations? We understand 
that these relations are internal-Moore. But still: how can internal-Moore 
relations stand alone without anything non-relational making such a world? 
What are they relating if not something non-relational? 
Ladyman and Ross have tried to answer this objection in what seems to be at 
least an evasive strategy: 
[T]he claim that relata are constructed as abstractions from relations doesnÕt 
imply that there are no relata; rather the opposite. A core aspect of the claim that 
relations are logically prior to relata is that the relata of a given relation always 
turn out to be relational structures themselves on further analysis. [...] Certainly, 
the structuralist faces a challenge in articulating her views to contemporary 
philosophers schooled in modern logic and set theory, which retains the classical 
framework of individual objects represented by variables subject to predication 
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or membership respectively. In lieu of a more appropriate framework for 
structuralist metaphysics, one has to resort to treating the logical variables and 
constants as mere placeholders which are used for the definition and description 
of the relevant relations even though it is the latter that bear all the ontological 
weight. [...] We may not be able to think about structure without hypostatizing 
individuals as the bearers of structure, but it does not follow that the latter are 
ontologically fundamental. (Ladyman and Ross 2007: 154Ð55) 
Why this response is unsatisfactory? 
First, Ladyman and Ross are wrong in accepting that the road of ÔanalysisÕ of 
relational structure can give a satisfactory response to the Ômissing relataÕ 
objection. Because every relational structure that will appear Ôon further 
analysisÕ will present the same recurrent ontological puzzle, whether there is an 
ultimate level of relations or not. And this is so because at every step of the 
analysis it seems that the whole structure is condemned to reappear, since every 
fragment of the structure is relationally constituted by the whole structure. 
Hence, no fragment of the structure can have its identity fixed before the 
identity of the whole structure is fixed. Yet there is really nothing more than the 
structure, since each ÔrelataÕ dissolves into relations and is, we may say, totally 
empty of privative content. While self-contained plurals give place to a world 
of isolated things-in-themselves, pure relational constitution offers not even 
one thing-in-itself but only bare structure. 
Second, from the fact that the metaphysics that underlies modern logic and set 
theory doesnÕt offer the adequate formal categories to express what OSR tries 
to express, it doesnÕt follow that relations are capable of doing that work. In 
this sense, Ladyman and Ross fall in the same kind of scholasticism that they 
condemn. When pushed to explain the metaphysics of OSR, Ladyman and 
Ross simply reply with a tu quoque:  
We ask the reader to consider whether the main metaphysical idea we propose, 
of existents structures that are not composed out of more basic entities, is any 
more obscure or bizarre than the instantiation relation in the theory of universals. 
(Ladyman and Ross 2007: 155) 
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They made, admittedly, an interesting point. Instantiation is one of the most 
intriguing metaphysical conundrums. However, in the first place, instantiation 
is mysterious in a major part precisely because contemporary metaphysicians 
think of it as a ÔrelationÕ between an object and numerically distinct properties/
relations, despite their use of non-relational words to refer to it (i.e., Ônon-
relational tieÕ, ÔfundamentalÕ, ÔprimitiveÕ, etc.).  Secondly, relations are not 52
only the source of the mystery of instantiation but also a victim, since they are 
also supposed to be instantiated if they want to relate. Thus, OSR has a double 
problem: it shares with contemporary metaphysics the burden of instantiation, 
but, additionally, it can offer nothing that could plausibly work as instantiators. 
One might think that there is nothing wrong with uninstantiated relations, but 
my point here is different. Take that there are uninstantiated relations. What I 
am saying is that our world doesnÕt look as if it were actually made of 
uninstantiated relations, and if we claim that relations are instantiated, then 
OSR not only needs to account for instantiationÐas everyone else in the 
marketÐbut it also needs to offer us some plausible instantiators. BradleyÕs 
strategy was to deny that instantiation made sense when understood in a 
relational way: no real unity of many attributes in one individual can be done 
by a relation, because relations also need to be instantiated, and this move will 
force us to bring into the scene more and more relations, without ever reaching 
the moment of unity. The regress certainly troubles contemporary ontologies 
that admit individuals with intrinsic natures, insofar as instantiation is 
conceived (pace appearances to the contrary) as relational (they want unity, but 
they also want to preserve numerical distinctness of intrinsic properties and 
contingency of predication). The truth is that BradleyÕs regress can only be 
avoided by accepting a non-relational form of unity. If so, individuals and their 
intrinsic natures cannot be treated as relata-in-relation; and the same goes for 
individuals and their relations. Thus, OSR does not escape from the regress: if 
relations relate, then they must be ÔinstantiatedÕ. The only way to avoid the 
 The same worry extends to the relation of bundling or compresence that allegedly glues 52
various properties together into a single bundle.
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regress is to accept relata and relations as internal-Bradley related, i.e., as 
abstractions from a more substantial, non-relational, unity. 
Third, Ladyman and Ross (2007), as well as Dipert (1997) and most of the 
authors that are looking for something to connect the world or to make it an 
interdependent whole, make the mistake of trying to achieve that 
connectedness or interdependence by importing relations allegedly stronger 
than external relations of distance and by dissolving self-contained individuals 
into that relational structure. Dipert, for instance, wrongly believes that his 
Ôgraph-worldÕ is capable of bringing to us a connected world like the one 
conceived by Spinoza or Sprigge (Dipert 1997: 330). The error here lies in 
thinking that relations are capable of doing that job. Admittedly, external 
relations leave the world loose and separate, lacking any real unity; they are the 
very recognition and expression of fragmentation and of the ontological and 
epistemic isolation of the fragments that stand as relata. But we also saw that it 
is difficult to understand how can causation or dispositions, when understood 
relationally, could ever be able to connect the world. For connecting a loose 
and separate world you have to do something different from adding more 
relations, just like if you want to build a chain you have to do something 
different from adding more loose links. Internal-Russell relationsÐas we saw in 
ch. 3 and as it is evident in LeibnizÕs metaphysicsÐstill leave the world as a 
plurality of distinct and separate individuals, yet somehow essentially 
coordinated in mysterious ways. Now the internal-Moore relations of OSR 
raise new mysteries: what is what they are allegedly relating if there are no 
individuals to relate but only more relations? And how can these relations 
connect the world better than internal-Russell relations if the world is not 
already connected in a more substantial way? And if the world is already 
connected in a more substantial way, then why do we need relations to do the 
job of connecting it? In connected worlds, like those of Spinoza, Sprigge, 
Bradley and Bohm, there are of course no separate and independent individuals 
except from the world. Yet with the same certainty we can affirm that there are 
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no such entities as relations doing the work of connecting it.  In these 53
connected worlds there are no relations or strong interactions, since there is 
already an undivided wholenesses, from where both relata and relations are 
abstractions, useful for practical purposes but metaphysically spurious: what 
we find is internal-Bradley relatedness. 
4.4 The concrete and the abstract     
The only consistent way in which OSR can be defended (at least the only one 
that I can see) is as a form of Platonism, where the world is conceived simply 
as an abstract universal, an ante rem relational structure. In this case, I am 
using the word ÔabstractÕ in the sense which is supposed to apply to objective, 
self-subsistent entities, which are singular (an abstract entity is a type, a one 
that may be multiply realised across many concrete individuals or that may 
have many tokens), not in space nor in time, nor constrained by space or time, 
and outside the causal traffic. Numbers, sets, Platonic forms and Fregean 
thoughts are supposed to be abstract in this sense. It should be noticed that 
when I defined internal-Bradley relatedness I used ÔabstractÕ in a different, 
more traditional sense, which is (pace the uses of contemporary metaphysics) 
the only sensible way in which I can understand that term and conceive 
abstract entities (¤2.4). The contemporary sense in which the relations of OSR 
are said to be abstract fulfils the platitudes of what Lewis understands under 
the head of ÔThe Negative WayÕ (since they are not spatiotemporally bounded, 
they are outside the causal traffic, and, qua distinct types, they are never 
indiscernible from each other) and under the head of ÔThe Way of 
 This is why Dipert is wrong when he attributes to Sprigge a serious commitment to a 53
relational picture of the world (Dipert 1997: 330). This is simply a misunderstanding or 
misinterpretation of SpriggeÕs doctrine. Sprigge tries to develop a doctrine of relations from 
BradleyÕs work, very similar to the one defended here. The result is a holistic picture in which 
SpriggeÕs Ôholistic relationsÕ have a central role. But SpriggeÕs Ôholistic relationsÕ, like 
BradleyÕs, offer us nothing like DipertÕs Ôexclusive relationalismÕ. What Sprigge understands 
by Ôholistic relationsÕ is precisely the most plausible sense that can be traced in BradleyÕs work, 
i.e., that both relata and relations are abstractions from a more substantial, non-relational, form 
of unity (Sprigge 1979, Sprigge 1983: ch. 5.3). This is a commitment towards monism and 
towards BradleyÕs doctrine of the Ôunreality of relationsÕ, not towards a metaphysical picture 
where relations are fundamental. In SpriggeÕs world, like in BradleyÕs world, there is holism 
insofar as there is monism, but not insofar as there are internal-Moore relations.
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ConflationÕ (since they are more like sets than individuals, more like universals 
than particulars) (Lewis 1986a: 81Ð86). 
The relational structure of OSR seems to be irreducibly abstract or ante rem 
because if it were in rem, then something moreÐthat ÔremÕ, regardless if it 
admits individuation and whatever it turns out to beÐwould exist. But OSR 
denies this. If there is only structure, then nothing has it: there is just self-
sufficient structure. The world of OSR is a type with no discernible tokens. 
While the previous objection points to the lack of relata that affects a purely 
relational world, the present objection points to the lack of concreteness that 
seems to exhibit exclusive relationalism. I do not think that the distinctions 
particular/universal and abstract/concrete are sharp and insightful dichotomies 
to classify entitiesÐin fact, I find them very confusing. But what I do think is 
that our world doesnÕt make sense when conceived as exclusively made of 
abstract, ante rem, universals, as relations stubbornly appear to be. The 
objection can be formulated in these terms: does the world as depicted by OSR 
have anything concrete at allÐin the broadest possible sense of the words 
ÔanythingÕ and ÔconcreteÕ that you can conceive, and regardless if there is any 
determinate criteria of individuation of that Ôconcrete somethingÕ? 
To be fair, the supporters of OSR are ready to embrace full-blooded Platonism. 
Dipert, for instance, is explicit:  
I would maintain that the very possibility of a clear understanding of the world 
requires the possibility that it is a simple mathematical structure, and that 
creating complex, ad hoc, or hybrid structures for this task constitutes negative 
progress. (Dipert 1997: 332, his emphasis) 
French and Ladyman (2003b) seem also happy to embrace Platonism, and 
Ladyman and Ross (2007) also toy with the idea that there is ultimately no real 
distinction between mathematical and physical structure, between what we can 
say is very abstract and what is undeniably more concrete:  
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Physical structure exists, but what is it? [...] What makes the structure physical 
and not mathematical? That is a question that we refuse to answer. In our view, 
there is nothing more to be said about this that doesnÕt amount to empty words 
and venture beyond what the PNC allows. The Ôworld-structureÕ just is and exists 
independently of us and we represent it mathematico-physically via our theories. 
(Ladyman and Ross 2007: 158)  54
Skepticism towards the distinction between physical and mathematical is, up to 
a certain point, understandable. After all, the lines are blurred in the work of 
contemporary theoretical physics, which is very distant from direct empirical 
research and very focused on trying to find solutions to what are mainly 
mathematical equations (van Fraassen 2006: 287). To realise this we just need 
to think about those physicists who devote their whole lives to find solutions to 
SchrdingerÕs equation or to the field equations of GR. What is the nature of 
their research? Are those theories about something qualitatively different and 
notoriously more concrete than mathematical models? More understandable 
turns out to be when we realise that what seems to be the paradigmatic 
example of concretenessÐnamely, a material individualÐapparently fails to fit 
the bill, because the very notion of matter is now under suspicion, since it no 
longer satisfies the classical features of solidity, impenetrability and the like: 
Ômatter has become increasingly ephemeral in modern physicsÕ (Ladyman and 
Ross 2007: 160). 
But what do we mean by ÔconcreteÕ then? Very difficult question. And more 
difficult is when matter itself is said to melt into thin air. I am tempted to think 
that a necessary condition for something to be concrete is that it must be a 
determinate being, a being that enjoys fully specific character. Participating in 
the temporal and causal traffic seems also to be a necessary condition. Some 
negative criteria may also be helpful: first, not everything that is concrete needs 
to be a concrete individual in the sense of being a concrete entity that enjoys 
 ÔPNCÕ stands for what Ladyman and Ross call the ÔPrinciple of Naturalistic ClosureÕ, 54
according to which Ô[a]ny metaphysical claim that is to be taken seriously at time t should be 
motivated by, and only by, the service it would perform, if true, in showing how two or more 
specific scientific hypothesis, at least one of which is drawn from fundamental physics, jointly 
explain more than the sum of what is explained by the two hypotheses taken 
separatelyÉÕ (Ladyman and Ross 2007: 37)
!136
determinate identity-conditions and countability;  second, a fully specified 55
being does not need to be material or spatial. This is why a Leibnizian monad 
is an immaterial and unextended individual but also qualifies as concrete: it is 
an entity whose character is fully specific and determinate, it is temporal and 
causally active, and enjoys experience. Third, I am tempted to say that what is 
concrete seems evidently more close to the occurrent than to the dispositional, 
more Ôright here-right nowÕ than ÔiffyÕ (where ÔoccurrentÕ shouldnÕt be equated 
with something non-causal or inactive; cf. ¤3.4). 
The most obvious and uncontroversial example of concreteness that I can think 
of is experience.  Someone with reductive inclinations about experienceÐnot 56
meÐmight say that experience is ÔmerelyÕ an epiphenomenon, or something that 
ÔsupervenesÕ on something non-mental, or simply a systematic illusion. I think 
all these strategies are doomed to failure, as it has become each day more 
evident. Anyhow, my point here is not to prove that experience exists but that 
experience enjoys evident concrete character (it is fully specific and 
determinate in character, it is temporal and active, in a sense which seems very 
close to the occurrent activities defended in ¤3.4), in such a way that any 
attempt of reduction or elimination of it must offer as a reductive base or 
 Thus, maybe free processes or primordial stuffs are concrete entities but do not have 55
determinate identity-conditions and countability so they do not qualify as individuals in this 
metaphysically relevant sense. See Lowe (1998: ch. 2) and Seibt (2002: ¤3.5).
 I could also have used the word ÔexperiencingÕ (to stress its active character), 56
ÔconsciousnessÕ, Ôphenomenal experienceÕ, Ôsubjective experienceÕ, ÔqualiaÕ, ÔfeelingÕ, Ôwhat-
is-likenessÕ or any other similar word that attempts to name what gives a direct and satisfactory 
answer to the hard problem of consciousness. But I want to remain as neutral as possible about 
the connotations of the expression. For instance, I donÕt want to suggest that if we accept 
experience then we are committed to accept an ÔobjectÕ of experience plus a ÔsubjectÕ of 
experience. And I shouldnÕt be understood as claiming that experience consists in a ÔrelationÕ 
of direct acquaintance with a sense-datum or that it is something ÔexternalÕ upon which a 
subject imposes certain conceptual scheme. Far from this. If I were forced to use a more 
suggestive expression, I would choose Ôabsolute experienceÕ or Ôpure experienceÕ, that is, 
experience previous to, or unconditioned by, all of those distinctions and constraints, 
experience previous to a distinction between subject of experience and object of experience, 
between what is external and what is internal. Of course, Bradley takes experience this way 
(viz., as pre-relational and then, after ÔthoughtÕs happy suicideÕ, as supra-relational; see Mander 
2009), and so do Bohm ([1980] 2002: 169, ch. 7), Nishida (1990: Part I), Oakeshott (1933: ch. 
2), and Schrdinger (1959, 1964). I also take it this way, but I am not trying to argue for this 
here (I will say more in ch. 6). For the moment, as I said before, I want to remain neutral and 
simply avoid misinterpretations. You can take experience as ÔsubjectiveÕ or as ÔinternalÕ, as 
long as you respect and preserve its concrete character.
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replacement something that at least preserves that concreteness. This is why 
relational structure is not enough: its irreducibly abstract character is not 
sufficient to ground or replace something as concrete in character as 
experience, nor can I imagine how it would be possible to recover the 
concreteness of experience from nothing but relations. And no consistent and 
comprehensive metaphysics can simply accept as real some hidden and 
abstract realm, while at the same time denies what is the most evident and 
concrete point of departure of any form of comprehensive inquiry into the real, 
from the most trivial to the most sophisticated. That would be like cutting the 
branch over which all comprehensive theory of reality is ultimately sitting.  57
Thus, if you, like me, are not ready to jump into the relational Platonism 
embraced by OSR, then our answer must be something along these lines: first, 
it doesnÕt really matter whether what exists admits to be individuated in 
traditional terms as long as it exhibits concreteness, at least more concreteness 
than abstract structure. This answer says nothing about what is that something, 
nor how it can be individuated. We donÕt need to provide any sophisticated 
criteria of individuation nor any fancy categorical system. And we donÕt need 
to argue against the existence of a Platonic realm per se; we only need to say 
that Platonism alone is not sufficient to account for the evident feature of 
concreteness. Although ÔmatterÕ doesnÕt seem concrete enough these days, 
there is still something which without doubts is as concrete as it gets: 
experience. We can either accept its existence as an irreducible primitive or we 
might try to offer something that grounds it or replaces it. If the former, no 
problem; if the latter, then whatever we offer as a ground for it, or as a 
replacement of it, must at least preserve its concrete character.  
 A comprehensive metaphysics cannot deny the existence of experience. Even a Ôrealistic 57
physicalismÕ (StrawsonÕs expression), that is, a metaphysics according to which Ôeverything 
real is physicalÕ, cannot deny the reality of that whose existence is more indubitable than 
anything else: experience. If there is one kind of physical-stuff then this stuff must also be 
experiential-stuff, and if this sort of Ôneutral monismÕ cannot stand together, then what we must 
give away is the non-experiential bit (Strawson 2006a, 2006b). Coming from a different 
approach but arriving to similar conclusions, see Adams (2007), who understands that reality 
makes no sense if we donÕt recognise the primitive character of something like mental activity, 
in such a way that either mentalism or at least panpsychism appear as the only real alternatives. 
More on this later (ch. 6). 
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My point is rather minimal: in order to reject the Platonic world of OSR we 
just need to show that something concreteÐanything concreteÐexists. If our 
strategy succeeds, then there is something which is at least more concrete than 
structure. And if so, then OSR is false, and what seems to be the ultimate step 
in the process of abstraction shows that its sparseness is insufficient, and leads 
us back to some kind of reification. As van Fraassen says, Ôif structure is not 
just there as mathematical or abstract entity, then it is not true that structure is 
all there isÕ (van Fraassen 2006: 294). 
Here is what a fan of relations might say. In a world of relations these are the 
actual configuration of space, time, matter, causal activity and experience, they 
constitute the concrete realm. He might say, for instance, that the concrete 
realm is simply a concrete bundle of abstract universals. However, I cannot see 
how can bundling bring concreteness to relations, since what is bundling if not 
another relation? (Notice that the problem of unity persists and that BradleyÕs 
regress is still a threat for the bundle theorist: How can bundling do the trick of 
unifying distinct universals into one object, many relations into one complex 
structure? DonÕt we need more bundling-relations to bundle our original 
relational relata and the original bundling-relation, and so on ad infinitum?) Or 
he can insist by saying that it might well be the case that there are abstract 
relations, but this doesnÕt mean that there are no concrete instances of them, 
concrete instances that do not require the concurrence of some non-relational 
relata. But I cannot see how could relations have concrete instances without 
there being some non-relational concrete entity doing at least part, if not all, the 
real job. How could relations by their own be enough? Obviously, it is not 
enough to call them Ôconcrete instancesÕ: their concrete and token character 
must be shown or be quite obvious. But this hasnÕt been shown and it seems 
very far from obvious. How can we talk about concrete instances of, lets say, 
<__exerts causal influence over__> without accepting some other non-
relational concrete entities (events, processes, substances, stuffs, etc.), that fill 
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in those blanks? It may be the case that monadic properties have instances, as 
when we distinguish between the redness of this rose and the redness of that 
rose. But we can only make sense of these as distinct property-instances if we 
first can make sense of a real distinction between this and that rose as two 
distinct individuals.  But what would make the difference between the abstract 58
relation <__being two feet apart from__> and a concrete instance of it? What 
would make it ÔconcreteÕ? Not another relation! Certainly not the relation of 
bundling! It may well be the case that relations within a relational structure get 
their identity fixed by recurring to other relations, indeed to the whole 
relational structure (Dipert 1997, Holton 1999). This certainly happens when a 
structure is not Ôloose and separateÕ but made of internal-Moore relations: this 
structure is a universal of universalsÐindeed, a ÔstructuralÕ universal. However, 
this only means that there is a way of fixing the identity of relations embedded 
in a relational structure without more help than the relational structure itself; 
but it doesnÕt mean that concreteness has been achieved. Relations seem to 
acquire concreteness only when something non-relational enters into the scene, 
something that has a more specific character, an existent that enjoys 
experiential, temporal and causally active character (or at least one of these 
features!). But relations by their own do not fit the bill. As Russell thought, if 
relations exist, then they are the best case for there being abstract, ante rem, 
universals (Russell [1912] 1959: 98, 1956b: 107, quoted in ¤1.4.2 above). 
Thus, if only relations exist, then the world is simply an abstract, ante rem, 
structural universal. Because even a shadow or a hole enjoy more concrete 
character: you can refresh under the former, you can break a bone by falling 
into the latter.  
 Imagine a leaf of grass, which is dark-green over its central area and smoothly varies to 58
yellow over its dry borders. How many colour-instances we have here? There seems to be only 
two non-arbitrary ways to answer this question. Either we say that there is only one internally 
variegated colour-instance, as a continuous spectrum, or we break this spectrum into point-like 
colour-atoms, each of them being a simple instance of a colour. Any other alternative would 
involve making an arbitrary boundary within the leaf. The same reasoning applies when we try 
to demarcate the leaf from its surroundings, when we try to distinguish one object from another 
one. The generalisation of this puzzle is one of the main reasons that leads a bundle and trope-
theorist like Campbell (1990) to embrace a monistic metaphysics.
!140
CanÕt we avoid the missing-relata objection and the objection against exclusive 
Platonism by embracing MOSR instead of OSR? Philosophers that support 
MOSR say that while QM shows that we cannot say that individuals have 
intrinsic natures, this does not mean that there are no individuals standing in 
those relations (Esfeld 2004; see also Esfeld and Lam 2008). As it can be 
appreciated, MOSR just adds to OSR the existence of individuals that work as 
relata but, apart from that, these relata lack any private content. Not too much 
progress. Bare individuals are not less mysterious than pure structure. And the 
addition of these two types of ingredients in one package doesnÕt seem to give 
too much of substance to our world. The position of MOSR is very unstable. 
First, to posit some transcendental bare individuals merely to support the 
structure of OSR seems not only an ad-hoc move but also a quite poor 
improvement. The sparseness of such ontology makes it insufficient to explain 
the most evident concreteness. An individual devoid of intrinsic nature might 
qualify as a concrete particular that can work as a relatum, but why would 
anyone believe in such an empty thing? In what sense such an entity can give 
us the concreteness that we are looking for? How can it be the source of 
temporality, causal activity and experience? Simply because it ÔstandsÕ in 
relations to other entities of the same empty character, without being anything 
but that? MOSR has to make sense of the idea of relata, that, apart from 
standing in relations to other relata, are otherwise naked. Dressing them 
exclusively with internal-Moore relations offers little consolation. The 
individuals of MOSR that work as relata look like naked men who insist in 
being sufficiently dressed just by pointing to the clothes of the others, who, in 
their turn, claim the same but pointing to the clothes of the first ones. But who 
is really dressed?! I cannot see how one can ÔinstantiateÕ those abstract 
relations or recover concreteness merely by adding these type of relata. A 
ÔrelationÕ of instantiation certainly cannot do the trick, since BradleyÕs regress 
will haunt it, and I cannot see what makes a bare point more ÔconcreteÕ than an 
abstract structure. If OSR seems devoid of all instantiators and all 
concreteness, MOSR does very little more by adding to this picture some thin 
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individuals that lack any specific nature for their own and that do not offer any 
evidence of a non-relational instantiating power. We can appreciate why 
Bradley was suspicious about an ontology of internal-Moore relations: these 
relations recognise the individuality of the relata but at the same time they deny 
their self-sufficient character. The constitution of this type of relata rests 
mysteriously in what lies outside them. Why do they deserve the name of 
individuals at all? What is left for them? Why arenÕt they simply dissolved into 
the relational structure that constitutes them? 
4.5 Restoring concreteness     
It is my impression that OSR is just an example of a methodological error that 
affects most of current naturalistic, physicalist and reductive metaphysics. 
W h i t e h e a d c a l l s t h a t e r r o r Ô T h e F a l l a c y o f M i s p l a c e d 
ConcretenessÕ (Whitehead 1925: 72). It occurs in all intellectual enterprises 
that involve a great amount of generalisation. It happens, for instance, when we 
use geometrical models to represent extended nature. Abstractions such as 
ÔlineÕ, ÔpointÕ and Ôsimple locationÕ are certainly useful elements of those 
theoretical models, but extended nature doesnÕt present itself like that: line, 
point or simple location are constructed by considering the abstract limit of 
what experience presents as having extension and duration or as being in 
motion. OSR simply represents an extreme of the hypostasis done at the end of 
a process of abstraction.  A mathematical model is reached by abstraction 59
 As the rise of OSR proves, physicalist reductivism often is followed by mathematical 59
reductivism. Quine (1981) is also a good example of how this (misguided) process works. He 
started with abundance, he continued with points, then he replaced points by systems of 
coordinates, and he ended up betting for an ontology of nothing but sets of sets. If you love 
dessert landscapes, you will look for dessert landscapes, and you will start paying attention 
only to dessert landscapes. Just like a man with a new hammer sees nails everywhere. 
Suspiciously, sets fans avoid the issue of what makes a singleton distinct from its member or 
what makes an individual to be a member of its singleton (compare Socrates and {Socrates}). 
Of course, the identity-conditions of sets are very clear, since the identity of a set is given by its 
members. But how are we supposed to understand membership? Or how are we supposed to 
understand the identity-conditions of a member of a set which is not itself a set, i.e., the 
member of a singleton? The building of set theory rests upon heavy (and shaky) metaphysical 
assumptions. It either presupposes an answer to the question of individuality/objecthood or it 
(conveniently) leaves ÔsingletonÕ or ÔmembershipÕ as primitives. But it is in these very notions 
where all the real action takes place!
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from experience, and then the model is taken as if it were reality in itself. 
Whitehead saw this fallacy as one of the two more misleading strategies in 
which philosophers regularly fallÐthe second one, closely associated to it, was 
to overestimate the place of logic when drawing the premises of a 
philosophical system of thought: 
The aim at generalization is sound, but the estimate of success is exaggerated. 
There are two main forms of such overstatement. One form is what I have 
termed, elsewhere, the Ôfallacy of misplaced concretenessÕ. This fallacy consists 
in neglecting the degree of abstraction involved when an actual entity is 
considered merely so far as it exemplifies certain categories of thought. There 
are aspects of actualities which are simply ignored so long as we restrict thought 
to these categories. Thus the success of a philosophy is to be measured by its 
comparative avoidance of this fallacy, when thought is restricted within its 
categories. (Whitehead 1929: 9Ð10) 
The search for general categories and principles should never lead us to forget 
our point of departure: the qualitative richness and concreteness revealed in 
experience, which any general way of making sense of reality as a whole must 
account for and try to preserve. Feyerabend raises a similar point in a 
suggestive manner: 
The search for reality that accompanied the growth of Western civilization 
played an important role in the process of simplifying the world. It is usually 
presented as something positive, or an enterprise that leads to the discovery of 
new objects, features, relations. It is said that it widens our horizon and reveals 
the principles behind the most common phenomena. But this search has also a 
strong negative component. It does not accept the phenomena as they are, it 
changes them, either in thought (abstraction) or by actively interfering with them 
(experiment). Both types of changes involve simplifications. Abstractions 
remove the particulars that distinguish an object from another, together with 
some general properties such as color and smell. Experiments further remove or 
try to remove the links that tie every process to its surroundingsÐthey create an 
artificial and somewhat impoverished environment and explore its peculiarities. 
In both cases, things are being taken away or Òblocked offÓ from the totality that 
surrounds us. Interestingly enough, the remains are called Òreal,Ó which means 
they are regarded as more important than the totality itself. Moreover, this 
totality is described as consistent of two parts: a hidden and partly distorted real 
world and a concealing and disturbing veil around it. (Feyerabend 1999: 5; in 
similar vein, Oakeshott 1933: ch. 2) 
OSR just shows how far the way of abstraction can take us. The thirst for 
reduction starts when a line is drawn between appearance and reality, or 
between subjective and objective, or internal and externalÐyou name it: any 
fragmentation of similar sort will do. After that, we start forgetting about 
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appearances, subjectivity or internality, and we give them away as derivative, 
redundant or even illusory. Then we approach the real, the objective or the 
external with the same attitude. Thus, a landscape is reduced to objects in 
relations, objects are reduced to points, points to mere locations, locations to 
mere nodes of a relational structure. ÔLess is more!Õ, we hear. It is only after we 
start missing what we lost and after we try to recover it that we realise that the 
materials that we have in our hands are not sufficient to do the trick. They are 
too thin, too sparse. We need to move some steps back. Reality cannot be pure 
structure, so something must exist apart from it, whatever it is. As van Fraassen 
puts it: 
I do not see any way out of this. The radical form of structuralism seems to me to 
lead right back to reification: the whatever it is that bears this structure may be 
denied other properties perhaps, but not existence. This does not mean, of 
course, that there have to be distinguishable particles. What it does mean is that 
we must take as at best metaphorical any attempt to equate particle talk, of any 
sort, with descriptions of structure. (van Fraassen 2006: 294) 
So we need to restore the richness and concrete character of appearances with 
the help of a more complete metaphysics. Bare structure is not enough. OSR 
has the right diagnosis about the ontologies of externally related and self-
contained individuals: they are incapable of making sense of the results of 
contemporary physics and they lead us to intractable metaphysical 
conundrums. But the solution offered by OSR is not better: it might make sense 
of the results of physics, but its price is too high, since it leaves us with nothing 
but abstract structure. LetÕs see whether a holistic ontology that is willing to 
add more substance to the world can do the trick. 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5 Priority monism: The priority of One, the internal      
relatedness of Many 
Having showed the ontological insufficiency of DE and OSR, in this chapter I 
will move forward to examine what seems to be a more substantial 
contemporary holistic ontology: Priority Monism (PM), the view that Jonathan 
Schaffer has made popular during the last years (Schaffer 2010a, 2010b, 2013).  
I will argue that PM is not a satisfactory ontology. In ¤5.1 I present PM in 
contrast with other views about fundamental cardinality. In ¤5.2 I present one 
of SchafferÕs central arguments for PM, according to which PM can be inferred 
from the internal relatedness of all things, where internal relatedness is 
understood as failure of free recombination. In ¤5.3 I argue against the 
mereological principles upon which this argument rests. Incidentally, my 
objections will also undermine another core argument that Schaffer has used 
for PM: the possibility of gunk. In ¤5.4 I argue against the metaphysical 
assumptions upon which the argument of internal relatedness rests, in 
particular against SchafferÕs understanding of ontological basicness and modal 
freedom. In ¤5.5 I argue against SchafferÕs peculiar understanding of internal 
relatedness and show that his view either collapses into some form of relational 
essentialism, or into a stronger form of monism, or back into the fragmented 
world of Humean Supervenience. My central claim is that we cannot make 
clear sense of SchafferÕs inference because his understanding of internal 
relatedness is compatible with different ontologiesÐincluding pluralistic onesÐ 
and because he doesnÕt give us a more specific idea of what kind of whole we 
are supposed to infer. SchafferÕs inference only works if one takes too much for 
granted, as he does in the ÔassumptionsÕ and ÔprinciplesÕ of his arguments, most 
of which I dispute in what follows. 
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5.1 The number of things     
LetÕs start with a very simple model. Imagine world W, which appears as 
inhabited by two metaphysical atoms, x and y: 
xy 
Take a metaphysical atom to be a simple or non-composite individual, that is, 
an object with no proper parts into which it could be divided (Leibniz 1989: 
655). Understand Ôcould be dividedÕ as expressing metaphysical possibility in 
the widest sense. Assume x and y to be concrete and material. Moreover, 
assume that they are wholly distinct and that there are no gaps between them; 
take these two claims as compatible.  For the moment, forget about how x and 60
y are related. Now quantify over such world. How many individual objects are 
there? 
PM says that there are three, namely two atoms (x and y) and one composite 
whole or mereological fusion (W). But with one qualification: the whole is 
metaphysically prior to the two atoms; that is, x and y are grounded in, or are 
ontologically dependent upon, W. According to PM, our world is just like that. 
There is one prior or basic concrete material individual, the cosmos, which is 
the maximal fusion, and many posterior or grounded concrete material 
individuals, the planets, chairs and grains of sand. There is the whole and there 
are the parts, but the whole is ontologically prior to the parts. 
 Connecting the part-whole structure with the prior-posterior structure, Schaffer accepts what 60
he calls the tiling constraint, according to which, Ôthe basic actual concrete objects collectively 
cover the cosmos without overlapping. In a slogan: no gaps, no overlapsÕ (Schaffer 2010a: 38). 
As I said in ¤1.5.2, it is mysterious to me how a Humean metaphysics of externally related 
basic objects, where everything is Ôloose and separateÕ, can leave no gaps, since wholly distinct 
basic objects do not even touch each other, and if they donÕt touch, and space is dense, then 
they do leave a gap. Thus, I deny from the very start that Humean pluralism can satisfy 
SchafferÕs tiling constraint. This is not the way in which Schaffer thinks, though. Under 
SchafferÕs understanding, the Humean pluralistic metaphysics, prima facie, can also satisfy the 
tiling constraint. Schaffer just wants to make clear that neither parthood nor overlapping obtain 
among what he calls basic or prior individuals, but the constraint says nothing about what is 
prior to what.
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Obviously, PM is not the only possible answer. Take Existence Monism (EM) 
to be the view that rejects the assumed atoms as mere appearance of plural 
cardinality and answers that there is only one individual object, W, which is 
not a composite but an extended simple (Horgan and Potrč 2008, Potrč 2003, 
Rea 2001, Spinoza 1994: IP12Ð13, IP15s). In W, x and y do not have 
determinate identity-conditions nor are they countable, so they only deserve to 
be called individual objects when talking under the fiction of decomposition 
(Schaffer 2007: 179). If EM is right, x and y can only be internally-Bradley 
related, since both the relata and the relation would be mere abstractions or 
fictions derived from W. The object defended by EM qualifies as simple 
because, though extended, it is neither composed nor metaphysically divisible 
into distinct individual objects or proper partsÐaccording to reasons that EM is 
supposed to provide, as we will see soon. 
Thirdly, there is also Priority Pluralism (PP), the view that answers, just like 
PM, that there are three individual objects, namely two atoms (x and y) and 
one composite whole or mereological fusion (W). But with the opposite 
qualification: the two atoms are metaphysically prior to the posterior whole, 
i.e. the whole is grounded in, or is ontologically dependent upon, the atoms. 
LewisÕ thesis of Humean Supervenience may fall under this label (only if we 
take that wholes represent real addition of being that stand in asymmetrical 
dependence upon the atomic base; more on this later). 
Finally, there is Existence Pluralism (EP), the view that answers that there are 
only two individual objects, x and y, period. Typically, nihilists about 
composition fall under this label (Rosen and Dorr 2002, Sider 2013, Unger 
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1979, van Inwagen 1990, 1994, 2002),  though of course we should not forget 61
that EM is also a variant of compositional nihilism (Horgan and Potrč 2008, 
Potrč 2003, Schaffer 2007). What PP calls a posterior or grounded composite is 
only so under the fiction of composition (Rosen and Dorr 2002: 167). Mere 
aggregates or composites, no matter how close are their atomic components, 
never make one individual object. Thus, W is just a plurality. What happens is 
that simples are arranged in many different ways, e.g., there are no chairs but 
only simples arranged chair-wise.  
Prima facie, these four views exhaust the possible answers to the question 
about the number of things in our toy-world,  at least under the assumption of 62
a metaphysics of concrete material individuals.  There is wide agreement in 63
the literature on the idea that, if any of these views is true, then it is so with 
metaphysical necessity (Rosen 2006, Schaffer 2010a, Sider 1993, Tallant 2013, 
 I include van Inwagen as giving arguments for compositional nihilism, though obviously his 61
position is not strictly that. He thinks that things never compose unless they compose a living 
organism. So, leaving aside living organisms, van Inwagen does support compositional 
nihilism. Now, his argument for accepting that living organisms are the only composites is very 
weak, and leads to difficulties. It takes this form: (i) I exist; (ii) I am a material composite; 
therefore, (iii) at least one material composite exists (cf. van Inwagen 1990: 73). The argument 
has a Cartesian tone but there is nothing Cartesian about it. Only premise (i) seems 
uncontroversial: something existsÐcall it ÔIÕÐbecause I have direct awareness that mental 
activity takes place, and I cannot deny it. But there is nothing indubitable about premise (ii). 
On the contrary, the indubitable character of premise (i) can perfectly drive me to conclude that 
there are no material objects, neither composites nor simples. Only materialistic prejudices lead 
van Inwagen to his implausible conclusion. And his conclusion multiplies the problems, for 
what criterion can we offer to determine when some material simples compose a ÔlifeÕ or an 
ÔorganismÕ? Moreover, are we going to include only organisms that think? What about living 
organisms that do not think or computing artefacts that are not organic? Very vague.
 This is not exactly true. Those who accept composites have two options: either they accept 62
unrestricted composition or restricted composition. I take PP and PM as embracing unrestricted 
composition, that is, as supporting the mereological criterion according to which any two 
objects always compose a whole or mereological fusion (this is the way in which fans of 
mereology take composition; see Armstrong 1997: ¤2.12 and Lewis 1991: 74). The so-called 
ÔrestrictionistÕ about composition would recognise the existence of the two atoms but would 
make a pause before answering the question about the existence of a derivative composite. ÔIt 
dependsÕ, he would say. But, as far as I know, no restrictionist offers a clear criterion of 
composition for concrete material objects. More on this later (¤5.3.2).
 There are other possibilities. For instance, x and y (or W) could be immaterial, or free-63
floating tropes, or mere patterns in a relational (hence, abstract) structure (as in OSR), or just 
portions of some primordial stuff (substance-mass-term, not substance-count-noun). It is 
difficult for me to make sense of the idea of free-floating tropes and specially of the relation of 
ÔbundlingÕ that allegedly makes many of them one bundle, so I will not consider this alternative 
(see Campbell 1990 and Williams 1953 for a defence of the pure trope metaphysics). We 
already saw the puzzles that affect OSR (ch. 4). Later on, I will say a little more about 
immaterial things and stuff.
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van Inwagen 1990: ¤2, ¤8, Williams 2006). Since these views involve claims 
about the inherent nature of reality (its fundamental cardinality and identity), 
they are necessarily true if true at all. I will not dispute this claim; I will only 
note that this shared commitment says nothing about what is actually the case. 
EM and EP reject composites as real individual objects; they are nihilists about 
composition. To the question about when two individual objects compose a 
third one, their answer is ÔneverÕ. To the question about when an individual 
object is a proper part of some other, their answer is also ÔneverÕ. According to 
EM and EP there are only simples, either one or many. Consequently, they both 
also reject the metaphysics of levels, at least when applied to individual 
objects: since there are only simples, there are neither ÔwholesÕ nor ÔpartsÕ that 
require grounding. The objects that exist have equal metaphysical rights. They 
are exclusionary: the existence of many excludes the solitary existence of one, 
and vice-versa. In contrast, PP and PM accept composites and, consequently, a 
metaphysics of levels that introduces direction of ontological priority between 
components and composite (in either direction). 
For the sake of argument, take PM, EM, PP and EP to exhaust the possible 
answers about what is the number of things in our toy-world. How can we 
decide? Not clear at all. The four alternatives, prima facie, make sense. But if 
the answer is necessary true if true at all, then only one of them can be true. 
Which one? PP and PM need, as a condition of sense, the existence of 
mereological structure and the existence of a fundamental layer of being, either 
the whole or the atoms. This need is more or less clear: without a fundamental 
layer, no objects would exist because there would be no ground for them; but 
there are objects, so there is some layer grounding them! On the other hand, 
EM and EP need, as a condition of sense, the existence of either one or many 
simples. This need is also more or less clear: without the existence of one or 
many simples, no objects would exist; but there is at least one object, so at least 
some simple exists! But how can these views guarantee that their particular 
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conditions of sense actually obtain? From the armchair we can answer only 
some questions, as I will try to do in this chapter. From the armchair we can 
reflect on the range of possible alternative views and the conditions that each 
of these views needs to meet in order to make sense at all; from the armchair 
we can also clarify what possibilities threaten those conditions. But certainly 
we cannot tell from the armchair what is actually the case! From the armchair 
we can also offer reasons for preferring a metaphysics of simples over a 
metaphysics of levels, or vice-versa. But once we have decided, say, in favour 
of a metaphysics of levels, how can we decide between PM and PP? Or once 
we have decided for a metaphysics of simples, how can we decide between EM 
and EP? The question has the form of an empirical question. Thus, the question 
is either not answerableÐbecause the answer lies beyond the bounds of sense, 
as Kant thought (Kant 2007: 7, 402ff)Ðor it is answerable only by doing 
empirical investigationÐas Russell ended up thinking after giving so many 
frustrating battles against the neo-Hegelians: 
There is nothing in logic that can help us to decide between monism and 
pluralism, or between the view that there are ultimate relational facts and the 
view that there are none. My own decision in favour of pluralism and relations is 
taken on empirical grounds, after convincing myself that the a priori arguments 
to the contrary are invalid. (Russell 1956a: 338Ð9) 
If the answer lies beyond the bounds of sense, end of story, and all discussion 
is futile. If the question is answerable by empirical grounds, then we need to 
stop thinking and start looking, and only once we have a clear understanding of 
what is actually the case we can definitely rule out certain possibilities. As I 
will argue in the next chapter, empirical evidence supports a conclusion that is 
the exact opposite of RussellÕs. 
5.2 From internal-Schaffer relatedness to PM     
One of the core arguments that Schaffer has given in favour of PM is a 
reformulation of what he takes to be a classical monistic argument: that of 
universal internal relatedness (Schaffer 2010b). As I said in ¤2.4, there are at 
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least three different meanings of internal relatedness. SchafferÕs understanding 
of internal relatedness adds a fourth one. For arguing for PM, Schaffer takes as 
point of departure MooreÕs understanding of the ÔdogmaÕ or ÔaxiomÕ of internal 
relations (Moore 1919). Recall that a relation is internal-Moore iff it is 
essential to its relata. By saying this, Moore means that if two terms are 
internally-Moore related, then they are (at least partly) constituted by being so-
related. Pervasive relational constitution has obvious strong modal 
consequences: if all relations are internal-Moore, then all the related terms 
wouldnÕt be what they are without the others being what they are. Yet these 
necessary truths about the terms are a consequence of their relational essences; 
they hold because the terms are relationally constituted.  This is precisely 64
what happens in OSR. 
Schaffer thinks that MooreÕs formulation is unnecessarily strong, since Ôthe 
monistic conclusion will equally follow from a much less demanding 
conception of internal relatednessÕ (Schaffer 2010b: 349). FurthermoreÐand 
this is very puzzlingÐhe thinks that this less demanding conception leaves room 
for external relations (Schaffer 2010b: 361Ð2). Question: which ones? What 
Schaffer tries to do is to infer the organic unity of the world just by using a 
Ômodally constraining relation, which is a relation that precludes the free 
recombination of its relataÕ (Schaffer 2010b: 350, his italics). According to the 
Lewisian understanding of the principle of Humean free recombinationÐwhich 
Schaffer dogmatically accepts as true of basic objectsÐÔanything can coexist 
with anything else, at least provided they occupy distinct spatiotemporal 
positions. Likewise, anything can fail to coexist with anything elseÕ (Lewis 
1986a: 88). Since the Lewisian world is just one tiny thing after another one, 
and since the natural properties instantiated by those things are perfectly 
intrinsic, and since all natural relations are external relations of spatiotemporal 
distance, the actual mosaic is a metaphysical accident and every bit of it could 
 The essence, inherent nature or real definition of a thing (i.e., what a thing is) grounds 64
necessary truths about that thing; in contrast, necessary truths about a thing do not necessarily 
tell us what a thing is (Fine 1994). E.g., Socrates and {Socrates} necessarily hang around 
together, yet only the second of these objects is a set.
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have existed differently arranged or could have failed to exist without affecting 
the rest of the arrangement. By way of contrast, Schaffer understands that an 
internal relation is a relation that constraints modal freedom or precludes 
Humean free recombination thus understood. LetÕs call this fourth 
understanding of internal relatedness internal-Schaffer: 
Two terms, x and y, are internally-Schaffer related iff x and y 
cannot be freely recombined. 
While in internal-Moore relatedness, modal constraint is a natural consequence 
of relational constitution, in SchafferÕs formulation there is only a commitment 
to the modal consequence: internally related terms are modally constrained 
terms. Schaffer simply assumes that the principle of Humean free 
recombination must hold between basic objects, in such a way that if it fails to 
hold, then this failure must be explained by the fact that the objects in question 
are not, after all, basic, either because they overlap or because they have a 
common ground in a more basic object (recall that according to SchafferÕs 
tiling constraint, basic objects do not leave gaps and do not overlap). His idea, 
then, is to take the reverse path that the Humean pluralist takes: 
A disconnected pluralist heap should be amenable to free recombination; failure 
of free recombination is thus the modal signature of an interconnected cosmos. 
In short: while the neo-Humean argues from pluralism to free recombination, the 
neo-Hegelian should argue from failure of free recombination to monism. 
(Schaffer 2010b: 350, his italics) 
SchafferÕs argument is developed in two stages: 
Stage I: There is universal internal-Schaffer relatedness, i.e., there is at least 
one sufficiently pervasive internal-Schaffer relation, call it R, that modally 
constraints all things. Though his aim is not to defend some specific version of 
R, Schaffer offers three plausible candidates to fulfil RÕs role: R1=CausationÐ
given causal essentialism; R2=Spatiotemporal relatednessÐgiven 
supersubstantivalism about the relation of objects and regions, and 
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structuralism about the essence of regions; and R3=Being world-matesÐgiven 
counterpart theory (Schaffer 2010b: ¤¤3.2Ð3.4). 
Stage II: PM follows from the failure of free recombination of the dependent 
objects. If two wholly distinct objects do not enjoy modal freedom, then they 
cannot be basic. Otherwise, they would be freely recombinable. If they are not 
basic, then this is so because they co-depend upon a Ôcommon groundÕ. Since 
the cosmos overlaps everything and nothing hinders its modal freedom, the 
cosmos is prior to all of its dependent objects.  
In what he takes to be his first proof for stage II, Schaffer includes the 
following mereological principles and metaphysical assumptions, which I 
reproduce here with minor alterations (cf. Schaffer 2010b: 356): 
P1=There is a unique maximal element among concrete objects (a concrete 
world). 
P2=A concrete object that has a proper part has other disjoint proper part. 
A1=All things are internally-Schaffer related (stage I). 
A2=There is some basic object (chains of ontological dependence stop 
somewhere). 
A3=A basic object is freely recombinable (tiling constraint and Humean free 
recombination of basic objects is assumed; failure of free recombination of basic 
objects needs explanation). 
Given all these assumptions, the first proof for stage II is trivial, and it consists 
in the following reductio (Schaffer 2010b: 357): Suppose (for reductio) that 
there is a basic object, x, which is short of W. (Importantly, by P1, the world or 
cosmos does exist qua maximal element among concrete material objects.) If 
so, then there is in W another basic object, y, which does not overlap x (P1, 
P2). If so, then x and y should be freely recombinable (A3). But x and y are not 
freely recombinable (A1). We have a contradiction. Therefore, since neither x 
nor y can be basic because neither of them enjoys modal freedom, and since 
there must be some basic and modally free object (A2, A3), this object must be 
W. The cosmos is the only basic or ontologically independent thing; all the rest 
of things are not freely recombinable because they depend upon it. 
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Notice that this first proof for stage II cannot demonstrate the existence of a 
prior concrete material object upon which many other posterior concrete 
material objects depend. These facts are taken for granted (P1, P2, A2). 
SchafferÕs argument, at the very most, can reveal an asymmetrical direction of 
ontological priority, according to which a whole is prior to its parts, given the 
existence of both a whole and its various parts (P1, P2), given that either the 
whole or the parts must be basic (A2), and given that basic things are taken to 
be not modally constrained by wholly distinct basic things, that is, that being 
basic is the same as being modally free (A3). But this is something quite 
different from offering a proof for PM simpliciter. The second proof for stage 
II runs in very similar terms, so I will skip it. If my objections work against the 
first proof, then they should work against the second proof without problems, 
in particular because the latter employs stronger mereological assumptions. 
5.3 SchafferÕs prior whole unpacked: Mereology and metaphysics     
It is quite clear that great part of SchafferÕs argument depends on the 
mereological principles assumed for stage II (P1, P2). In particular, it depends 
on P1, the idea that there is an object which is a maximal element among 
concrete material objects. However, I donÕt see why should one accept 
mereological principles as offering a guide to, or imposing constraints on, a 
specific ontology. After all, mereology is supposed to be like logic: 
uninformative about what is the case. ItÕs nothing more than a formal analysis 
of the concepts ÔpartÕ and ÔwholeÕ, and, as such, it says nothing about whether 
the concepts apply or not. As Simons puts it, mereology Ôcan have little or 
nothing to say about what parts or wholes there actually are or what is part of 
what, any more than an analysis of causation could tell us what events there are 
or what causes whatÕ (Simons 2006: 597; in similar vein, van Fraassen 1995, 
2002: ch. 1). Furthermore, even if we were to accept mereological assumptions, 
I see no reason for accepting SchafferÕs particular mereological assumption of 
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there being a maximal whole, when there are equally coherent mereological 
systems that work without such assumption. LetÕs see these reasons in detail. 
5.3.1 Mereology: Not so innocent after all  
Mereology is supposed to be like logic in the following respects. First, it is 
supposed to be vacuous: it is supposed to tell us what is consistent to say given 
certain assumptions, but not what there is or what is actually the case. Second, 
it is supposed to be topic-neutral: it is supposed to apply regardless the nature 
of a given domain of objects Ðyet with the obvious restriction that its primitive 
concepts (e.g., Ôproper partÕ, ÔfusionÕ, ÔdistinctÕ, ÔoverlapÕ) only make sense 
under the assumption of a plural domain; but granted a plural domain, those 
concepts are supposed to apply across the board and cross-categorically (e.g., 
mereological notions can even apply across possibilia, since a world can be 
taken to be a proper part of the fusion of all possible worlds). Third (and this is 
the most important bit), mereology is supposed to be Ôontologically innocentÕ, 
in the sense that, unlike set-theory, it represents no addition of being to that of 
the domain. Mereological composition is supposed to be like identity. Or at 
least this is the way in which Armstrong and Lewis take it. As Lewis puts it,  
To be sure, if we accept mereology, we are committed to the existence of all 
manner of mereological fusions. But given a prior commitment to cats, say, a 
commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment. The [cat-] fusion is 
nothing over and above the cats that compose it. It just is them. They just are it. 
Take them together or take them separately, the cats are the same portion of 
Reality either way. Commit yourself to their existence all together or one at a 
time, itÕs the same commitment either way. If you draw up an inventory of 
Reality according to your scheme of things, it would be double counting to list 
the cats and then also list their fusion. (Lewis 1991: 81, his italics; similarly, 
Armstrong 1997: 12Ð13) 
It looks innocent. Thus, if reality consists in two angels, then the two angels are 
the one mereological fusion that obtains; each angel is a disjoint part of the one 
fusion; the fusion is just where the angels are. You get the fusion of the angels 
just by taking the two angels as one whole or aggregate. What is not innocent is 
the metaphysics involved in the claim that reality is made of two angels. This is 
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a substantial claim. But once we recognise that the two angels are our domain 
of universal quantification, mereology takes care of itself. Given that reality is 
two angels, some bits of mereology will apply, some others not. For instance, 
such a world is not gunky,  since everything indicates that angels are 65
metaphysical atoms, hence mereological simples. Similarly, such a world is not 
junky,  since there is one maximal whole: the fusion of the two angels. And, 66
allegedly, there is no ontological increase: the fusion of the two angels is not 
something like a third angel. Granted that there is an ontological commitment 
to angels, a commitment to angels-fusions is not additional commitment. Once 
you fix your ontology, your mereology is fixed. 
I have no objection against this ontologically innocent way of taking 
mereological-talk. But, if so, we cannot take it, strictly speaking, as expressing 
substantial ontological truths. Otherwise, there is confusion. In fact, against 
mereological-talk applies, mutatis mutandis, what I said against supervenience-
talk (¤1.1): if Y supervenes on X, then supervenience is ontologically innocent 
(a free lunch, no real addition of being) iff Y and X are identical, that is, if the 
name ÔYÕ and the name ÔXÕ are just two different modes of presentation of the 
very same object. Thus, to know what you have, first you need to be clear 
about the supervenience base, since that is, strictly speaking, all what you 
have. And so with mereology. Because if mereology is really ontologically 
innocent, then it can only be taken as a way of talking about many as if they 
were one, or about one as if it were many, depending on which substantial 
ontological commitments are made before counting. But this is just what the 
compositional nihilist says! Namely, that composition (or decomposition), 
strictly speaking, never occurs; and that quantification is singular when is over 
one simple and plural when is over many simples, but never singular when is 
about many simples or plural when is about one simple. This means that in our 
 Gunky world=a world without atomic parts. Everything in such a world is a whole with 65
proper parts (parthood Ôall the way downÕ).
 Junky world=a world without a maximal whole. Everything in such a world is a proper part 66
of some whole (parthood Ôall the way upÕ).
!156
two-angels world, when I quantify universally, I count two objects, period. 
There is angel1 and there is angel2, each of them numerically identical with 
itself. I can talk about the two angels collectively, as when I call them ÔtheyÕ, 
but then I am using plural quantification: ÔtheyÕ is not a singular name for a 
singular object but a plural name for a plurality; because they are not one 
(Bohn 2012, Simons 2003). ÔTheyÕ works just like ÔflockÕ or ÔThe BeatlesÕ. The 
true metaphysical unities are the two angels and their fusion is only one by 
courtesy.  
When mereology is taken seriously then it ceases to be innocent. Schaffer 
admits this. For there being a whole that is ontologically prior to some parts, 
there must exist both the whole and the parts, and they must stand in a relation 
of asymmetrical dependence. In fact, whenever a metaphysician looks to our 
two-angels world and counts three objects (namely: angel1, angel2 and the 
whole or fusion angel1+angel2), then mereological talk ceases to be 
ontologically innocent. And only after parts and wholes are recognised as 
distinct objects in their own right, the question of what is ontologically prior to 
what can appear. This is where PM and PP emerge as alternative ontologies. In 
sum, if mereology is really ontologically innocent, then it collapses into 
compositional nihilism and there are no parthood relations and no distinct 
layers of objects. If not, then we must be offered an explanation about why is it 
that one layer grounds the other one and not the other way around. In either 
case, we need clarity about what is the basic ontological inventory before 
counting: in PM and PP we need clarity about what is the fundamental level of 
existents; in EM and EP we need clarity about the exclusionary existents. 
5.3.2 Against composites  
PM and PP embrace a layered ontology of composite objects, where both 
whole and parts exist, and either parts are prior to whole or whole prior to 
parts. Of course, they still need to say more about what falls under ÔwholeÕ and 
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what falls under ÔpartÕ (spirits, sets, strings, etc.). As it happens, I donÕt see any 
convincing reason for taking composites or aggregates as serious individuals. 
Hence, I donÕt see any reason for accepting P1 and P2 as offering anything like 
an insightful metaphysics. I will not go into the details of the arguments for 
compositional nihilism. There is good contemporary literature supporting this 
position (Horgan and Potrč 2008, Rosen and Dorr 2002, Sider 2013, Unger 
1979, van Inwagen 1990, 1994, 2002), and still much better and more 
insightful discussion in the classical texts of Leibniz and Spinoza (Bennett 
1984: ch. 4, 2001: chs. 7 and 12, Jolley 2005: ch. 2, Mason 1967: 94Ð95, 120Ð
22, Spinoza 1994: IP12Ð13, IP15s, Woolhouse 1993). I will only make a brief 
summary. 
(i) Real individuals. First, there is a metaphysical consideration to reject 
material composites as serious individual objects. As Leibniz said: Ôwhat is not 
truly one entity is not truly one entity either. It has always being thought that 
ÔoneÕ and ÔentityÕ are interchangeableÕ (Mason 1967: 121). The existence and 
identity of material composites seem always to rest on the existence and 
identity of their components; or, as Spinoza will approve, the concept of a 
material composite presupposes concepts of its components, while a real 
substantial unit can only be conceived through itself (Spinoza 1994: ID3). That 
is, if there are individual objects at all, then these should exhibit a true and non-
arbitrary kind of unity. But material composites do not exhibit it. Pace Arnauld, 
when Leibniz asked of real substances to be truly one, he wasnÕt imposing 
arbitrary restrictions but only making explicit the ultimate consequences of the 
Aristotelian criterion according to which individual substances are ultimate 
subjects of predication:  
[W]hat constitutes the essence of an entity through aggregation is only a state of 
its constituents; for example, what constitutes the essence of an army is only a 
state of being of the constituent men. This state of being therefore presupposes a 
substance whose essence is not a state of being of another substance. (Mason 
1967: 121) 
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Thus, according to Leibniz, an army is not a true individual object because it is 
finally the result of many soldiers being certain ways. And so with all 
composites. The difference is only a matter of degree of cohesion of the 
components, of how close they stand to each other, but, ultimately, there is no 
substantial difference between a block of marble and a heap of sand. All 
material composites, regardless their degree of cohesion, are pluralities, just 
like flocks of sheep. Material composites are never ultimate subjects of 
predication, because they are predicable of other ultimate subjects of 
predication: their components (Jolley 2005: 39). For there being aggregates at 
all, there must be ultimate parts that are not aggregates.  But material things, 67
qua extended things, seem always to be entities by aggregation! LeibnizÕs 
search for real substantial units took him through the following path: (i) for 
there being material composites, there must be ultimate parts that are not 
composites, i.e., there must be real individual substances; (ii) whatever is 
material is extended; (iii) whatever is extended has proper parts, therefore is 
the result of those parts being certain ways; (iv) whatever is material is not a 
real individual substance; therefore, (v) real individual substances are 
immaterial. The search for real substantial units led Leibniz to embrace an 
ontology of unextended and immaterial atoms (monads), and to reject 
 In the Monadology, Leibniz takes this to be an a priori requirement: ÔThere must be simple 67
substances, since there are compounds, for the compounded is but a collection or an aggregate 
of simplesÕ (Leibniz 1989: 655, emphasis in the original). In the same spirit, the early 
Wittgenstein: Ô... we realize the existence of the simple objectÐa prioriÐas a logical necessityÉ
the simple object is prejudged in the complexÕ (Wittgenstein 1979: 60, emphases in the 
original).
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composites (material aggregates) as substances and regard them, in the best 
case, as well-founded phenomena.   68
A similar type of reasoning led Spinoza to embrace one extended simple as the 
only real individual. A monist like Spinoza would have no problem with 
talking about soldiers and pebbles as if they were individual objects, but only 
as a way of speaking with the vulgar, since for him soldiers and pebbles were 
not real individuals but finite modes of the one real individual, God-Nature 
(Spinoza 1994: ID5, IP15, IP25c). Like the swirls of a river, modes are not 
individual objects in their own right since they do not have determinate 
identity-conditions and countability. There is no fact of the matter about what 
counts as one swirl, or about where it starts and where it ends, or about what is 
its intrinsic nature. Not because there are infinite swirls nor because counting 
swirls involves a super-task, but because what we call a swirl of a river is a 
more or less convenient abstraction from the river itself. Correctly, Spinoza 
thought that modes were not the result of real distinctions, but the result of 
distinctions of reason or imagination (more on this in ¤6.2). Only God-Nature 
is said to enjoy substantial unity because it is an extended simple. But how can 
something be extended and enjoy simplicity at the same time? Only if that 
extended thing is very special, like space is. Space is neither divided nor 
 See Bennett (2001: ch. 12), Jolley (2005: 39Ð41), Leibniz (1989: 454, 503Ð4, 530), and 68
Mason (1967: 94Ð95, 107Ð12, 120Ð22, 133Ð34, 152). This passage is very representative of 
LeibnizÕs thought: ÔI therefore maintain that a marble tile is not a single complete substance, no 
more than would be the water in a pool with all the fish included, even if all the water with all 
these fish were frozen; or a flock of sheep, even though these sheep should be bound together 
to such an extent that they could walk only at the same pace and that one could not be touched 
without all the others crying out. There is as much difference between a substance and such 
and entity as there is between a man and a community, such as a people, army, society or 
college, which are moral entities, where something imaginary exists, dependent upon the 
fabrication of our minds. Substantial unity requires a complete, indivisible and indestructible 
entity . . . a soul or substantial form after the example of what one calls self. These are the only 
truly complete entities . . . Now, the above-mentioned self, or its counterpart in each individual 
substance cannot be made or unmade by placing the parts nearer together or farther apart, for 
this is totally foreign to the question of what creates substanceÕ (Mason 1967: 94Ð95, emphases 
in the original). And so is this one: ÔI believe that where there are only entities through 
aggregation, there will not even be real entities; for every entity through aggregation 
presupposes entities endowed with a true unity, because it obtains its reality from nowhere but 
that of its constituents, so that it will have no reality at all if each constituent entity is still an 
entity through aggregation; or one must yet seek another basis to its reality, which in this way, 
if one must constantly go on searching, can never be foundÕ (Mason 1967: 120, emphases in 
the original).
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divisible into proper parts (wait and see). Alright, but how can the contents of 
space resist metaphysical divisibility? By being identical with space, by 
rejecting the superfluous distinction between the container and the contained. 
Hence, we have in Spinoza a version of what is now called 
supersubstantivalism. Thus, not only space is a substance in its own right, as in 
substantivalism, but the contents of space are also said to be identical with it. 
The question that seems to have worried Descartes, i.e., the question about 
what is the status of finite material bodies (one or many objects? only one 
stuff?), is totally irrelevant for Spinoza, since he followed to the end the 
conceptual implications of the identity between space (extended substance) and 
matter (corporeal substance) that was already approved by Descartes.  No 69
piece of matter, regardless how tiny, how thick and impenetrable, can 
guarantee metaphysical simplicity. But if the material contents of space are 
identical with space, then the problem vanishes. Because if space is a 
substance, then it is an extended simple. It is simple because it is not composed 
of other objects nor decomposable into other objects: the concept of it can only 
be obtained through itself. It is a clear unity, an undivided and indivisible one, 
an individual object. Obviously, if space is a substance, it is not composed by 
regions in the sense in which a heap of sand might be said to be composed by 
grains of sand. If space is a substance, it is continuous and extended, because if 
it were discrete then it would collapse into many objects, like many grains of 
 See Bennett (1984: ch. 4, 2001: ch. 7), Descartes (1985: II.11Ð12), Spinoza (1994: IP12Ð13, 69
IP15s), and Stuart (1999).
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sand, and this would mean the immediate restoration of a form of relationalism 
between those many discrete elements.  70
But arenÕt regions of space proper parts of space? ArenÕt they posterior or 
dependent individual objects, as PM suggests? No. Any individual object, 
whether basic or not, whether composite or not, whether concrete or abstract, 
whether universal or particular, whether material or immaterial, must fulfil at 
least one requirement: have determinate identity-conditions and countability. 
Yet the so-called ÔpartsÕ of space do not fit the bill. First, because if space is an 
extended substance it makes no sense to ask whether a region is identical to 
itself or distinct to a second region before making an arbitrary carving of space 
 This is the key text where Spinoza argues for the simplicity of the One substance and the 70
identity of matter with extension: ÔAnd indeed it is no less absurd to assert that corporeal 
substance is composed of bodies, or parts, than that a body is composed of surfaces, the 
surfaces of lines, and the lines, finally, of points. [...] For if corporeal substance could be so 
divided that its parts were really distinct, why, then, could one part not be annihilated, the rest 
remaining connected with another as before? And why must they all be so fitted together that 
there is no vacuum? Truly, of things which are really distinct from one another, one can be, and 
remain in its condition, without the other. Since, therefore, there is no vacuum in Nature (a 
subject I discuss elsewhere), but all its parts must so concur that there is no vacuum, it follows 
also that they cannot be really distinguished, that is, that corporeal substance, insofar as it is a 
substance, cannot be divided. [...] For example, we conceive that water is divided and its parts 
separated from one anotherÐinsofar as it is water, but not insofar as it is corporeal substance. 
For insofar as it substance, it is neither separated nor divided. Again, water, insofar as it is 
water, is generated and corrupted, but insofar as it is substance, it is neither generated nor 
corruptedÕ (Spinoza 1994: IP15s; see also IP12Ð13). In Spinozistic vein, see also Bennett 
(1984: ch. 4, 2001: ch. 7), Campbell (1990: ch. 6), who talks of regions as Ôquasi-partsÕ or 
Ôpseudo-partsÕ, Cover (1999), Clarke (in Alexander 1956: 22, 31, 48), Kant (2007: 69, 405), 
and Lowe (2002: 253Ð55, 271Ð72). The point is clearly stated in ClarkeÕs replies to Leibniz: 
ÔSpace, finite or infinite, is absolutely indivisible, even so much as in thought; (to imagine its 
parts moved from each other is to imagine them moved out of themselves;) and yet space is not 
a mere pointÕ (Alexander 1956: 22, punctuation as in the original). ÔFor infinite space is one, 
absolutely and essentially indivisible: and to suppose it parted, is a contradiction in terms; 
because there must be space in the partition itself; which is to suppose it parted, and yet not 
parted at the same timeÕ (Alexander 1956: 31, punctuation as in the original). ÔParts, in the 
corporeal sense of the word, are separable, compounded, ununited, independent on, and 
movable from each other: but infinite space, thought it may by us be partially apprehended, 
that is, may in our imagination be conceived as composed of parts; yet those parts (improperly 
so called) being essentially indiscernible and immoveable from each other, and not partable 
without an express contradiction in terms, . . . space consequently is in itself essentially one, 
and absolutely indivisibleÕ (Alexander 1956: 48, punctuation as in the original). In Kant words: 
ÔSpace is not a discursive or, as we say, general concept of relations of things in general, but a 
pure intuition. For, in the first place, we can represent to ourselves only one space; and if we 
speak of diverse spaces, we mean thereby only parts of one and the same unique space. 
Secondly, these parts cannot precede the one all-embracing space, as being, as it were, 
constituents out of which it can be composed; on the contrary, they can be thought only as in it. 
Space is essentially one; the manifold in it, and therefore the general concept of spaces, 
depends solely in [the introduction of] limitationsÕ (Kant 2007: 69; see also Kant 1889: 196, 
quoted in ¤1.4.1 above, where he argues that Spinozism is the only real alternative to an 
idealistic conception of space and time).
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(i.e., before we make a landmark and draw a system of coordinates). In fact, if 
space is an extended substance in its own right, then it has no real joints, there 
is no right way to carve it. Regions of it can only be singled out after mapping 
space by using an arbitrary system of coordinates. Hence, the individuation of 
regions is not grounded in a real distinction but subjected to pragmatic 
constraints; their names are only Ôconvenient designatorsÕ (see next paragraph). 
Because we could map space using a grid of ÔsquareÕ regions or, if you prefer, 
using a grid of ÔhexagonalÕ regions, and none of the models would deserve the 
status of the right one (Campbell 1990: ¤6.3). If regions were objects in their 
own right, yet ontologically dependent upon another prior object, as PM 
suggests, then their identity-conditions shouldnÕt depend on such pragmatical 
decisions. However, neither the number, nor the size, nor the shape of regions 
seems to be objectively there in space; and this is so because they are not real 
distinctions but pragmatic posits. In fact, if regions within a spatial continuum 
were objects in their own right, there would be a fact of the matter about where 
a region ends and where another region starts. But how can there be a fact of 
the matter before an arbitrary abstraction is made from space? Regions can 
only be called Ôposterior objectsÕ or Ôproper partsÕ of space if we force the 
meaning of words up to an absurd extreme. Secondly, it is not only that regions 
do not seem to be actual parts or real components of space, but also that it 
seems very clear that they are not even potential parts of space. Indeed, it 
seems to be a metaphysical and conceptual impossibility to think of removing a 
region from space and preserving the region and the rest of space unaltered, or 
to chop down space into regions. For these reasons, it seems at least distorting 
to say that there is both a space and its regions, and that regions are posterior 
objects grounded in the basic object which is space. What we call ÔpointsÕ, 
ÔlinesÕ, ÔplanesÕ and ÔregionsÕ of space are abstractions from it. Regions, points, 
lines and planes deserve to be called objects only when talking under the 
fiction of decomposition of space. In this Spinozistic ontology there is only one 
individual object, and Ôquantifiers are useless, because there is no difference 
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between ÔThe thing is FÕ and ÔSomething is FÕ and ÔEverything is FÕÕ (Bennett 
1984: 96). 
(ii) Lack of criterion of composition. A second argument against composites is 
that there seems to be no adequate criterion of identity for composite objects 
(¤5.1). The criterion of unrestricted composition accepted by the mereologist is 
clear and non-vague, but obviously arbitrary: it counts as one object the fusion 
of my right toe and the morning star. On the other hand, restrictionists fond of 
commonsensical intuitions who complain that unrestricted composition 
includes too many arbitrary objects and that compositional nihilism includes 
too few, offer no clear criterion to distinguish when two things compose a third 
thing. But if there are material composites, then they have determinate identity-
conditions. The problem is that material composites, the posits of 
commonsensical realism, which is the view that restrictionism embraces, do 
not exhibit sharp identity-conditions and we fall into paradox when trying to 
individuate them (Horgan and Potrč 2008: ¤4.5.1, Unger 1979). Because there 
seems to be no fact of the matter, no real boundary that sharply demarcates a 
material composite from a distinct material composite, a boundary that can 
clearly tell us how many drops of water are necessary and sufficient to have 
one cloud, or where this cloud ends and that other cloud starts, or whether that 
cloud is one single cloud or many clouds that share most of their drops except a 
few number of them. After all, one single drop is sufficient to make the 
difference between one cloud and a different cloud, one composite and a 
different composite. And what goes for clouds goes for cats, stones, planets and 
all material composites. Thus, my response to the restrictionists is that they 
cannot offer a criterion of composition because there is no such criterion; and 
there is no such criterion because there is no real distinction that can sustain it; 
and common sense has nothing to worry about because it doesnÕt need such a 
criterion for making its way through life. A pragmatical criterion, a criterion 
that works for determinate purposes, is perfectly sufficient for ordinary life, as 
it is proved by so many people who couldnÕt care less about metaphysics and 
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still get to understand each other perfectly wellÐindeed, achieving more 
agreement and successful communication than metaphysicians. Thus, 
following the teachings of the Buddhist monk Nāgasena, I prefer to say that 
names for composites are only Ôconvenient designatorsÕ, and the statements 
that use them can only be Ôconventionally trueÕ; on the other hand, those names 
that refer to non-composites are Ôreal designatorsÕ, and the statements that use 
themÐand only these statementsÐcan be Ôultimately trueÕ (Siderits 2007: ¤¤3.5Ð
3.6). These last statements are what we expect from metaphysics; the first ones 
are what we expect from Ôcommon senseÕ. And there is no need to force 
metaphysics and common sense into marriage, since they obey different 
intellectual impulses and have different explanatory goals. This was also the 
way in which Spinoza and Leibniz faced the puzzles of fundamental 
cardinality. They both recognised different levels of discourse and thought, but 
no metaphysical levels of individual objects (Bennett 2001: 147). And they 
both were in the need to argue for the metaphysical indivisibility of their 
simples, since lack of metaphysical simplicity ultimately entails lack of true 
individuality (!). But this cannot be true, because someone is writing these 
lines; hence, at least one individual object exists. 
(iii) Parsimony. Thirdly, there are methodological reasons for rejecting a 
metaphysics of levels and for embracing the exclusionary simplicity of 
compositional nihilism. OckhamÕs razor or parsimony is perhaps the main one: 
in our theories, we should avoid positing explanatory redundant entities 
(Horgan and Potrč 2008: chs. 5 and 7, Nolan 1997, Rosen and Dorr 2002, 
Schaffer 2007, Sider 2013). Both qualitative and quantitative parsimony should 
be preferred when qualitative and quantitive extravagance are explanatory 
superfluous. Thus, if the evolution of the world can be explained in terms of 
non-composite objects, then there is no need of including composite objects in 
our ontology, since they are explanatory redundant. If non-composites carry the 
weight of all the necessary and sufficient causal contribution to that evolution, 
then there is no extra causal weight around to be carried by composites. If this 
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argument is sound, then the layered metaphysics of PM and PP should be 
rejected in favour of the exclusionary simplicity of EM or EP. And, ceteris 
paribus, if we run again the argument of parsimony in order to choose between 
EM and EP, the choice is clear: EM (Schaffer 2007). Notice that I say Ôceteris 
paribusÕ. Our world is not necessarily a simple world. I take that considerations 
of parsimony offer a good reason to reject the metaphysics of levels, since such 
a metaphysics is, for me, simply like double-counting, but I am not sure that 
we can decide between EM and EP based on considerations of parsimony 
alone. I think it is unavoidable to make a decision informed by empirical 
considerations. 
5.3.3 Gunk, junk and simplicity  
Now imagine that none of the arguments given in ¤5.3.2 succeeds and that the 
world does have mereological structure. The question is why should we accept 
the particular mereological model accepted by Schaffer in P1? That is, why 
should we assume that there is a maximal whole? 
Here is one reason. Schaffer has argued that gunkÐi.e., parthood Ôall the way 
downÕ, infinite metaphysical divisibilityÐis metaphysically possible. In fact, 
this is one of his main arguments for PM (Schaffer 2010a: ¤2.4).  SchafferÕs 71
argument works under the (controversial) assumption that a metaphysics of 
levels is true, i.e., that either PP or PM is true about the realm of concrete 
material objects, and under the (uncontroversial) assumption that the claims of 
metaphysics are necessarily true if true at all. Given these two assumptions, the 
argument goes like this: (i) gunk is metaphysically possible; (ii) if gunk is 
metaphysically possible, then PP is not necessarily true as it is meant to be, 
hence not true at all, since, possibly, there is no bottom level of atoms capable 
of grounding all being; (iii) if the whole is fundamental, gunk is still 
 In favour of the possibility of gunk, see also Schaffer (2003, 2007), Sider (1993; but see his 71
2013, where he regrets it) and Zimmerman (1996). The possibility of gunk is nothing new 
(what is new is the horrible terminology!). Descartes accepted it (Descartes 1985: II.20).
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metaphysically possible; (iv) in a metaphysics of levels, there must be some 
fundamental object (in fact, this is a condition of sense of both PP and PM); 
therefore, (v) the whole is fundamental. But for there being a fundamental top 
level, a whole that grounds all the parts, that whole cannot be in itself a proper 
part: it must be maximal.  
But the argument from gunk seems quite arbitrary. I see three possible 
objections against it. First objection: It can be said that PM is equally 
threatened by the possibility of gunk, because if the whole of PM has parts, 
then it is a composite. And composites, as Leibniz argued, seem to obtain their 
reality and identity from their components. So there must be some non-
composite or true individual object for there being any composites. Because if 
everything were a composite, then there would be no objects at all. PM can 
insist: Ôgunk is possible and there must be at least one object; hence, the whole 
is fundamental!Õ But this is no real solution to the lack of an ultimate non-
composite individual capable of grounding composites. Because calling a 
whole ÔmaximalÕ or ÔfundamentalÕ doesnÕt make it less a composite: it still has 
parts, it is not a metaphysically indivisible unit. And if it is a composite, in 
what sense it can be prior to its parts? In what sense the whole does not depend 
upon its parts to be what it is? Maximality does not guarantee metaphysical 
indivisibility, nor a basic or fundamental status: a maximal whole is still made 
of parts. This is precisely why Leibniz posited immaterial units and why 
Spinoza accepted the material world as an extended simple. 
Second objection: PP might even the score. That is, taking for granted that 
reality has mereological structure, why should PP accept the standard 
mereological principles used by Schaffer? In particular, there seems to be no 
privileged reason to prefer a mereological system that accepts gunk and 
assumes as an axiom the idea of a maximal whole over a system that accepts 
junk and assumes as an axiom the idea of minimal parts (atoms). Recall that in 
a junky mereology there is no maximal element: every whole is a proper part 
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of some whole. And a junky mereological system is as consistent as one with a 
maximal whole. (Moreover, mereology can play with both gunk and junk, and 
without maximal whole and minimal parts: these are requirements of the 
metaphysics of levels, not of mereology, which is neutral on these matters.) In 
fact, the argument of the possibility of junk has been directed against PM by 
Bohn (2009, 2012) and Morganti (2009), and I see no way in which PM can 
block it.  Thus, PP, sharing the same metaphysical assumptions of PM, can 72
argue in the opposite direction: (i) junk is metaphysically possible; (ii) if junk 
is metaphysically possible, then PM is not necessarily true as it is meant to be, 
hence not true at all, since, possibly, there is no maximal whole; (iii) if the 
atoms are basic, junk is still metaphysically possible; (iv) in a metaphysics of 
levels, there must be some basic objects (in fact, this is a condition of sense of 
both PP and PM); therefore, (v) the atoms are basic.  
The possibility of junk accepts mereological structure but puts P1 into question 
by taking for granted the opposite metaphysical axiom. If the world is junky, 
then there is no maximal whole, since every whole is always a proper part. And 
if there is no maximal whole, there is no maximal overlapper, and SchafferÕs 
P1 simply does not hold and his argument fails for assuming wrong principles. 
If one is willing to accept the possibility of gunk, then there are no a priori 
reasons for rejecting the possibility of junk. Insisting in something like P1 is 
just dogmatism. Why should we accept a maximal whole instead of a junky 
world? If PM can make such an incredible assumption as P1, why shouldnÕt PP 
be allowed to assume, as an equally (im)plausible dogma, that there are 
minimal parts? True, the metaphysics according to which mereological atoms 
are prior to any wholes is threatened by the possibility of gunk. This is a 
scenario that mereology tolerates, but that PP, qua ontology, is forced to reject 
in order to make sense. In contrast, SchafferÕs ontology, whatever this means, 
is threatened by the possibility of junk, a scenario that mereology also 
tolerates, but that PM, qua ontology, must reject in order to make sense. But 
 As with the possibility of gunk, the possibility of junk is also an old idea. It was also 72
recognised by Descartes (1985: II.21). See also Leibniz (1989: 504) and Whitehead (1925).
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now it seems that PM and PP are on a par: the possibility of gunk threatens PP, 
while the possibility of junk threatens PM. Once a layered ontology is 
accepted, the most we can do is to insist that there must be one fundamental 
level, either a maximal whole or some minimal parts; but the crucial problem, 
of course, is which one, since there seems to be no reason to prefer one over 
the other (Tallant 2013). This is evident: ceteris paribus, to prefer a gunky 
mereology over a junky mereology, is like preferring Euclidean geometry over 
Differential geometry as an adequate tool to map the Earth without taking a 
look at the Earth. Mereology itself cannot give us more help than providing 
consistency; it is ontologically uninformative. Just like we cannot infer what is 
the case by having clarity about what is consistent to say, we cannot infer a 
concrete ontology from mereological principles. We need to know something 
more about the ontology of the domain. But what is SchafferÕs prior whole? 
Not clear at all. 
Third, there is an external objection, which consists in reconsidering the virtues 
of the exclusionary simplicity of EM and EP. This means a general attack on 
the metaphysics of levels embraced by PM and PP. If this attack succeeds, 
priority between objects does not obtain, parthood does not obtain, and both PP 
and PM are wrong. There might be fictions of composition and decomposition, 
but the real dispute is between EM and EP, since there is either one indivisible 
simple (finitely or infinitely extended, it doesnÕt matter) or many maximally 
divided and indivisible simples (finite or infinite in number, it doesnÕt matter), 
but nothing vulnerable to metaphysical division. Arguments for the 
exclusionary simplicity of EM and EP have already been provided (¤5.2.1), 
and the fact that PP and PM are now equally threatened, is a good reason to 
reconsider those exclusionary ontologies. But arenÕt LeibnizÕs (EP) and 
SpinozaÕs (EM) ontologies threatened by the possibilities of gunk or junk? No, 
their ontologies block from the very start those possibilities, because no 
composite enjoys the status of a true individual object. Hence, neither part-
whole relations nor prior-posterior relations obtain between real individual 
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objects. This is not to say that their ontologies are actually true, but to say that, 
if they were true, then gunk and junk would be nothing but fictions. But how 
could these ontologies block these possibilities?  
Leibniz succeeded in blocking the possibility of gunk (the one that threatens 
pluralism) because he excluded matter and posited a nature that was maximally 
divided into metaphysically indivisible atoms. He rejected material atoms 
precisely because they didnÕt offer guarantees of sufficient unity and 
indivisibility (i.e., of true individuality), and embraced soul-like entities 
because these were the only objects capable of guaranteeing that. As I said, this 
is not to say that this is actually case. But, if it were the case, gunk would be 
ruled out as impossible: there would be nothing there to chop down. Infinite 
cardinality, yes, but not infinite divisibility, since LeibnizÕs nature is already 
infinitesimally (maximally) divided into unextended units. Can a materialistic 
pluralist block the threat of infinite divisibility? I donÕt think so. Ultimately, 
material atoms cannot but be extended things, otherwise no number of them 
could ground extension; and if extended, then they can always be thought as 
being composed of parts into which they could be divided. The sole idea of a 
materialistic atomism seems contradictory (because if these atoms are material, 
then they are extended; and if extended, then divisible). And a plurality of 
extended simples, pace McDaniel (2007) and Simons (2004), seems arbitrary: 
why this particular extension of the minimal units and not that one? Or why 
not each plural a different minimal extension? Hence, the threat of infinite 
divisibility is real. However, this is not a problem for atomism in general, but a 
problem for materialistic atomism. Now see how radical is LeibnizÕs move: 
ruling out the possibility gunk means ruling out the existence of matter! 
Leibniz bites the bullet and gives his back to the material world. Bold, 
consistent, and beautiful. But true? 
SpinozaÕs EM also has the resources to guarantee the metaphysical 
indivisibility of the one individual object and for explaining composition/
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decomposition as fictions. EM rules out the problem because it treats space, 
whether infinite or not, as an extended simple which is identical with the 
matter that fills it. Space might be infinite in extension, though this doesnÕt 
affect the main point of its metaphysical indivisibility and simplicity. If it is, it 
is simple; and if it is so, it is necessarily so. SpinozaÕs way, just like LeibnizÕs 
way, rules out the possibilities of gunk and junk. Bold, consistent, and 
beautiful. But true?  
How can we decide? SpinozaÕs EM and LeibnizÕs EP seem both safe from the 
threats of gunk and junk, but only make sense with the existence of either one 
or many simples. And if they both seem equally consistent and possible, but 
only one of them can be true, which one has the privilege? It doesnÕt seem that 
we can make the decision based on more metaphysical considerations! (DonÕt 
say that realism about matter trumps idealism, because this is still a 
metaphysical consideration! As Carnap would say, this is an external question.) 
We have reached rock bottom. Showing the map of consistent alternatives is as 
far as we can get. It seems that we need to bring in considerations of a different 
sort. Empirical considerations should play a decisive role. As I will argue in the 
next chapter, there are strong empirical reasons to believe that a Spinozistic 
metaphysics makes better sense of things. Though provisional, they are still 
good reasons, perhaps as good as they can get.  
5.4 Basicness and modal freedom: Against A3     
Another central assumption of SchafferÕs argument is A3, the idea that basic 
objects must enjoy modal freedomÐwhere basic objects, according to the tiling 
constraint, do not overlap and together cover the whole cosmos, and modal 
freedom is understood as Humean free recombinability. Thus, according to 
Schaffer, things that do not enjoy modal freedom are not basic. I think 
SchafferÕs inference from lack of modal freedom to the status of basicness is 
unjustified. 
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Here is my view. Humean free recombinability, which is SchafferÕs idea of 
modal freedom, is not a direct consequence of being a basic or fundamental 
object; it is a consequence of the nature or real definition of those basic objects. 
Thus, I take a basic object to be an irreducible ontological item, something 
whose essence or real definition cannot be given in terms of the essence or real 
definition of other entity, something of which everything else is made. Whether 
we are talking about a layer of basic things or an exclusionary layer of things in 
which everything that exists is thereby basic, in all cases we get to know 
whether an entity is modally free or not only after having a real definition of it. 
Thus, what a thing is is something prior to the modal conclusions that we can 
make of it, because through essence we get necessity but from necessity we 
donÕt get essence (Fine 1994). This is precisely why one cannot infer the 
existence of a more basic object from the lack of Humean modal freedom of a 
determinate pair of objects. 
LetÕs illustrate this point with some counterexamples. Take, for instance, 
ArmstrongÕs N-type relations. According to Armstrong (1997: ch. 15), in 
addition to first-order states of affairs, there are second-order states of affairs of 
the form N(F,G), where N stands for a second-order relation between the 
universals F and G. N is an external relation, a non-supervenient and 
contingent addition of being of irreducible nomic character. N(F,G) is not a 
necessary state of affairs, but, given that N(F,G) is actual, then the Fs 
necessitate the Gs. Thus, the existence of N-type relations brings pervasive 
modal constraints to the world. But N is not part of the intrinsic nature of the 
first-order states of affairs xF and yG. In fact, since laws are external and 
contingent, there are Hume-worlds where xF and yG stand totally unregulated. 
N is neither internal-Moore, nor internal-Russell, nor internal-Bradley. As it 
happens, it is wholly external; as it happens, it also qualifies as internal-
Schaffer. Taking for granted, for the sake of argument, that there are atomic 
first-order states of affairs and that every singular causal relation is an instance 
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of an N-type relation, as it is in ArmstrongÕs ontology, we have universal 
internal-Schaffer relatedness. But nothing like the existence of one prior 
concrete material object, upon which many atomic states of affairs (thick 
particulars) like xF and yG depend, follows from that. In ArmstrongÕs ontology 
there is universal internal-Schaffer relatedness, but this follows from the nature 
of one type of his basic ontological items, namely N-type relations. But an N-
type relational network is not a prior concrete material object. Is N mysterious? 
Of course, and Armstrong has many problems to deal with, not only because of 
the brute modalities that N-type relations introduce, but because these are 
external relations, and these are totally mysterious entities to which the modern 
metaphysician gives substantial status. But isnÕt SchafferÕs prior whole equally 
or more mysterious? After all, isnÕt the asymmetrical dependence that allegedly 
holds between a prior whole and its many dependent parts also a mysterious 
necessary connection between distinct existents? If one has Humean suspicions 
against de re modalities, the mysterious character of N-type relations cannot 
work as a positive argument for PM, but only as a consideration against 
ArmstrongÕs ontology. The Humean is satisfied with appearances and cosmic 
coincidence as ultimate explanations, and he must recognise that the existence 
of a prior concrete material object, the maximal overlapper of PM, is at least as 
suspicious as brute de re modal constraints. From a Humean point of view, 
both moves are wild, and the move of PM just replaces one metaphysical 
mystery with another one. On the contrary, if one is free from Humean 
skepticism, then the motivation for explaining away brute de re modalities by 
PM looses its initial force. The point that I am trying to make is that SchafferÕs 
reverse strategy is not a good way of inferring a determinate ontology. Humean 
free-recombination of the plurals follows from the Lewisian basic ontology. 
But from the lack of modal freedom of two things doesnÕt follow any 
determinate ontology.  
A more clear case of pluralism coexisting with internal-Schaffer relatedness 
can be found in the classical pluralistic ontology of Leibniz (see Jolley 2005: 
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ch. 2, Leibniz 1989: 303Ð30, 643Ð53, Mates 1986: chs. 2 and 4, Rescher 1979: 
chs. 5Ð6, Russell 1937: ¤29). In this case, failure of free recombination follows 
from the real definitions of the basic plurals. LeibnizÕs monads are internally-
Russell related individuals, insofar as all relations are grounded in their 
monadic natures. According to Leibniz, there is a Ôcomplete individual notionÕ 
of any possible monad. A complete individual notion is an exhaustive essence. 
Thus, PlatoÕs complete individual notion involves that he is disciple of Socrates 
and master of Aristotle, that he inspires WhiteheadÕs work, that he is the author 
of the Republic, and so on. Everything true about Plato is contained in his 
complete individual notion. An individual of whom any of that is false would 
not be Plato because it is of the essence of Plato to be the person that lives 
PlatoÕs life. Of course, we donÕt know everything that is true about Plato, but 
when God decided to create Plato he had in mind a complete individual notion 
of him, and Plato cannot but fulfil such complete individual notion on pain of 
Plato not being Plato. Before deciding to create the actual world, God had in 
his mind many possible worlds. Each possible world is a plurality of complete 
individual notions. The complete individual notions that inhabit a possible 
world mirror each other: while PlatoÕs complete individual notion involves 
influencing Whitehead, WhiteheadÕs complete individual notion involves being 
influenced by Plato. This means that, though there are many possible 
individuals, not all of them are ÔcompossibleÕ, as Leibniz puts it. And not being 
ÔcompossibleÕ has, as a consequence, that they are not freely-recombinable, i.e., 
that they are internally-Schaffer related. For instance, Plato could not have 
existed in a world where Whitehead didnÕt exist. Because each individual has a 
complete individual notion and all relations are internal-Russell, Plato would 
not have being himself nor a duplicate of himself if he were to exist in a world 
where Whitehead didnÕt exist. In fact, each complete individual notion can 
belong only to one possible world. Each possible world is maximal because 
each of them is a plurality that contains all and only those complete individual 
notions that are compossible. Thus, Leibnizian possible worlds are systems of 
compossible essences or Ômutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive sets of 
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conceptsÕ (Mates 1986: 44). Though every individual notion that is not self-
contradictory is possible, not every possible individual notion can coexist with 
everything: it can only coexist with those other notions that are compossible 
with it. And no fragment of the actual world is freely recombinable in the 
Humean sense, because the actual world contains everything that is 
compossible and only what is compossible with what it contains. Nothing 
belonging to other possible worlds is compossible with something actual. To be 
sure, in contrast with LewisÕ metaphysics, in LeibnizÕs metaphysics we cannot 
freely recombine Plato with other things because being compossible requires 
much more than occupying different positions; in fact, we cannot duplicate 
Plato without duplicating PlatoÕs world. Does this obvious failure of modal 
freedom mean that the actual Leibnizian world is a prior concrete object upon 
which the plurality of monads depends? No. The organic character of the 
Leibnizian pluralistic system obtains thanks to the universal reciprocity of the 
complete individual notions of monads. But they are many, and they are not 
posterior parts of a prior concrete object, as PM suggests. In fact, created 
monads are not even a proper part of God, the monad upon which their 
existence depends. By coming into existence, created monadsÐunlike possible 
monadsÐare no longer contained in GodÕs mind. 
Something quite similar happens with WhiteheadÕs pluralistic metaphysics. His 
basic building blocks are Ôactual occasionsÕ. Actual occasions Ôare the final real 
things of which the world is made upÕ (Whitehead 1929: 24). Atomism is 
endorsed by Whitehead: an actual occasion is an extended simple event. 
WhiteheadÕs actual occasions are internally-Moore related, insofar as they are 
conceived as relationally constituted (Whitehead 1926: 114, 154Ð56, 198Ð206; 
1929: 69, 154, 205, 334Ð38, 409). Thus, Ôatomism does not exclude complexity 
and universal relativity. Each atom is a system of all thingsÕ (Whitehead 1929: 
49). Apart from the relations that help to constitute its nature, an actual 
occasion would not be what it is but a mere abstraction. In fact, an actual 
occasion Ôin virtue of being what it is, is also where it isÕ (Whitehead 1929: 82). 
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Yet the cosmos, being Whitehead a convinced relationalist, is obviously not a 
substance, but a relational network of actual occasions. What makes 
WhiteheadÕs world an organic whole is the fact that these relations are not 
external but internal-Moore and that each actual occasion is like a moment of 
experiential synthesis, where previous actual occasions (all those in the back 
light cone) are perceived by an actual occasion, who then becomes object of 
perception of others. The great mystery, of course, is how this perception of 
distinct existents takes place, i.e., how can actual occasions make ingression 
into another actual occasion yet all these still remain relata-in-relation, or how 
can an actual occasion be constituted by other actual occasions that lie outside 
it. However this happens, the fact is that the organic character of the world is 
not due to the existence of a prior concrete material object, as PM suggests. In 
fact, in WhiteheadÕs system, the whole of PM is excluded from the start, 
because WhiteheadÕs cosmos is conceived as junky. 
There is an obvious sense in which both monads and actual occasions are 
basic: each of them is an irreducible building-block of an ontological system, 
their real definitions are unique, they cannot be given in terms of other real 
definitions. In particular, because both monads and actual occasions are 
perspectival and experiential units. More important: without their contribution, 
there would be no world at all, so the world depends upon each one of them. 
Conversely, each one of them depends on the rest. Thus, despite being basic, 
they are not freely recombinable, i.e., they are internally-Schaffer related. It is 
also more or less clear that this lack of modal freedom is a direct consequence 
of the real essence of those basic units, i.e., of what they are: monads are 
internally-Russell related, actual occasions are internally-Moore related. What 
happens in these pictures is that the basic units lack the ontological 
independence or the unconditioned and self-sufficient character expected from 
substances. But this is not a reason for inferring that monads or actual 
occasions co-depend upon a more basic concrete material object, as suggested 
by PM. What happens with internal-Moore or internal-Russell related terms is 
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that they exhibit reciprocal dependence for their identity and existence (Fine 
1995: 282Ð85). Their essences are either relational (as in internal-Moore 
relatedness) or contain all relations in the way of monadic properties (as in 
internal-Russell relatedness). Since they are reciprocally dependent, the world 
can only come into existence as a package, but only because the whole is 
nothing but all of them, like an orchestra. They (monads, actual occasions, 
musicians) are many. And they do not co-depend upon a more basic concrete 
object. For Leibniz and Whitehead, ÔworldÕ is a plural term, like ÔorchestraÕ, 
like ÔflockÕ, like ÔWe, the people...Õ. Neither a Leibnizian world nor a 
Whiteheadian world is a basic concrete object, and certainly not ÔmaterialÕ, as 
PM depicts the world. Of course, the lack of existential self-sufficiency of 
monads and actual occasions might be seen as a downside of these views. They 
cannot but exist together. This fact makes them mysterious individuals. 
Internal-Russell relatedness makes the fact of universal coordination of monads 
to look miraculous and capricious. Internal-Moore relatedness makes the 
essence of each individual still more mysterious: somehow, an individual is 
constituted by what is outside it, yet it still remains a distinct individual. These 
of course are good reasons for rejecting these ontologies (in fact, this unstable 
character of internal relatedness is what led Bradley (1930: 26Ð27) to reject 
them and to offer instead a self-sufficient, non-relational unit), but they do not 
provide any base for inferring the existence of an additional layer of being, a 
prior object upon which they all co-depend. In reciprocally dependent 
pluralities there is no basic and self-sufficient individual but many basic 
individuals that only together, in joint effort, can exist and be what they are. 
In sum, we cannot infer a determinate ontology from lack of modal freedom of 
many plurals. For a start, lack of modal freedom can be the result of external 
but irreducibly nomic relations (as in ArmstrongÕs metaphysics), of internal-
Russell relatedness (as in LeibnizÕs metaphysics), or of internal-Moore 
relatedness (as in WhiteheadÕs metaphysics). If these are mysterious 
ontologies, then we have good reasons to look elsewhere, but not a reason for 
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adding an extra basic layer as the one suggested by PM. In particular, because 
it is not clear how can parts be ontologically dependent upon a whole without 
the whole also being ontologically dependent upon the parts. (Think: can the 
whole be what it is if one of its parts is removed?) And because it can still be 
the case that the apparently related terms are not proper terms at all but only 
abstractions from a self-sufficient unity, as in the internal-Bradley relatedness 
that takes place in EM. In the latter case, internal-Schaffer relatedness is 
nothing but the result of wrongly taking as relata-in-relation what is really not. 
5.5 Internal-Schaffer relatedness unpacked: Against A1     
SchafferÕs prior whole does not exhibit a clear nature. If it has proper parts that 
compose it, then it is not clear in what sense that whole is ontologically more 
basic than those parts. Perhaps we can get a more clear idea through the 
development of stage II of his argument; perhaps the particular candidates that 
Schaffer considers for an internal-Schaffer relation reveal something more 
specific about the nature of the whole of PM.  
As I said before, Schaffer thinks that there are at least three plausible 
candidates to fulfil the role of a sufficiently pervasive internal-Schaffer 
relation: CausationÐgiven causal essentialism (R1); spatiotemporal 
relatednessÐgiven supersubstantivalism about the relation of objects and 
regions, and structuralism about the essence of regions (R2); and being world-
matesÐgiven counterpart theory (R3). As I will show now, none of these 
candidates speaks in favour of PM. 
5.5.1 Against R1 as a sign of PM  
To be clear, I am not disputing or defending R1 here. What I am disputing is 
SchafferÕs understanding of R1 and his use of it as an argument for PM. The 
label Ôcausal essentialismÕ, as used by Schaffer, makes reference to DE, the 
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view that we discussed in chapter 3, and in particular to the variant that I called 
Ôrelational essentialismÕ in ¤3.2 (Schaffer actually quotes some holistic remarks 
from Mumford 2004 and Ellis 2001; see Schaffer 2010b: 364Ð65). Schaffer 
thinks that if things have their causal powers essentially, then causation will 
generate necessary connections between distinct things. Thus, according to 
Schaffer, under this conception of causal powers, two causally related things do 
not enjoy modal freedom. Since causation has good credentials for being a 
sufficiently pervasive relation that relates all things, it can be said that all 
things are R1-related. Or so Schaffer argues. 
But DE is not what Schaffer says it is; and even if DE were what he says it is, it 
would not be a sign of a prior whole of the type that he is suggesting. In the 
first place, DE is a view about properties, not about actual causal relations. 
Relational essentialism is the holistic variant of DE according to which all 
properties are dispositions, and the nature of a property is determined by 
second-order relations to other properties. But the instantiation of a first-order 
property is ontologically independent from any other property-instantiation. 
When fragility is instantiated by a vase, the identity of such a property is 
determined by second-order relations to other properties that are not 
instantiated: a non-actual hit, a non-actual breaking. Thus, a disposition can be 
instantiated without necessitating any further property-instantiations. In 
particular, dispositions can be instantiated without anything like occurrent 
causation taking place. What DE offers us is simply a relational way of fixing 
the identity of properties. In a clear sense, the second-order relational network, 
the power-net, is a ÔwholeÕ that enjoys ontologically ÔpriorityÕ, since only after 
we have fixed its identity we can fix the identity of a first-order property that 
belongs to that power-net. But certainly is not the type of whole in which 
Schaffer is thinking, i.e., a basic concrete material object. Rather, it seems to be 
the opposite kind of whole: abstract and immaterial. When an object 
instantiates a first-order disposition what occurs is that a node of such abstract 
relational structure is instantiated, and, as far as I can see, this structure can 
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only be Platonic in character (¤3.2). This instantiation involves nothing more 
than the instantiation of a pure potency, and this is a fact that obtains with 
ontological independence from everything else. This is an essential feature of 
it. DE might be an inadequate ontology, but at least we need to be clear about 
its content before supporting it or rejecting it. Thus, DE is not what Schaffer 
thinks it is. 
What Schaffer seems to be thinking about is in two objects that are actually 
constituted by their causal relations. But then he has something different from 
DE in mind. He might be thinking in something closer to MOSR, where there 
are objects yet relations take the place of intrinsic properties (Esfeld 2004, 
Esfeld and Lam 2008, Teller 1986). If so, objects have relational natures, they 
are wholly relationally constituted, they are internally-Moore related. And it is 
only because objects are internally-Moore related that they are internally-
Schaffer related: modal constraint is a consequence of essence. Objects are 
mere placeholders of a relational structure. There is also an obvious sense in 
which such a structure is a ÔwholeÕ which is ÔpriorÕ to its ÔpartsÕ, since the 
existence and identity of the relata is dependent on the existence and identity of 
the structure, just like for the mathematical structuralist the existence and 
identity of a natural number depends on the existence and identity of the whole 
relational structure of natural numbers. But how can we call such a prior 
relational structure a Ôbasic concrete material objectÕ, as SchafferÕs prior whole 
is supposed to be? In what sense a relational structure is a basic individual 
object? In what sense a relational structure is ÔconcreteÕ (cf. ¤1.4, ¤4.4)? Still 
worst: in what sense a relational structure is ÔmaterialÕ? On the other hand, in 
what sense those placeholders of relations deserve the name of Ôposterior 
concrete material objectsÕ (as Schaffer understands the parts of his prior 
whole), when they literally lack any intrinsic nature? In fact, once we think of 
an object as relationally constituted, what is left for itself in order to deserve 
the name of an individual object in its own right? Surely, OSR in all its variants 
is a puzzling ontology, as I argued in ch. 4. And it is puzzling because relations 
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in general are puzzling. But these are different questions. To make things clear: 
neither DE nor ontic structuralism (OSR or MOSR) endorse something like 
internal-Schaffer relatedness. What they do is endorsing at different levels the 
idea of relational constitution expressed by internal-Moore relatedness. 
Internal-Schaffer relatedness obtains in virtue of internal-Moore relatedness. 
Relational constitution is mysterious because relations are mysterious. Yet I 
donÕt see how we can infer something like SchafferÕs prior whole (a basic 
concrete material object) from relational constitution (whether of properties, 
objects, or the world as a whole). 
5.5.2 Against R2 as a sign of PM  
R2 is a double-thesis which involves an essential tension. On one hand, R2 
affirms supersubstantivalism about concrete material objects and spatial 
regions (I will talk about classical ÔspaceÕ for the sake of simplicity of 
exposition; the extension of the argument to Ôspace-timeÕ is direct and 
obvious). On the other hand, R2 affirms the idea that regions have their 
relations of distance essentially.  
As we saw before (¤5.3.2), supersubstantivalism, as a species of 
substantivalism, rejects the idea that space is a system of bodies in relations of 
distance, and attributes space a substantial status, at least in the technical sense 
that the conditions of existence and identity of space are not only determinate 
but also independent of the existence and identity of other entities. The prefix 
ÔsuperÕ of ÔsupersubstantivalismÕ stands for an identity thesis: the rejection of 
the idea that there are both space and material occupants, the container and the 
contained. I am not going to discuss the reasons in favour of 
supersubstantivalism here (wait for ch. 6). I just want to argue that there is no 
clear sense in which this thesis is a sign in favour of PM, and that there is a 
clear sense in which it is in tension with the second claim made by Schaffer, 
according to which there are Ôrelations of distanceÕ between regions of space.  
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First, once supersubstantivalism is accepted, it is hard to take regions as 
Ôposterior objectsÕ, as PM says. If space is a substance and there is identity 
between it and its contents, then everything indicates that we are in front of an 
extended simple, as EM says and as we already argued. Because if space is a 
substance, it is not a composite of elements: it is actually undivided and 
potentially indivisible into components. In fact, regions of space are pure 
arbitrary carving and do not fulfil the minimum requirement for being real 
individual objects. But PM needs the real existence of both one prior and many 
posterior individual objects so the former can be prior to the latter. 
The second idea, the idea that regions have their relations of distance 
essentially, is either a relational way to describe something that is not relational 
or a way of collapsing supersubstantivalism into some form of relationalism. In 
the former case, of course any arbitrary point of space is where it is essentially. 
If space is a substance, and there is no distinction between the container and 
the contained, then we do not have a region or a proper part of space before 
making an arbitrary carving. After making a couple of arbitrary carvings in 
order to abstract two parts of space we can say that their identity is fixed by its 
spatiotemporal relations to other regions. But when space is a substance, and 
there is no distinction between it and its contents, the whole idea that relations 
of distance play a constitutive role is misleading. Because, as Bradley would 
say, there are no real terms for the spatial relation before making the arbitrary 
abstraction. In fact, as I will argue later in more detail, if space is a substance, 
then relations of distance, like their relata, are mere abstractions or derivative 
notions, since what really connects any arbitrary region with any other 
arbitrary region is a continuous path of the same continuous and common 
space, like a highway literally connects two cities, not like a relation, allegedly, 
relates two bodies. 
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Now, if relations do play a constitutive role in space, then it is not clear 
anymore in what sense space is a substance and not a bunch of relations. As far 
as I can see, R2 either collapses into a space without proper parts, or into some 
form of structuralism where relations have a constitutive role. If the former, 
then R2 is a sign of EM, not of PM, and relations of distance are internal-
Bradley. If the latter, then R2 is a sign of MOSR or OSR, hence a type of 
relationalism, where relations of distance are not external (as in the realistic 
relationalism of Armstrong and Lewis), nor internal-Russell (as in LeibnizÕs 
idealistic relationalism), but internal-Moore. In any case, R2 is neither an 
internal-Schaffer relation nor a sign of PM, i.e. of a concrete material object 
which is prior to many posterior concrete material objects. If things seem 
internal-Schaffer related is either because they are mere abstractions from an 
underlying unity or because the constraint is a consequence of relational 
constitution. There is no space enough for PM. 
5.5.3 Against R3 as a sign of PM  
According to Schaffer, the third type of relation that can plausibly fulfil the 
role of an internal-Schaffer relation for A1 is Ôbeing world-matesÕ, given 
counterpart theory. Since according to counterpart theory all things are world-
bounded, they are all internally-Schaffer related: two things that are world-
mates can only be found together in one world. I think R3 is only a sign of two 
confusions. First, if R3 counts as an internal-Schaffer relation, then we donÕt 
know what Schaffer means by modal freedom or free recombination anymore. 
Second, R3 only begs the question of what ontology underlies PM, i.e., what is 
the nature of SchafferÕs prior whole. After all, Ôbeing world-matesÕ says 
nothing about what exactly is supposed to be a ÔworldÕ for those mates nor in 
what sense that ÔworldÕ is ontologically prior to them. 
To illustrate my objections IÕll make use of LewisÕ metaphysics for the actual 
world. Humean Supervenience is a Humean metaphysics in the most obvious 
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sense: everything is loose and separate (i.e. externally related). Because 
everything is externally related there are no modal constraints for free 
recombination: everything could have coexisted in a different arrangement or 
have failed to coexist. The only restriction to free recombination is colocation. 
This loose and separate coexistence is what permits exact duplication of 
individuals, where duplication is understood as sharing of intrinsic properties, 
and the intrinsic properties of an individual are understood as not including its 
relations to wholly distinct individuals (of course, because relations are 
external). Now, it is true that in the Lewisian metaphysics all individuals are 
world-bounded because no individual has transworld identity or lives two 
parallel lives. But still there is a clear sense in which those world-bounded 
individuals are actually part of a world which has no more structure than a 
heap of sand. And it is because the world is like a heap of sand that everything 
is freely recombinable via duplication. So, in the Lewisian metaphysics, it is 
actually true that Plato and I are not standing two feet apart. And it is also 
actually true that Plato and I might have been standing two feet apart (Lewis 
1986a: ¤4.1). And this modal claim is actually true because in other world, as 
concrete as this one, there are exact duplicates of Plato and I actually standing 
two feet apart from each other. But of course weÐPlato and IÐare not sitting 
next to each other: exact duplicates of us are doing so. This is not a particular 
downside of LewisÕ theory, because it is something common to any theory that 
attempts to offer an analysis of modality. (Thus, an erzatsist, instead of 
duplicates, would use some abstracta, but certainly neither Plato nor I are those 
very same abstracta.) The central point is that LewisÕ modal metaphysics is 
grounded in a Humean conception of the actual: since everything is actually 
loose and separate, everything could have failed to exist or could have been 
differently arranged without affecting the existence, position or intrinsic nature 
of other things. Thus, what is actually before could have been after, what is 
here could have been there. And this is exactly what it means that the actual 
arrangement is a loose and separate metaphysical accident and that all things 
are modally free. 
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I have exposed LewisÕ understanding of modal freedom and Humean free 
recombination, which is also the understanding that Schaffer accepts at the 
beginning of his paper before running his argument of internal relatedness 
(Schaffer 2010b: ¤1.4). But now Schaffer seems to be flipping because he is 
telling us that the fact that Plato and I are world-bounded means that we are 
internally-Schaffer related, i.e., that we are not freely recombinable (!). And 
what explains our world-bounded character is, allegedly, the fact that each of 
us Ôis a dependent fragment of that worldÕ (Schaffer 2010b: 369). But if 
Schaffer thinks that being world-bounded is to be internally-Schaffer related, 
then my question to him is what sense of modal freedom and free 
recombination has he in mind now? That is, if the very champion of modal 
freedom and free recombination (Lewis) counts also, under SchafferÕs lights, as 
a champion of modal constraint, one expects some guidance from Schaffer 
about what he understands by modal freedom and free recombination now. We 
have no clue. And we have no clue because if the actual world were in fact an 
externally related heap of sand (as LewisÕ actual world is), and SchafferÕs 
mereological assumptions and metaphysical principles were accepted, then the 
actual world would satisfy the proof for PM: (i) there is both the heap of sand 
and its grains; (ii) the heap is maximal; (iii) if the grains were basic, then any 
grain of sand that does not overlap other grain of sand would be modally free; 
(iv) but any two grains of the heap are world-mates, hence they are internally-
Schaffer related, hence they are not basic; (v) but there must be something 
basic; therefore, (vi) the heap is prior to the grains. PM is true if the world is an 
externally related heap of sand! Well, if this counts as an organic unity, then 
something is wrong with PM or PM is just a fancy name for restating the 
fragmented world. Unless the whole posited by PM enjoys the same kind of 
organic unity that enjoys a heap of sand (that is, none), R3 cannot be accepted 
as a suitable candidate for A1. Because if LewisÕ fragmented world counts as a 
case of PM, then I donÕt know anymore what is to be a monist. 
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The central point of my criticisms is that we donÕt have a clear idea of what is 
the nature of SchafferÕs prior whole. Again, LewisÕ ontology can help us to 
highlight SchafferÕs confusions. LewisÕ thesis of Humean Supervenience can 
be seen as a clear case of PP. We may disagree with the thesis, but at least we 
have clarity about the basic ontology posited: point-like individuals with 
intrinsic natures standing in external relations of spatiotemporal distance. And 
this ontology is fixed before any mereological story is told. Each constituent is 
ontologically independent from its surroundings. If there is any composite at 
all, then its real definition can only be obtained through the real definition of its 
constituents. Every whole is just a metaphysical accident, because all the basic 
ontology has no more structure than a heap. Everything is loose and separate. 
This is why the principle of separability or independence rules, and this is why 
Lewis can make free use of duplication and Humean recombination. Lewis 
ontology is not gunky. Not because mereology cannot play with gunk, since 
mereology can play with anything (atoms, gunk, junk or a mixture of these), 
but because the thesis of Humean Supervenience is an ontological thesis, not 
just vacuous mereology. And thatÕs it. Without those basic constituents the 
world would vanish, because all compositesÐthe world includedÐare ultimately 
grounded in them. If we donÕt take mereological talk seriously, then LewisÕ 
world is still there, but it is just the existent plurality, without giving place to 
any mereological fusions. If, in contrast, we think of a mereological fusion as 
real addition of being, then we can still understand what elements of being 
ground or are prior to any mereological fusion: the externally related atoms. Is 
there a maximal fusion? Maybe, maybe not. Lewis can leave that question 
open, since his basic constituents can ground an infinity of wholes. Humean 
Supervenience does not necessitate, for internal consistency, the idea of a 
maximal whole (P1). After all, saying that the world is a whole offers very little 
metaphysical insight about its constitution. Think: the plurality of all possible 
worlds is also a mereological whole, and any world is part of it. Lewis knows 
this. And he is explicit: the criterion of demarcation that he offers to distinguish 
one world from another is a piece of ontology and not a piece of mereology, 
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namely: spatiotemporal relatedness (Lewis 1986a: 70). Things are part of the 
same world because they are spatiotemporally related. The fact that worlds are 
not spatiotemporally related is what makes them different worlds. And 
spatiotemporal relations, according to Lewis, are external! And the fact that 
these relations are external relations is what makes a world a recombinable 
heap, a ÔunityÕ that is only so by metaphysical accident, a ÔoneÕ only by 
aggregation. Of course, it is very puzzling how can external relations relate 
things if they are not part of their intrinsic nature. More than that: it is 
mysterious how external relations can be said to be instantiated at all and at the 
same time be wholly external to the relata. But still, there you have the 
ontology: a world is a spatiotemporally-related plurality, an externally related 
plurality.  
But in SchafferÕs case, what is a world? We know that is a maximal fusion, but 
that is only mereology, and is ontologically uninformative. A fusion of what? 
Of concrete material objects, as far as we know. Thus, it is a composite, not the 
extended simple individual of Spinoza. But if it is a composite, in what sense 
can be said to be prior to its component parts? In what sense its conditions of 
existence and identity do not depend on the conditions of existence and identity 
of its parts? The asymmetrical dependence embraced by PM is obscure, as all 
relations of asymmetrical dependence are, since these always introduce 
necessary connections between distinct existents. After all, if the world is a 
whole with parts, then why should we say that the parts asymmetrically depend 
upon the whole and not the other way around? As far as we can tell, it seems 
that the whole would not be what it is if one of its parts were removed. Thus, if 
there is a whole and its parts, and there is ontological dependence upon them, 
then that dependence seems to be reciprocal or symmetric. Otherwise, it seems 
quite arbitrary and obscure to choose only one direction of priority. Mereology 
is not helpful here. Mereology does not distinguish between organic or 
inorganic fusions: every fusion is equally a good whole for its neutral purposes. 
In LewisÕ case, nature is divided into points-like entities. The possibility of 
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gunk threatens the grounding capacity of these thin atoms (¤5.3.3). But what 
about SchafferÕs world? It only raises doubts. Is it divided or undivided? If 
divided, in what sense it is still one? If undivided, in what sense it is many? 
And which is SchafferÕs criterion for distinguishing what belongs to his prior 
whole? Being world-bounded, as he suggests? But this is begging the question, 
since what we are asking is precisely what counts as a world for those 
purposes. In LewisÕ metaphysics this is clear: a world is an externally related 
heap. What about PM? In what sense PM differs from the Lewisian world? Are 
the parts of PM externally related (recall that internal-Schaffer relatedness 
allegedly leaves room for external relations)? Do the parts of PM admit 
duplication? If they admit duplication, in what sense they are not freely 
recombinable? And if the parts are externally related and recombinable via 
duplication, then in what sense they are not basic or prior to the whole? What 
sense of modal freedom, if not free recombination via duplication, has Schaffer 
in mind? If the whole, being the only basic object, is the only thing that enjoys 
modal freedom, then it is free from what? Not from its parts! Recombinable 
with what? No answers. We cannot say that a mereological fusion is 
ontologically prior to its parts if we havenÕt been told what is the ontology that 
underlies the fusion. After all, neither mereology nor internal-Schaffer 
relatedness offer a guide to any specific ontology; they donÕt provide real 
distinctions. 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6 Existence monism: The non-relational One      
I started this investigation by raising objections against the two main 
ingredients of the dominant fragmented ontology: self-contained plurals and 
external relations. We have seen that neither DE nor OSR nor PM are self-
sufficient and coherent alternatives. It is time to examine our final holistic 
candidate, the one that in ¤5.1 I distinguished as Existence Monism (EM). In 
¤6.1 I will explain the content of the thesis. Throughout ¤¤6.2Ð6.6 I will 
support it and develop its consequences, although an important part of the job 
has already been anticipated in previous arguments. As it happens, EM 
vindicates my favourite conception of relations: internal-Bradley relatedness. 
And as I hope to show, the internal coherence of EM and the arguments for it 
are signs of its relative superiority, at least when compared to the other 
alternatives discussed here. However, I still remain very suspicious. The 
relative victory of EM, if victory at all, has a Pyrrhic taste. Yet this is not EMÕs 
fault in particular. My skepticism is the result of the vices that EM shares with 
ontology in general. The ascent that culminates in EM simply reveals those 
vices in a more clear way. I leave these skeptical remarks for the Epilogue. 
6.1 Undivided wholeness     
According to EM, the actual world is a single concrete individual object, since 
no other concrete entity but the world enjoys determinate identity-conditions 
and countability. Supporters of EM speak of one dynamic ÔblobjectÕ or 
ÔjelloÕ (Horgan and Potrč 2008, Potrč 2003), or of one ÔUndivided Wholeness 
in Flowing MovementÕ (Bohm [1980] 2002: 14), or of one ÔGodÕ or one 
ÔNatureÕ, indistinctly (Spinoza 1994). For short, I will call it ONE. ONE is 
concrete, extended and qualitatively rich. It is undivided and indivisible (a true 
in-dividual); it cannot be said (meaningfully) to be composed by, or 
decomposable into, a plurality of other objects, i.e., it is an extended simple. 
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EM is exclusionary: since ONE is one object, it is not many objects. There 
might be levels of discourse and thought, but not levels of objects. According 
to EM, all composition/decomposition is fictional discourse, the product of 
what Bradley called Ôvicious abstractionÕ. A fortiori, ONE is not a basic object 
upon which many other objects depend, as PM says. According to EM, the 
asymmetrical dependence embraced by PM is an obscure and spurious solution 
for an inexistent problem. The problem that PM faces does not exist, because 
without composites no problem of composition ever arises and, a fortiori, no 
problem about which one is more basic, whether the composite or the 
components, whether the whole or its parts, ever arises (recall the arguments 
stated in ch. 5 against composites in general and against PM in particular). 
According to EM, no object short of ONE has a real definition, since nothing 
but ONE is in itself and can be conceived through itself, and everything short 
of ONE can only be and be conceived through ONE (Spinoza 1994: ID3). 
Furthermore, ONE is the only substance, in the technical sense that it is the 
only entity that enjoys independent conditions of identity and existence. 
Is ONE particular or universal? As I said before (¤3.4), one cannot but realise 
how little insight provides the universal/particular distinction when applied to a 
concrete individual object. If you think that a universal is a numerically one 
that runs through many, then ONE cannot be just one among many particulars, 
since it is the only clear individual object around; but it might well be 
considered a universal, since ONE runs through the many attributes into which 
ONE can be divided through abstraction. If you prefer, you can think of ONE 
as an Aristotelian substantial form, like Socrates (better: Socrateshood), which 
is not a bare substratum but the substantial form itself (¤2.1.3); or, following 
some British idealists, you might prefer to call ONE a Ôconcrete universalÕ (see 
Stern 2007). Is ONE material/physical? Yes, but only if this also means being 
experiential (more about this in ¤6.6). 
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EM reaches the highest point that the dialectic process of overcoming 
fragmentation can reach: ONE is neither a plurality of externally related 
objects, nor a plurality of internally-Moore or internally-Russell related 
objects, nor a pure internal-Moore relational structure, nor many internally-
Schaffer related objects that co-depend upon a more basic or fundamental 
object. Just the exclusionary and all-embracing ONE. ONE has place only for 
internal-Bradley relatedness, where both relata and relations are better 
understood as fictions of decomposition, as abstractions from the unbroken 
substantial unity that ONE is. Intrinsic nature is something that can only be 
enjoyed by ONE, since it is not divided by internal boundaries and there are no 
externally related objects within it, no Ôloose and separateÕ building blocks 
available for playing the lego-game of free recombination. The doctrine is the 
complete opposite of Humean Supervenience: the world is one and relations 
are internal-Bradley. 
Two traditional objections have been raised against EM. First, that EM cannot 
explain the heterogeneity that the world exhibits. Second, that EM is shocking, 
since it denies Moorean truths like this one: ÔHere is my right hand! Here is my 
left hand! There you have it: there are at least two concrete individuals.Õ None 
of these objections is compelling because both of them apply with equal force 
to any sparse ontology in the market, and in particular to all the other 
ontologies examined in this work. Hence, what is a common or shared vice 
cannot be used as a reason to dismiss EM without dismissing the other 
alternatives. Firstly, it is not the number of individuals what explains 
heterogeneity but the qualitative richness of each one of the individuals 
admitted. Thus, the problem of accounting for heterogeneity is equally pressing 
for the pluralist, since a world of many externally related atoms, all of them 
having the same colour, mass, smell, etc., is as boring as each of the atoms that 
compose it. Nor the mere introduction of the relation of ÔdifferenceÕ can do the 
trick: imagine that relation and wait for difference to arise... Secondly, all the 
ontologies examined here equally offend common sense, and they do so 
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because any kind of revisionary metaphysics offends common sense. After all, 
according to Humean Supervenience, two hands are just like two clouds of 
dimensionless pixels, and those are not the kind of hands that come as obvious 
to common sense. What the revisionary metaphysician is asking to Moore is 
this: What do you really mean by Ôa handÕ? By answering: ÔWell, I mean this: a 
handÕ, Moore is begging the question. It is objecthood or individuality itself 
that is under discussion, that is, we are examining what counts as a legitimate 
ÔtermÕ and whether there are any real items like ÔrelationsÕ holding between any 
pair of them. It might be very wise to stop right where the commonsensical 
fellow stops, but this is precisely what the revisionary metaphysician doesnÕt 
do, for better or worse. Schaffer, Lewis and other post-QuineanÐyet still 
scholasticÐmetaphysicians usually like to picture themselves as in agreement 
with the commonsensical fellow, and one cannot avoid the thought that they 
must be joking. Just try to name one Ôcommonsensical fellowÕ who believes in 
four-dimensionalism, or in eternalism, or in a plurality of worlds, or in 
universalism about composition, or in pointillisme. The Ôcommonsensical 
fellowÕ is an anti-metaphysician per excellence: he stops asking right where 
Moore stops asking. 
In the following sections I offer what I would prefer to call ÔsignsÕ in favour of 
EM. I use the word ÔsignÕ because the arguments that I will offer here are more 
like symptoms of rather than conclusive reasons for EM. Of course, the fact 
that EM survives the criticisms raised against the weaker holistic ontologies 
previously exposed is already a consideration in its favour, but much more 
work would be needed in order to build a positive, fully articulated, and 
conclusive case in favour of EM. In particular, because it is not clear whether 
these various signs in favour of EM can be put together under a single 
theoretical framework. For instance, there are signs of EM in General 
Relativity and in Quantum Theory, but, as it is well known, although these two 
theories are the best we have, they are incompatible and we still have no theory 
that can put them together. Maybe this incompatibility is also a sign, a sign that 
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a new kind of order is needed, as Bohm insists. After all, despite their 
incompatibilities, both theories have something in common: they both give 
signs of undivided wholeness and this common aspect is perhaps the best point 
to start such a new order (Bohm [1980] 2002: 223, Bohm and Hiley 1993: 
¤15.2). Given that science does not and cannot tell us the whole story, we 
should also take the answers of science as indicators or symptoms and not as 
final truths. 
6.2 Space and its occupants, continuity and plenitude     
I argued that non-Leibnizian relationalism about space is mysterious because 
real relations are mysterious (¤1.4.1, ¤4.3, ¤4.4), and this is a consideration that 
indirectly favours either Leibnizian (idealistic) relationalism or 
substantivalism. I also argued that if space is an individual object in its own 
right (substantivalism) and not just a relational order of some sort 
(relationalism or structuralism), then the best way to understand that object 
without falling into incoherence is as an extended simple, not as a composite 
having proper parts (ÔregionsÕ or ÔpointsÕ) standing in any sort of real relations 
(ch. 4, ¤5.3.2, ¤5.5.2). Of course, this second argument was not an argument 
for substantivalism itself, but only an argument for the way in which 
substantivalism should be understood. I also said that if substantivalism is the 
case, then the indivisibility of the material contents of space obtains via 
supersubstantivalism. Supersubstantivalism, as I said then, is the monistic 
version of substantivalism according to which there are no material objects 
ÔoccupyingÕ space, since there is no real distinction between the container and 
the contained, between extended substance and corporeal substance (Descartes 
1985: II.10Ð11). If so, then material objects do not ÔoccupyÕ space nor they go 
from a fixed spatial location to another spatial location. What is really going on 
is that space or extended substance as a whole stops being ÔwateryÕ around here 
and becomes more ÔwateryÕ around there, or stops being ÔmassyÕ around there 
and becomes more ÔmassyÕ around here, but Ôcorporeal substance, insofar as it 
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is substance, cannot be dividedÕ (Spinoza 1994: IP15s). It happens that EM 
understands the world just like that: neither as objects-in-relations, nor as 
relations trough-and-through, nor as a space-and-objects-occupying-it, but as 
one extended simple, a non-composite object that directly, without the 
mediation of ÔoccupiersÕ, enjoys qualitative richness. There is simply a 
continuous, extended and indivisible plenum, a qualitatively rich ONE. 
Now I am offering a reason for supersubstantivalism as understood by EM. 
The reason is empirical: the best and more comprehensive theories about the 
material world that we have, i.e., General Relativity and Quantum Theory, 
support it. Although these two theories are not compatible and we are still 
waiting for a unified theory, both of them point in the same direction of 
understanding: first, spatial extension has features that cannot be captured by 
relationalism but only by substantivalism (e.g., certain topological features); 
second, there are no material objects ÔoccupyingÕ space. What we have is space 
with its all-pervading field-like energy. 
This is certainly the case in General Relativity. In EinsteinÕs own words:  
The combination of the idea of a continuous field with that of material points 
discontinuous in space appears inconsistent. [...] Since the theory of general 
relativity implies the representation of physical reality by a continuous field, the 
concept of particles or material points cannot play a fundamental part... (Einstein 
1950: 14Ð15, his emphasis) 
According to Bohm, one of the important implications of General Relativity is 
that it is strictly inadequate to think of space as a set of well-defined points in 
relations of distance (Bohm [1980] 2002: 210). Another important implication 
is that Ôno coherent concept of an independently existent particle is possible, 
neither one in which the particle would be an extended body, nor one in which 
it would be a dimensionless pointÕ (Bohm [1980] 2002: 220). The so-called 
ÔparticlesÕ are simply ripples, wrinkles or vortices in a Ôvast sea of 
energyÕ (Bohm [1980] 2002: 242), more or less stable patterns that occur when 
the concentration of energy reaches high values, certain Ôkinds of abstractions 
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from the total fieldÕ (Bohm [1980] 2002: 158). The core idea that can be 
distilled from General Relativity is that Ôneither the point particles nor the 
quasi-rigid body can be taken as primary conceptsÕ (Bohm [1980] 2002: 157). 
And if one is tempted to replace ÔparticlesÕ by spatiotemporal worms, chains of 
eternal and externally related stages or extensionless events, is totally 
misguided, and probably under the pernicious influence of what Bergson 
([1911] 1998) denounced as Ôthe logic of solidsÕ. Because the so-called 
ÔwormÕ, just like any other concrete individual short of ONE, can only be taken 
as an Ôabstraction of a relatively invariant formÕ or Ômore like a pattern of 
movement than like a solid thing that exists autonomously and 
permanentlyÕ (Bohm [1980] 2002: 157). 
What happens in General Relativity also happens in Quantum Theory. 
Relativistic Quantum Field Theory is a theory without particles but only fields. 
It has no real meaning to talk about material particles ÔoccupyingÕ space. 
Because what we take as particles are just more or less stable patterns in a Ôvast 
sea of energyÕ. The particle-talk is strictly false because a ÔparticleÕ is only a 
convenient abstraction, fiction or idealisation. Strictly speaking, there are no 
such things. As Halvorson and Clifton put it: 
RQFT [Relativistic Quantum Field Theory] does not permit an ontology of 
localizable particles; and so, strictly speaking, our talk about localizable particles 
is a ﬁction. (Halvorson and Clifton 2002: 23, their emphasis) 
In similar sense, Zukav: 
According to quantum field theory, fields alone are real. They are the substance 
[i.e. stuff] of the universe and not ÔmatterÕ. Matter (particles) is simply the 
momentary manifestations of interacting fields which... are the only real things 
in the universe. (Zukav in Bennett 1984: 92, his emphasis) 
Cao also argues that, according to the most accepted interpretation of Quantum 
Field Theory since the 90s, the right ontology Ôcan only be the quantum fieldsÕ 
because Ôwhile from fields we can derive all the aspects of particles, the 
physical content of the quantum fields is not exhaustible by particlesÕ (Cao 
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2003: 63). Moreover, Zeh (2003) suggests to abandon the concept of material 
ÔparticleÕ altogether. After all, not even the number of particles of a system is 
frame-invariant (Schaffer 2010a: 54). Thus, Quantum Field Theory allows the 
particle-talk; however, this talk is not literally true but only true about a fiction 
or abstraction. 
Alright. LetÕs accept that there are no material occupants but only fields, and 
that point-like objects and particles are, strictly speaking, abstractions from the 
Ôvast sea of energyÕ to which fields give place. But what do we mean by 
ÔfieldsÕ? In particular, how do they stand to space? This is very controversial. 
By pressing this question we might be again resurrecting the idea of relata-in-
relations. A field is supposed to be an essentially extended and unbroken actual 
force that pervades all space with different degrees of intensity but without 
gaps. Yet there is no obvious agreement about how we should understand this. 
Schaffer says that fields are the properties or attributes of space itself, and he 
takes space to be the one (ÔpriorÕ, we should add) substratum upon which fields 
inhere, understanding that this substratum enjoys independent existence from 
the fields (Schaffer 2009b: 142Ð44, with references). Campbell also takes 
fields to be attributes or properties (in CampbellÕs case, these are supposed to 
be tropes), and he takes space to be not a substratum but also a sort of attribute, 
perhaps the most ÔetherealÕ of all, and understands that space and the fields 
together conform the single bundle that is this world (Campbell 1990: 147). As 
it can be appreciated, science might well accept that space is not merely a 
relational order but a substance in its own right, and then it might well reject 
familiar material ÔoccupantsÕ and material ÔbodiesÕ in relations of occupation to 
space, and give us just one big object with many attributes or one huge bundle 
of fields. But we would be very fool if we take this as giving us some deep 
metaphysical insight into the nature of reality, since while dealing with space 
and its fields we are just dealing once again with the same metaphysical 
conundrum that troubled Bradley while observing a lump of sugar (Bradley 
1930: ch. 2). Is the lump of sugar distinct from its hardness, its whiteness, and 
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its sweetness? If so, how does the object stand to those qualities? Are the lump, 
its hardness, whiteness and sweetness somehow relata-in-relation? Or are 
hardness, whiteness and sweetness unified by a relation of bundling without 
the concurrence of a bare substratum? In sum, what makes the lump of sugar 
ÔoneÕ and not ÔmanyÕ? The problem of SchafferÕs and CampbellÕs 
understandings of space and the fields is the same old problem: they 
understand attributes as if they were wholly distinct relata in a sort of relation 
(ÔinstantiationÕ in SchafferÕs case; ÔcompresenceÕ or ÔbundlingÕ in CampbellÕs 
case). And my point is BradleyÕs: understanding space as an Ôindependently 
existentÕ substratum over which the fields are ÔinstantiatedÕ is non-sensical, just 
like understanding space along with the fields as a bundle of attributes in 
relation of ÔcompresenceÕ or ÔbundlingÕ is non-sensical. The unity of an 
individual (any individual) can never arise from some substratum being 
somehow related to its attributes or by some attributes being somehow related 
to each other. To keep it simple: Firstly, a lump of sugar is not an Ôindependent 
existentÕ substratum somehow ÔrelatedÕ to its attributes, because there is 
nothing left if we screen-off its hardness, its whiteness, and its sweetness. 
There is no ÔthatÕ without ÔwhatÕ. Empty space is as absurd as a bare 
substratum or as the referent of a logically proper name; and fields that do not 
involve spatial extension are as absurd as extensionless paintings. Secondly, 
there is no way in which we could get the unity of one lump of sugar by 
magically ÔbundlingÕ what we take as numerically distinct attributes, namely 
hardness, whiteness and sweetness. How can these many attributes become one 
object? BradleyÕs central point is that the unity of an individual (any 
individual) can never be obtained if one starts from numerically distinct 
constituents. If the unity is there, then it must be recognised that the numerical 
distinctness of the so-called ÔconstituentsÕ is only obtainable through 
abstraction from the unity. And if we pay attention, it does seem that the unity 
is already there, and that only analysis destroys it. If fields are all-pervading 
and they donÕt leave any vacua within the whole of spatial extension, if they 
are like superimposed layers of water in an ocean of energy, then how can we 
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legitimately conceive space and treat it as something distinct from the ocean 
itself? Or how can we legitimately identify one layer of water and treat it as a 
distinct existent? Or how can we legitimately think that space or any layer of 
water could be removed or swapped from the undivided plenum without 
altering all the ocean, the whole plenum of space-energy? In fact, we are not 
entitled to take layers of water or fields as ÔtermsÕ in their own right; when we 
do so, we are abstracting them from the ocean, from the space-energy, making 
an illegitimate cut into an already substantial unity that lacks internal 
boundaries (or can we really say that there is a point where this layer of water 
ends and that layer of water starts?). In a way, it is not surprising that there is 
still no ÔunifiedÔ field theory. How could we ever get to that point if we start by 
taking space, the metric field, the gravitational field, the electromagnetic field, 
etc., as if they were numerically distinct relata somehow waiting to be related? 
Nothing can do the trick! Is like someone who wonders why he has a theory of 
whiteness, a theory of sweetness, a theory of hardness, but still no theory about 
how they stand together as a lump of sugar. Or a theory of the spatial extension 
and the layers of water of the ocean but no theory of the ocean. What does he 
expect after he has destroyed the unity of the lump of sugar, the unity of the 
ocean, through analysis and abstraction? That these separate elements will 
come back together as if by magic?  
It is interesting to note that despite not being able to develop a unified field 
theory, Einstein himself was in speculative agreement with the fundamental 
unity of space and the energy that fills it and that space-energy was simply one 
field. For Einstein, the Field was the only reality and Ôthe concept of space 
detached from any physical content does not existÕ (Einstein 1950: 15). The 
Field might have variable degrees of thickness or intensity, but it is always 
coincident with the whole of extension. Bohm, unlike contemporary 
philosophers that try to fit everything in the pigeon wholes of their set-theoretic 
prejudices, understood well that EinsteinÕs idea was to take Ôthe total field of 
the whole universe as a primary descriptionÕ and that such a field was 
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Ôcontinuous and indivisibleÕ, so that we should take the world Ôas an undivided 
and unbroken wholeÕ, where divisions represent only a Ôcrude abstraction and 
approximationÕ (Bohm [1980] 2002: 157Ð58). Thus, just like substantial space 
cannot be legitimately analysed into components (regions, points), the Field is 
not a series of point-like entities in any kind of relation. Just like space, the 
Field is essentially extended, undivided and indivisible. One of the oldest and 
more important tensions within the metaphysics of science is the one between 
atoms and plena (Hooker 1974), and Einstein definitely favoured the latter. He 
vindicated the old Cartesian and Spinozistic idea according to which the 
material world is a single extended and continuous plenum, without gaps and 
without vacua (Descartes 1985: II.16Ð18, Spinoza 1994: IP15s, Sachs 1976), 
Ôinasmuch as the so called ÔvacuumÕ of present-day physics is seething with 
activity . . . and is defined simply as the lowest energy-state of the field system, 
which has no ÔholesÕ or true vacua at allÕ (Strawson 2006b: 202n). Thus, 
Einstein offered real remedies for those of us who suffer horror separationis 
and horror vacuis, diseases that a pluralistic metaphysics seems incapable to 
cure. In General Relativity there is just the Field and it is identical with space; 
the Field and space are not separate existents but simply two ways of naming 
the same thing. Thus, it has no real meaning to ask whether the world is 
substance-stuff or substance-thing or substance-process: the stuff is the thing 
and the essence of a thing is conatus. The world is an unbroken wholeness in 
which arbitrary divisions can be made, but where these divisions do not map 
real distinctions. According to Bohm, even the common notions of space and 
time seem to be obtained through abstraction from this unbroken wholeness 
(Bohm 1980 [2002]: xviii). Ultimately, as Spinoza would say, ONE is the only 
substance, because IT is in itself and IT can only be conceived (or really 
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defined) through itself (Spinoza 1994: ID3).  The ordinary individuals posited 73
by common sense (including us), are better understood, if your prefer, as what 
Spinoza called modes or affections. In Spinozistic terms, modes or affections of 
the substance do not obey real distinctions, but only to distinctions of reason or 
imagination.  This is so because any individual object should at least enjoy 74
determinate identity-conditions and countability, and there is no fact of the 
matter of what counts as a single wave or vortex within the ocean. Again, not 
because their number is infinite or because counting them involves doing a 
super-task, but because waves and vortices are not individuals that ÔcomposeÕ 
the ocean, i.e., they do not have determinate synchronic/diachronic boundaries, 
nor determinate location, nor determinable number, nor a self-contained 
intrinsic nature that makes them ÔseparableÕ from the ocean itself. They are 
expression of the striving of the single ocean that is identical with all 
extension, that is, relatively stable patterns that arise from, and dissolve back 
into, an undivided, indivisible and always resonant plenum of energy. They are 
like grins or blushes in SocratesÕ face, which can only be and be conceived 
through Socrates and are distinguished and separated from Socrates only by 
reason or imagination. 
 Bohm insists that fragments of ONE are not individual objects in their own right (neither 73
point-like stages of worms, nor rigid continuants, nor ÔposteriorÕ or co-dependent upon IT)Ða 
fortiori, not objects-in-relations in their own rightÐbut only abstractions or convenient fictions. 
We chop IT down for pragmatic reasons, since it would be impossible to deal with IT all at 
once, but this does not mean that IT is Ôloose and separateÕ or a composite. As Bohm puts it: 
ÔThe notion that all these fragments are separately existent is evidently an illusion, and this 
illusion cannot do other than lead to endless conflict and confusion. [...] Indeed, to some 
extent, it has always been both necessary and proper for man, in his thinking, to divide things 
up, and to separate them, so as to reduce his problems to manageable proportions; for 
evidently, if in our practical technical work we tried to deal with the whole of reality at once, 
we would be swamped.Õ (Bohm [1980] 2002: 2)
 That categories applied in any fragmentary understanding of ONE (i.e., in any understanding 74
that is not through ONE itself) are not real distinctions but the result of arbitrary or pragmatic 
projections of reason or imagination seems to be SpinozaÕs position. Thus, he writes to Meyer: 
Ô[F]rom the fact that we separate the affections of Substance from Substance itself, and arrange 
them in classes so that we can easily imagine them as far as possible, there arises Number, 
whereby we delimit them. Hence, it can clearly be seen that Measure, Time and Number are 
nothing other than modes of thinking, or rather, modes of imagining.Õ (Spinoza 2002: 789; see 
also Spinoza 1994: Part I, Appendix).
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What leads some people like Schaffer to understand the continuous plenum 
endorsed by General Relativity, as a kind of composite of spatial points/regions 
and not as ONE? In my opinion this is just another consequence of set-
theoretic and mereological prejudices, of the permanent temptation to analyse 
and domesticate under Ôthe logic of solidsÕ what perhaps is ineffable but 
already clear to the intellect. This ÔanalyticalÕ understanding of continuity is the 
legacy of the so-called Ôarithmetic traditionÕ. Within this tradition fall most of 
contemporary analytic metaphysicians, who follow the path of Cantor, 
Weirstrass, Dedekind and Russell, whose attempts of understanding the 
continuum were analyses of it in terms of discrete notions like ÔsetsÕ, ÔpointsÕ 
or Ôreal numbersÕ. 
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In contrast, my understanding of real continuity follows the opposite tradition, 
the so-called (in PeirceÕs honour) Ôsynechist traditionÕ. We can count Aristotle, 
Brentano, Peirce, Poincar, Brower, Weyl and Wittgenstein among its 
representatives. Members of this tradition understand that continuity resists 
analysis into discrete notions.  This understanding involves different degrees 75
of strength, but what is common to the tradition is the claim that no plurality of 
extensionless points standing in external relations can do the trick. First, 
because from unextended simples one cannot conceive the birth of something 
extended: 0 multiplied by any quantity, no matter how large, is always 0. 
Second, because a continuum is an undivided and gapless one, so its parts, 
presumably, can be, in the best case, only potential parts, and, in the worst 
case, only abstractions obtained after a fictional cut. Thus, if one thinks that 
mathematics is supposed to represent reality, and not only to be a useful fiction 
or idealisation, then the arithmetic continuum is not a good representation of 
the real continuum, but only a ÔfictionÕ or a ÔmisrepresentationÕ, as Brentano 
thought. Under this conception, it is absolutely wrong to treat the continuum as 
a set of points, no matter how infinite in number are these. A real continuum 
has no proper parts before a cut is made in it. Does it have, then, potential 
 See Aristotle (1941c: Book VI), Brentano (1988), Peirce (1935: 6.102Ð6.163). For a good 75
survey of the continuum and the two opposite traditions mentioned above, see Bell (2010). For 
a good revision of the evolution of WeylÕs enlightened thoughts on the continuum, which were 
inspired by Brouwer, see Bell (2000). For a defence of the Aristotelian account of space and 
continuity, see Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1994: Appendix II). Against the arithmetical 
understanding of the continuum, Poincar said: ÔThe continuum thus conceived is nothing but a 
collection of individuals arranged in a certain order, infinite in number, it is true, but external to 
each other.Õ (Poincar in Russell [1903] 2010: ¤326) Wittgenstein, in various places, and 
evidently influenced by BrouwerÕs intuitionism, also complained about the arithmetic 
understanding of the continuum. For him, the inadequacy rested in using the tools of set theory 
to deal with all mathematical problems. He said: ÔLike the enigma of time for Augustine, the 
enigma of the continuum arises because language misleads us into applying to it a picture that 
doesnÕt fit. Set theory preserves the inappropriate picture of something discontinuous, but 
makes statements about it that contradict the picture, under the impression that it is breaking 
with prejudices; whereas what should really have been done is to point out that the picture just 
doesnÕt fit, that it certainly canÕt be stretched without being torn, and that instead of it one can 
use a new picture in certain respects similar to the old one.Õ (Wittgenstein 1974: 471, his 
emphasis) In other place: ÔMathematics is ridden through and through with the pernicious 
idioms of set theory. One example of this is the way people speak of a line as composed of 
points. A line is a law and isnÕt composed of anything at all.Õ (Wittgenstein 1975: ¤173, his 
emphasis)
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parts?  This might work for a continuous rope but it seems mistaken when 76
applied to a continuous space, and, a fortiori, to corporeal substance when is 
identical with it. Because after a cut is made we no longer have one continuum 
but two continua, just like when we cut a rope into two. And if space and 
energy, the plenum of nature, were a real continuum, wouldnÕt we be in 
presence of two spaces or two worlds if a cut were made? Additionally, in 
cases like the one of space, such potential parts seem to be a metaphysical 
impossibility. What would be the result of removing a ÔregionÕ from the space 
in which it is embedded? Can we think of adding a brand new ÔregionÕ into 
space? Are these scenarios even conceivable? It seems clear to me that this is a 
metaphysical impossibility. It seems that space can only be created ex-nihilo 
and all at once, not brick by brick. Similarly, it is not (it cannot be) destroyed 
or decomposed by removing bits of it. If space is a continuum, then it has no 
real internal boundaries (unlike discrete or contiguous entities, which, 
presumably, do have boundaries): regions or points are just fictions of 
decomposition or limits reached through abstraction. Talking about them as if 
they were proper parts or individual objects in their own right yet dependent 
upon a prior whole, as Schaffer does, only offers us a distorting image of what 
seems to be the peculiar character of space. Hence, according to what I have 
argued, space is either divided or undivided. If it is divided into points or 
regions, then it is no longer a continuum but, at most, a plurality of discrete and 
contiguous units somehow ÔunifiedÕ byÐwhat else?Ðrelations (!). If it is 
undivided, then it is an actual continuum. And since we are talking about space, 
it is not only actually undivided but also potentially indivisible. It can only be 
destroyed by its complete annihilation. An actual space is one by metaphysical 
necessity. Of course, we can still talk of regions or points of it, but that will be 
 Aristotle seems to have understood the continuum as having only potential parts. Feyerabend 76
makes an interesting point of AristotleÕs insight, since it somehow anticipates the difficulties of 
measurement in quantum mechanics: ÔAristotleÕs interpretation of the continuum as a whole 
whose parts are created by cuts (temporary halts in the case of motion) and cannot be said to 
exist before a cut has been performed implies that a well-defined location and a well-defined 
state of motion exclude each other; this anticipates some very profound features of modern 
physics.Õ (Feyerabend 1999: 221)
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only for pragmatic reasons. Parts of space are only abstractions under the 
fiction of decomposition. 
The contemporary analytic philosopher wants to affirm at the same time claims 
that are in obvious tension: he wants to affirm both the continuity and the 
plurality of discrete elements, both the unity of the components and also their 
sharp distinctness. More consistent was Leibniz, whose pluralist ontology was 
a perfect realisation of infinitesimal fragmentation. His monads are 
infinitesimal unextended (hence, immaterial) units and all nature can be seen as 
an aggregate of these, in different degrees of cohesion. Given this ontology, 
Leibniz understood that there was no real place for the continuum and he 
understood it as a mere abstraction, as an imaginary limit, never to be found in 
nature, which is actually divided into infinite extensionless units (Leibniz 
1989: 504, 535Ð536, 539, Levey 1999).  
6.3 Distance     
We have seen that relations of distance is what keeps the tiny individuals of 
Humean Supervenience entirely Ôloose and separateÕ and amenable for 
duplication and free recombination. Take a simple Lewisian world, inhabited 
by two of those point-like things, x and y. LetÕs say that they are three feet 
apart. This distance is an external relation. Allegedly, x and y could have both 
existed without being so related, but being, letÕs say, seven feet apart, since 
each of these point-like things has a real definition, each of them is a substance 
insofar as each of them has independent identity-conditions. The key question 
is not how can we complement or modify this picture in order to avoid the 
puzzles of fragmentation. The question is why should we believe it in the first 
place? On what grounds should we believe that our world is a bigger version of 
this tiny model where x and y stand separated by a relation of distance? 
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Maudlin (1993, 2007) has convincingly argued that the answer to this last 
question should be that there are simply no empirical grounds for such a belief. 
And this should be enough for a naturalistic philosopher like Lewis. Because 
what we call a relation of distance is an abstraction from an underlying unity or 
total situation which is a continuous, unbroken and common space. That is, 
relations of distance, perhaps the only external relations around, are internal-
Bradley. In Maudlin words:  
Distance between two points is a metaphysically derivative notion. The primitive 
notion from which it is derived is the length of a path in space. The distance 
between two points is then defined as the minimal length of a continuous path 
that connects the points. [...] If two points cannot be connected by a continuous 
path, then ipso facto it is metaphysically impossible for there to be any distance 
between them. (Maudlin 2007: 87) 
If distances between any two points are always derived from lengths of spatial 
paths, then any two arbitrary spatial points of which we predicate some 
distance must belong to the same continuously connected space (Maudlin 
2007: 89). Hence, a world with two point-like objects needs more than an 
external relation of distance holding between them. Better: such a world needs 
to be something totally different, namely a real and continuous spatial 
continuum, just like the spatial continuum that obtains when two cities are 
connected by a highway. Using this metaphor of cities one can get a more clear 
idea of the full picture. What we call objects standing in relations of distance to 
other objects, or objects standing in relations of occupation to some place, are 
just fictions or useful abstractions. What we call a particular object is just like a 
city: it does not occupy some space but it is spatial extension, whose thickness 
in terms of energy concentration is particularly salient but which is 
continuously and really connected with neighbour cities, in such a way that any 
boundaries between them can only be conventional or fictional but not real. 
Two objects standing in a relation of distance are just like two cities connected 
by the same land in which they are embedded: to go from one to another you 
need to walk through a path. What we call objects standing in relations of 
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distance are a convenient idealisation derived from an underlying, pervasive 
and thick unity: an extended continuous plenum of space-energy.  
The main problem with distances conceived as pure external relations is that 
they do not provide a good explanation of the so-called Triangle Inequality, 
while when they are conceived as derivative notions from substantial paths the 
explanation is nice and straightforward (Maudlin 1993, 2007: 86Ð96). 
According to the Triangle Inequality, if there are three points (A, B, C) 
standing in relations of distance, these must be constrained in the following 
way: Ôthe distance from A to B plus the distance from B to C must be at least as 
great as the distance from A to CÕ (Maudlin 2007: 88). Yet external relations of 
distance are supposed to hold without such constraints. Allegedly, an external 
relation is both indifferent to the intrinsic nature of the relata and to what 
happens elsewhere beyond the relata. Hence, from the fact that an external 
relation holds, we shouldnÕt expect any constraints on the relata or on anything 
beyond the relata. That is, if distances were relations, then it should be possible 
for three objects, A, B and C, to stand to each other without being constrained 
by the Triangle Inequality. But distancesÐthe paradigmatic case of external 
relations (and, according to many, the unique case)Ðdo hold with such 
constraint. This constraint is easily accommodated if we, in contrast, 
understand distances not as relations but as derivative notions, as abstractions 
from spatial paths. So, if there is a distance between A and B, then this is so 
because there is a continuous path that connects A with B. Similarly, if there is 
a distance between B and C, then this is because there is a continuous path that 
connects B with C. If these two distances exist, then a path between A and C 
exists. Given A, B and C, and the paths that connect them, then the distance 
from A to C must be at least as great as the distance from A to B plus the 
distance from B to C. The constraint posed by the Triangle Inequality cannot 
but be respected: the length of the minimal path from A to C cannot be greater 
than the length of the minimal path that connects A with B plus the length of 
the minimal path that connects B with C. The existence of a common space in 
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which paths are embedded explains beautifully why the Triangle Inequality 
actually holds between any arbitrary three points: yet the points, like the 
distances, are also derivative notions from what is a common, connected and 
really continuous space-energy. 
It is surprising how this conception of relations of distance, coupled with 
supersubstantivalism, vindicates BradleyÕs thoughts about what we really mean 
when we take a man and a billiard ball as free and self-contained terms 
standing in spatial relations: the so-called ÔmanÕ and Ôbilliard ballÕ, just like the 
allegedly external relation of distance in which they stand to each other, cannot 
but be more or less valid abstractions from the unfragmented spatial whole in 
which all of them are embedded and from which they obtain their identity 
(Bradley 1930: 517Ð18, quoted in ¤2.2). Someone like Schaffer might insist 
that there are many objects dependent upon one basic object. But if the basic 
object has no room for relations of distance, then how can these pop-up at the 
level of the so-called ÔdependentÕ objects? How can dependent objects enjoy 
privileges that the very basic object upon which they depend doesnÕt enjoy? 
Leibniz saw the problem of the spatial vacuum and the location of relations, 
and he correctly gave them monadic foundations in infinitesimal unextended 
souls. Spatial relations were just relations of ideas. Kant also saw the problem: 
he saw that if relations were not in the head, then Spinozism was the 
alternative. Descartes and Spinoza couldnÕt but think of relations of distance as 
modes of extended (hence, corporeal) substance, ways in which the one 
extended substance expresses itself, just like finite bodies were modes of that 
very same substance, because there are no naked ÔfeetÕ or ÔyardsÕ but only Ôfeet 
of ropeÕ or Ôyards of landÕ (Bennett 1984: 99Ð100). The contemporary 
relationalist has no story for his relations: he wants to be a realist about them 
and embrace their external character yet, at the same time, he seems 
comfortable with, and unmoved by, the fact that those relations are somehow 
outside the relata, inhering in sheer nothingness. 
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6.4 Causation     
Philosophers like Armstrong think that not only distance but also transeunt 
causation is external or, even more, that relations of distance somehow are 
grounded in causal relations. The point is that without there being external 
relations of distance, and, a fortiori, without spatially separated plurals to act as 
causal relata, it is very hard to find a place for transeunt causation. Commonly, 
causal talk assumes interaction or influence among distinct existents, yet 
modern Spinozism rejects this pluralistic picture. Once relations of distance are 
rejected in favour of paths within ONE, I think there are two alternatives, 
Parmenidean and Heraclitean monism:  
(i) Parmenidean monism (the eternal ONE). There is no place for anything like 
causation because ONE is a four-dimensional extended simple. We just need to 
extend our treatment of spatial relations to cross-temporal relations in such a 
way that we take spatiotemporal relations to be derivative notions from 
arbitrary chosen spatiotemporal paths abstracted from the eternal four-
dimensional ONE. Rea (2001) defends the plausibility of this form of monism. 
(ii) Heraclitean monism (the present ONE). The only actually existent objects 
are present objects, and ONE is the only present object. There are no spatial 
relations because these are derivative notions from arbitrary chosen spatial 
paths of the present ONE, and there are no cross-temporal relations since ONE 
is the only present object and only present objects actually exist. In this second 
hypothesis, there can be no causal relations if we understand them as relations 
that involve cross-temporality, i.e., as relations that hold between actually 
existent earlier and later relata, or between actually existent earlier causes and 
later effects. If there is any place for something like causation in the present 
ONE, then this must be due to its own dynamic character. Same energy, same 
extension, in continuous flux. Just think in terms of liquids rather than solids. If 
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so, the Field cannot be a disposition or a relation or an impotent causal 
property, but actual force or striving, and what we call causation between 
distinct existents is simply an imperfect abstraction from the undivided process 
that is the striving of ONE, the lawful evolution of the undivided and active 
wholeness itself, its immanent unfolding. ÔBeforeÕ and ÔafterÕ, ÔcauseÕ and 
ÔeffectÕ, can only be names for abstractions from that process of striving, more 
or less fixed and relational ways that try to express or to capture in inadequate 
terms what is essentially ongoing and non-relational: the tensed striving of 
ONE. -  77 78
My preferences are with the second alternative because the dynamics is evident 
from experience, and such a systematic illusion cannot be accommodated 
within an eternal ONE. However, I want to stress two important points. First, 
presentism itself doesnÕt guarantee a dynamic reality. This depends on how 
presentism is constructed. Present objects may well be static and changeless 
objects that happen to come into existence and vanish in an instant. Second, the 
question of relational pluralism vs. non-relational monism is neutral towards 
the static or dynamic character of reality (as the worlds of Parmenides and 
Heraclitus themselves exemplify). In fact, true dynamic character can hardly be 
obtained by merely accepting relational pluralism. An entity is not dynamic in 
virtue of being Ôin relationÕ to another entity. A dynamic view of reality needs 
to understand time itself not as a thing-like dimension or as a matter that arises 
in virtue of some entities Ôbeing in relation withÕ some other entities (objects, 
places or times), but as an abstraction from irreducible process and change. If 
 Both Bohm ([1980] 2002) and Spinoza (1994) can be seen as defending an essentially 77
dynamic ONE insofar as both of them take that the essence of being is to strive, that being is 
acting. See Basile (2012) for a defence of this interpretation of SpinozaÕs monism; textual 
evidence comes from various passages of the Ethics, in particular IP34, IP17d, IID2. Horgan 
and Potrč (2008) and Potrč (2003) also claim to defend a ÔdynamicÕ ONE, but it is less clear to 
me whether they succeed in expressing this character.
 For the sake of simplicity, I have excluded the alternative of what it could be called the 78
growing-block ONE. The growing block ONE is either a contradiction or an ecumenic mixture 
in which the treatment of relations offered by the eternal ONE applies for the eternal past, and 
the treatment of relations offered by the present ONE applies for the dynamic present. 
Whichever alternative, still no relations are involved. I am tempted to think that the growing 
block ONE lives in internal contradiction.
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ONE is inherently dynamic, like a Leibnizian monad or an Aristotelian 
substantial form, then no relations can do the trick of expressing this tensed 
reality (as LeibnizÕs and AristotleÕs simultaneous rejection of relations and 
embracement of dynamic pluralism shows). 
Bohm speaks in terms of Ôuniversal fluxÕ or ÔholomovementÕ. The 
holomovement is Ôan unbroken and undivided totalityÕ of which sometimes Ôwe 
can abstract particular aspects (e.g. light, electrons, sound, etc.), but more 
generally, all forms of the holomovement merge and are inseparableÕ, and 
ultimately unbounded by concepts or measures: Ôthe holomovement is 
undefinable and immeasurableÕ (Bohm [1980]: 191, his italics). The law of the 
holomovement, its ÔholonomyÕ, can only be understood in implicit terms 
(Bohm [1980] 2002: 199). This is not surprising: after all, there is no ÔoutsideÕ 
here, no external standpoint for description. Spinoza said that ÔGod [-Nature] 
acts solely from the laws of his own nature, constrained by noneÕ (1994: IP17) 
and that HE [IT] Ôis the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all thingsÕ (1994: 
IP18), since nothing is external to HIM [IT]. Thus, if ONE leaves place for 
causation, then this cannot be understood as the ÔcementÕ that comes to glue an 
otherwise loose and separate universe, since there is no Ôloose and separateÕ 
universe in need for any relational glue. In a phrase suggested to me by 
Stephen Mumford, in an undivided universe, the popular idea of causation as a 
Ôcement of the universeÕ (Mackie 1980) would be like a solution in need for a 
problem. In ONE, causation can only be the direct and immanent unfolding of 
IT, which can be taken to be an essentially active object (¤3.5). Using a 
metaphor, we can think of the world as an unbroken tire, where ordinary 
objects are wrinkles or bubbles in its surface and distances between them are 
abstractions from continuous paths of the rubber. If there is any causal 
influence here, then it is direct and from within. Just like when you pump up 
the tire and some of its wrinkles are flattened, or when you deflate it and some 
new wrinkles appear. Of course, the metaphor requires to be qualified: there is 
no ÔyouÕ outside the cosmos to pump it up or deflate it. So causation within 
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ONE cannot be but an expression of its immanent activity, striving, conatus or 
effort. In an obvious way, the Humean dictum according to which there are no 
necessary connections between distinct existents is vindicated by ONE by 
denying that there are distinct existents. The necessity of ONEÕs unfolding can 
only come from itself: like a single monad, its immanent unfolding comes from 
its own essence, from being what it is, or, as Leibniz would say, Ôfrom the 
depths of its own natureÕ.  
This picture of immanent causation is vindicated by our understanding of 
global laws, as opposed to our understanding of local laws. Local laws of 
nature always seem to ÔlieÕ (Cartwright 1983). This shouldnÕt surprise us. After 
all, local laws always seem to depend upon unexpressed conditions, i.e. they 
only hold Ôceteris paribusÕ, because their very formulation is done after some 
idealisation is made, after some concurrent conditions are artificially blocked-
off. In contrast, if global laws actually hold, then they seem to do so in an 
unconditioned way, since there is really nothing left that can condition their 
actual holding. They seem to describe the essence of a single object (Bigelow, 
Ellis and Lierse 1992: 384, Ellis 2001: 251, Maudlin 2007: chs. 1 and 6, 
Schaffer 2013). In fact, global laws have to do with the evolution of the world 
as a whole (e.g. SchrdingerÕs equation, conservation principles). As Maudlin 
puts it: Ô[T]he fundamental laws of nature appear to be laws of temporal 
evolution: they specify how the state of the universe will, or might, evolve 
from a given initial stateÕ (Maudlin 2007: 172). Taking ONE as the source of 
global laws vindicates the Leibnizian and Spinozistic idea according to which 
to be a substance is to strive or to act from within, that to be a substance is to 
be an essentially active or restless object, a principle of activity, and that to be 
one is to act as one. Leibniz, qua substance-pluralist, needed a complicated 
system for coordinating the striving of his infinite monads and this fact, in an 
obvious way, introduces a systematic tension: Leibnizian monads are many but 
they act as if they were one: each one has its own program of unfolding but 
they co-evolve in magic coordination. Spinoza avoids all of these 
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complications: the world acts as ONE and this is not surprising because it is 
ONE. ONE strives without the help of external things and nothing external to it 
can hinder its striving. It is self-caused, self-determined. Its overall necessity 
can only arise from its own essence; its freedom consists in being self-caused 
and unconditioned by any kind of external conditions. 
6.5 Entanglement  la Bohm     
We just saw that the physics of space rejects the idea of pure external relations; 
in fact, relations of distance can only be seen as abstractions or derivative 
notions from a continuously connected thick space. We also saw that the great 
empirical challenge that affects the fragmented worldview is that contemporary 
physics suggests, uncontroversially, that reality is non-separable (¤1.6). As we 
saw, the state of an entangled system of two particles simply cannot be 
explained by purely local and intrinsic qualities of self-contained tiny objects 
plus external relations of distance. Entanglement imposes some irreducible 
holism. The entangled world is a non-separable world whose total state is not 
analysable into local ÔintrinsicÕ states. In fact, Ôno physical theory that takes the 
wavefunction seriously can be a Separable theoryÕ (Maudlin 2007: 61). And 
most current physical theories do take the wavefunction seriously. Why should 
one insist, then, on the plausibility of an ontology that has been superseded by 
empirical evidence?  
What kind of holism? Is it a matter of modal relations without contact (at-a-
distance) between particles or points, as might be suggested by OSR or DE? Or 
is it a matter of each of the particles being a dependent object of a larger object, 
as it might be suggested by PM? The problem with these solutions is that they 
donÕt dispel the mysterious character of the correlation. Or they do so only by 
introducing darker ontological mysteries. 
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Here is a possible and very plausible interpretation of this mysterious feature of 
nature. It is BohmÕs interpretation (Bohm [1980] 2002, Bohm and Hiley 1993; 
see also Albert 1996 for a sympathetic treatment), which favours the ONE of 
EM. Bohm thinks that this non-local correlation or spooky connection is a sign 
of something else, a sign of a higher-dimensional implicate order. This Ôhigher-
dimensional realityÕ is the multi-dimensional and real wave-function, which 
Bohm takes with ontological seriousness.  79
The technical details of these matters are way too difficult and abstract, and far 
beyond my intellectual capacities. However, since I am only interested in the 
metaphysics embraced, here is a nice example used by Bohm that can illustrate 
in more familiar terms his interpretation of what is happening in entanglement 
and, in particular, in the EPR experiment. Bohm ([1980] 2002: 236-240) asks 
us to consider a transparent tank of water with a fish swimming inside it. Then 
we must add two video cameras, A and B, each of which shoots the tank from a 
different angle (letÕs say that one is directed to the front of the tank and the 
other one to the right side of it, covering both together a right angle of the 
tank). In addition, each of the cameras is connected to a different screen, screen 
A and screen B, where what is filmed is directly projected. Imagine that each 
of the cameras shoots, from its own perspective, the fish moving inside the 
tank. When the fish makes a movement, such movement is projected into the 
two screens from different angles. If you go and see what is projected in each 
of the screens you will find out that though the images look very different from 
each other, they reveal a magic correlation. Yet the truth is that each of the two 
screens is projecting in two dimensions what is really a higher-dimensional 
unity: the single three-dimensional fish. This kind of phenomenon, according 
to Bohm, is exactly what happens in quantum correlations: what we think are 
 As Bohm says: ÔAll that is important here is that one finds, through a study of the 79
implications of the quantum theory, that the analysis of a total system into a set of 
independently existent but interacting particles breaks down in a radically new way. One 
discovers, instead, both from consideration of the meaning of the mathematical equations and 
from the results of actual experiments, that the various particles have to be taken literally as 
projections of a higher-dimensional reality which cannot be accounted for in terms of any force 
of interaction between them.Õ (Bohm [1980] 2002: 236Ð37)
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separate particles magically correlated are just projections of an undivided 
higher-dimensional unity. Such a real unity is not a mereological aggregate of 
two particles, and the apparent correlation is not a mysterious modal relation-
at-distance or an interaction where one particle exerts magic influence over a 
different particle. Because the so-called ÔparticlesÕ are imperfect abstractions 
from the undivided ONE. The particles-in-interaction-talk is just the way in 
which this undivided wholeness, this implicate order, is made explicit for 
explanation. The example involves familiar dimensions (two and three); we 
need to project this move into higher-dimensions. Expressing such an order 
already implies breaking it down into pieces. It implies, at least, as Bradley 
feared, the separation of system of thought from object of thought. BohmÐand 
Bradley would agreeÐthinks that we should distrust any analysis of the 
situation, because it would involve, inevitably, a fragmentary mode of 
explanation, which will make things easy to handle but that will hinder the 
understanding of what is essentially indivisible. Nor does the mereological and 
literal talk of Ôproper partsÕ offers insight. According to Bohm, not only 
ÔÔparticlesÕ are convenient abstractions from the whole movementÕ (Bohm 
[1980] 2002: 52), but also analysis into ÔpartsÕ is futile and meaningless, since 
parts are also abstractions from the undivided wholeness (Bohm [1980] 2002: 
11Ð15, 25, 71, 74Ð75, 157Ð8, 169). What Bohm tries to show is that undivided 
wholeness was already present in General Relativity, but the mechanistic 
understanding of nature chopped down that unity into separate elements in 
external relations (e.g. dimensionless points or particles, fields as separate from 
each other and each one constituted by externally related elements, etc.). 
Quantum Theory once again points towards an undivided wholeness and posits 
a more serious challenge to the mechanistic way of thinking, because now 
Ô[u]ltimately, the entire universe (with all its ÔparticlesÕ, including those 
constituting human beings, their laboratories, observing instruments, etc.) has 
to be understood as a single undivided whole...Õ (Bohm [1980] 2002: 221). This 
undivided wholeness, this ONE, is what Bohm takes to be an Ôimplicate orderÕ, 
an order that cannot be understood but in an implicit way, since whenever we 
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attempt to make it explicit, fragmentation is necessarily involved (Bohm 
[1980] 2002: 226Ð27). Thus, the path of understanding ONE is the very 
opposite to the mechanistic approach, because every analysis of IT is 
distortion. Bradley will also agree, in the sense that everything less than the 
whole is a more or less valid abstraction from IT, useful for pragmatic 
purposes, but ultimately unreal. So it is not, as Schaffer claims, that there are 
tables and planets and pebbles, on one hand, and the whole universe, on the 
other hand. Ultimately, the referents of the words ÔtableÕ, ÔplanetÕ, and ÔpebbleÕ 
are more or less valid abstractions from ONE, fictions of decomposition that 
attempt to make explicit what can only be understood implicitly. 
6.6 Experience: The Absolute sneaking through the backdoor     
I have argued that the metaphysics offered by OSR has an intolerably abstract 
character that obviously clashes with the most uncontroversial example of 
concrete existence: experience (¤4.4). I also said that any metaphysics (holistic 
or otherwise) should accommodate within it the obvious reality of experience. 
Thus, if the ONE of EM is a continuous and unbroken plenum of field-like 
energy, a physical Ôvast sea of energyÕ, then it is plausible to say that either (i) 
ONE is experiential, or (ii) ONE is non-experiential but somehow capable of 
grounding experience, or (iii) some experiential stuff exists apart from ONE. 
Alternative (iii) has obvious undesirable consequences. It means, in the first 
place, the very recognition of the failure of EM as a metaphysics, since it 
would be to admit its incompleteness or its falseness, because either ONE is 
non-experiential or ONE is no longer alone (likewise, it means the failure of 
any other holistic metaphysics that canÕt accommodate experience within its 
preferred ÔwholeÕ). Indeed, under alternative (iii) it is free-floating experiential 
stuff apart from ONE what gives place to the experience that the non-
experiential ONE is incapable to grant. Furthermore, if influence between 
plurals made of the same kind of stuff is already mysterious, stuff-dualism is 
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doubly mysterious because it involves influence between plurals made of 
distinct kinds of stuff. One could defend some kind of property-dualism, 
according to which ONE has both experiential properties and non-experiential 
properties. However, one cannot deal with property-dualism without collapsing 
this into substance-dualism. Property-dualism lives in tension because it 
assumes that properties are somehow numerically distinct beings that have 
autonomous and determinate identity-conditions and that a concrete individual 
is wholly distinct from its properties since it is somehow independently 
ÔrelatedÕ to them. This is the only way in which such individual can be non-
experiential and experiential at the same time. But, as I have insisted, this is 
incomprehensible: it is not clear how a concrete individual can be distinguished 
from its nature nor how can those two type of properties coexist in one 
individual without contradiction or without collapsing into one of them. 
Because I cannot begin to understand how can we say without contradiction 
that the very same object can be at once both experiential and non-experiential. 
Alternative (ii) is utterly obscure. It shares the obscurity of metaphysical 
notions like those of ÔgroundingÕ, ÔsupervenienceÕ and Ôasymmetrical 
dependenceÕ, that is, notions that introduce distinct levels of being and force 
their proponents either to deny the seriousness of the addition by qualifying it 
as Ôontologically innocentÕ, or to accept its reality and then get involved in the 
insurmountable task of giving an account of the spooky character of the 
asymmetrical relation that allegedly holds between these two distinct levels. 
Thus, one might say that experience Ôis grounded inÕ, Ôsupervenes uponÕ, or 
Ôemerges fromÕ non-experiential stuff, but mean nothing serious by thisÐ
because, after all, all what there really is is non-experiential stuff, since the 
supervenient or emergent level is really Ôno addition of beingÕ. Or one might 
say that experience somehow Ôis grounded inÕ, Ôsupervenes uponÕ, or Ôemerges 
fromÕ non-experiential stuff, and do mean something serious by this, and then 
try to give a presentable account of how is it that from something more basic 
and fundamental which is of non-experiential character can arise something 
less basic and less fundamental that does enjoy experiential character. As far as 
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I can see, this is incomprehensible. Alternative (iii) is the best alternative. As 
the hard problem of consciousness stubbornly shows, physicalism as currently 
understood has never been a serious alternative because it denies the reality of 
the first and most undeniable phenomenon which is experience, the point of 
departure of any inquiry into reality. I take that the only alternatives are 
idealism (which is a living and elegant option for me), some sort of dualism or 
some sort of panpsychism. As I said above, the problem of dualism in all its 
variants is that while it gives an answer to the explanatory gap left by 
physicalism, it does so at the price of introducing an ontological gap between 
two distinct kinds of substances/stuffs/properties. Panpsychism leaves no gaps 
but suggests that ONE is neither mental nor physical but something that 
transcends these descriptions or something that can be equally referred by 
using physical names and mental names. I think this Spinozistic neutral 
monism is a plausible option. Campbell suggests something similar: if physics 
teaches us monism and the hard problem of consciousness resists solution in 
terms of the physical, then it is very plausible to predicate consciousness of the 
whole world, understanding consciousness as if it were also field-like, 
pervading the whole world with different degrees of intensity (Campbell 1990: 
151). Strawson, who believes that everything is physical and is sympathetic to 
both stuff-monism and substance-monism, concludes that physicalism entails 
panpsychism: if everything is the same fundamental physical stuff, then this 
sort of stuff must also be of experiential character (Strawson 2006a, 2006b). 
Now, if Spinozistic panpsychism proves to live in contradiction and we are 
forced to choose between an experiential ONE and a non-experiential ONE, 
then we better choose the experiential ONE, since experience is the one thing 
that cannot be excluded from any comprehensive metaphysics. As Schrdinger 
says, if we have to choose between the psychical and the physical, then there is 
really no contest: 
If we decide to have only one sphere it has got to be the psychic one, since that 
exists anyway (cogitatÐest). And to suppose that there is an interaction between 
two spheres involves something of a magical, ghostly sort; or rather, the 
supposition itself makes them into one single thing. ( Schrdinger 1964: 63)  
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Now, if ONE is of experiential character, what distinguishes this monistic and 
realistic metaphysics that recognises the reality of experience from the 
panexperientialist monism defended by someone like Bradley? Very little, if 
anything, since in both cases reality is seriously indivisible and enjoys 
experiential character. In fact, there are two routes to vindicate Bradleyan 
absolute idealism. The first one is to start arguing for experiential idealism and 
arrive to monism, by arguing against the implausibility of pluralistic (i.e., 
subjective and transcendental) and non-experiential (e.g., HegelÕs thought-like 
panlogicism) variants of idealism. This was BradleyÕs strategy, in times when 
some form of idealism was common currency and there was no need to argue 
for it. It is also the route taken by Sprigge (1983), who enthusiastically 
accepted the burden of proof in times where idealism was no longer dominant. 
A second route is the one that starts by accepting the (implausible) point of 
departure of current physicalist metaphysics, then argues that there are good 
reasons for accepting a physical ONE, and finally shows that, to have an 
adequate metaphysics, ONE must also be of experiential character. This is the 
route that we took here.  
The latter point has been happily accepted by some of our best physicists with 
metaphysical inclinations, yet it is hardly acknowledged by self-proclaimed 
physicalists metaphysicians who insist in denying the reality of experience 
based on their alleged deference to physics. Up to a certain point it is simply 
embarrassing to see how dogmatic those physicalists philosophers are when, on 
the other side of the road, our best physicists keep their minds open. Indeed, 
physicalists metaphysicians are more physicalists than some of our best 
physicists. For instance, Bohm understands that the mental cannot be denied 
and that if physics gives us signs that show that the world is an undivided 
wholeness, then it better be the case that both mind and matter are abstractions 
from this undivided wholeness (Bohm [1980] 2002: xi, chs. 3 and 7). 
Eddington is another clear example. In his wonderful The nature of the 
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physical world, after discussing the implications of Relativity and Quantum 
Theory, he ends up concluding that Ôthe stuff of the world is mind-
stuffÕ (Eddington 1928: 276), because mental activity is the only concrete 
existence whose reality cannot be denied, while everything beyond it 
(including the nature of space and time) still remains in the dark. The most 
eloquent, however, is Schrdinger (1959, 1964), who directly argues in favour 
of the doctrine of the Upanishads, according to which there is simply one 
indivisible mind, and the world is like the single mind of an hydra or like a 
single monad, and rejects the very precondition of standard realistic 
metaphysics, i.e., the external relatedness of mind and world, subject and 
object: 
The world is given to me only once, not one existing and one perceived. Subject 
and object are only one. The barrier between them cannot be said to have broken 
down as a result of recent experience in the physical sciences, for this barrier 
does not exist. (Schrdinger 1959: 51) 
According to the standard realistic account, a subjectÐin a magical way that, 
until now, has never been explained in clear termsÐcan experience an object 
that is external to it. The subject of experience and the object of experience lie 
outside each other and are independent of each other, yet they still manage to 
be ÔrelatedÕ in mysterious ways that donÕt affect their distinctness and 
independence. An experiential ONE forces us to reconsider this standard 
model. ONE cannot experience an external world because there is no ÔoutsideÕ 
IT.  IT can only constitute itself, as a monad does: from its own depths. Thus, 80
if reality is like EM says, then it has no meaning to say that reality is distinct 
and independent from experience. Because if reality is as depicted by EM, then 
reality is experience. We took the long road. We could have started with the 
evident and stop asking right there. Because when one attends carefully to the 
most obvious inquiry, subject and object of experience never come apart. In 
fact, what Schrdinger says is just what Bradley said before him: 
 A serious monistic metaphysics cannot be done sub specie aeternitatis or from the outside. 80
This was indeed a defect of SpinozaÕs monism, as Hegel thought: ÔSpinozism is a defective 
philosophy because in it reflection and its manifold determining is an external thinkingÕ (Hegel 
[1969] 2002: 536, his italics). 
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To set up the subject as real independently of the whole, and to make the whole 
into experience in the sense of an adjective of that subject, seems to me 
indefensible. And when I contend that reality must be sentient, my conclusion 
almost consists in the denial of this fundamental error. For if, seeking for reality, 
we go to experience, what we certainly do not find is a subject or an object, or 
indeed any other thing whatever, standing separate and on its own bottom. What 
we discover rather is a whole in which distinctions can be made, but in which 
divisions do not exist. And this is the point on which I insist, and it is the very 
ground on which I stand, when I urge that reality is sentient experience. [...] And 
what I repudiate is the separation of feeling from the felt, or of the desired from 
desire, or of what is thought from thinking, or the divisionÐI might addÐof 
anything from anything else. [...] But to be utterly indivisible from feeling or 
perception, to be an integral element in a whole which is experienced, this surely 
is itself to be experience. Being and reality are, in brief, one thing with sentience; 
they can neither be opposed to, nor even in the end distinguished from it. 
(Bradley 1930: 128Ð29, his emphasis) 
This outlook, that I find evident in the most ordinary cases of experience, is 
vindicated by more sophisticated inquiry. As Bohm highlights, in the quantum 
context it makes no sense to divide the observing instrument from the observed 
object: they both are better seen as abstractions from an indivisible wholeness 
(Bohm [1980] 2002: 169). Just like we overcome the fragmentation of the 
realm of matter by understanding the material world as an undivided 
wholeness, so we extend this way of reasoning to other contexts where we 
have operated assuming a puzzling fragmentation (mind and matter, subject 
and object).  
As I said, standard metaphysical realism works on the assumption that subject 
of experience and object of experience are distinct and independent (i.e. 
externally related), so when one experiences reality one does not constitute 
reality. But if physical reality is ONE, and ONE enjoys experiential character, 
then the subject of experience is the object of experience, and experience is no 
longer about reality but it is reality. This shouldnÕt surprise us. After all, the 
real enemy of monism is not metaphysical realism but pluralism, and the real 
enemy of idealism is not metaphysical realism but materialism. What monistic 
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idealism offers is a different ontology, but this doesnÕt mean that this ontology 
is less ÔrealÕ.  81
Unlike his contemporary heirs, Russell understood very well the importance of 
external relations: without external relations, not only pluralism, but also 
atomic truths, standard realism (the fragmentation and independence in which 
thought and reality, subject and object, allegedly stand to each other) and the 
very possibility of standard philosophy are in trouble (Russell 1956a: 333, 
1959: 62). What Russell didnÕt realise is that external relations can only offer 
us the mysteries of fragmentation and that empirical evidence might well go 
against them. Thus, if the world is in fact concrete and unfragmented, truths 
about IT that rest on abstraction and fragmentation cannot be literally true but 
only true under the fiction of decomposition that takes place after relational 
thought is unleashed. If ONE is concrete, non-relational and experiential, and if 
all forms of thought involve abstraction and are relational (as it seems to be the 
case), then the rich, concrete and unfragmented character of the experiential 
ONE is ineffable. We can only have understanding of IT through pre-relational 
experience (before the rise of relational and abstract thought) or through supra-
relational experience (after relational and abstract thought is transcended, i.e. 
after thoughtÕs happy suicide). 
EM seems shocking. In fact, it is shocking and I am sure that there is 
something wrong with it. But is it more shocking or wrong than any of the 
post-Quinean ontologies examined here? It doesnÕt seem so. Why is it more 
shocking and wrong than the world as depicted by Humean Supervenience, 
DE, OSR or PM? Or why is it more shocking and wrong than an ontology 
 See Stock (1998) for a defence of BradleyÕs Ôrealistic spiritÕ. Unlike the materialist, the 81
idealist simply thinks that a world without mental character is completely absurd, so the 
relevant question is not whether there is anything mind-like, but simply up to what extent the 
world is mind-like. As Hegel would say, Ô[e]very philosophy is essentially an idealism or at 
least has idealism for its principle, and the question then is only how far this principle is 
actually carried outÕ (Hegel [1969] 2002: 154Ð55). The monistic idealist says that the world is 
one mind-like object. This doesnÕt mean that reality is less real. It simply happens that if we are 
metaphysical realists, and the world is one mind-like object, then we can no longer describe 
reality as if it were mind-independent.
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according to which the world is only sets and nothing but setsÐas Quine (1981) 
was tempted to think without ever clarifying what are the identity-conditions of 
the member of a singleton or what is membership? As far as I can see, all these 
ontologies offer us some ontological absolute, and any ontological absolute is 
equally shocking and wrong insofar as it is either obviously incomplete, 
inconsistent or unbearable. 
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Epilogue 
As far as I can see, EM is the most stable, internally coherent, and empirically 
adequate holistic ontology examined here. If you are not convinced about its 
relative superiority, then you have my understanding, because even I have 
many doubts about it, as you will immediately see. However, if you donÕt think 
EM is any good, at least I hope to have convinced you that there are good 
reasons to reject Humean Supervenience and all the holistic alternatives to it 
that I have discussed here. 
What might be wrong with EM? Here is what I think are its two main 
problems: 
(i) Qualitative richness and unity. The central dilemma for an ontology of 
externally related plurals is to account for their unity. This certainly happens 
when we are trying to account for what makes things hang together in one 
world and not be isolated things-in-themselves. As I hope to have shown, 
relations are not a solution to the problem of unity, but only a different name 
for it. The problem persists even within a single individual when we think of its 
properties as somehow numerically distinct objects that conform a unity by 
standing to each other in a relation of bundling or by standing to a bare 
substratum or logical atom in a relation of instantiation (and, as we saw, similar 
problem arises within the nominalistic constructions of instantiation of 
properties in terms of membership or parthood, since these are also relations). 
How is it that from discrete wholly constituents like hardness, whiteness and 
sweetness we get one lump of sugar? Again, relations seem to be simply a 
name for an ontological gap, a name for a metaphysical vacuum. EM can 
account for the unity of the individual as no one else but only at the price of 
denying the literal truth of the relata-in-relation talk; thus, only by denying that 
properties are numerically distinct entities standing in any sort of relation. A 
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lump of sugar is one single individual from which hardness, whiteness and 
sweetness are abstracted by thought, they are only numerically distinct under 
the fiction of decomposition. But how can EM account for qualitative richness 
without collapsing ONE into a seamless, qualitatively undifferentiated, 
Parmenidean whole? That is, how can EM account for qualitative richness 
within ONE without accepting numerically distinct properties? If relata and 
relations and properties are only abstractions from ONE, are there any 
ÔabstractableÕ aspects within IT? This cannot be the case. At least not if we 
donÕt want them to be the result of real distinctions. So unless there is a 
distinction that lies somehow between a real/substantial distinction and a 
conceptual distinction or a distinction of thought or imagination (that is, unless 
there is a distinction like ScotusÕ, rather obscure, ÔformalÕ distinction), then EM 
must accept that all relata-in-relation thoughts are purely arbitrary carving, 
conceptual fictions, abstractions that are more like projections of the mind into 
a world that, strictly speaking, is devoid of mind-independent relata-in-
relations. While the pluralist cannot account for the unity of the many in one, 
the unity offered by the monist seems to put under risk real qualitative richness. 
Now, this shouldnÕt be a source of comfort for the pluralist. Because the 
pluralist has no better resources for accounting for qualitative richness. He 
certainly accepts, by definition, many objects. But what guarantees that the 
objects of the pluralist are not all of them a boring army of equals? Of course, 
he can rejoice himself in a brute fact. But brutality is a road that everyone can 
take. So can the monist. 
(ii) The place of relations. EM says that relata and relations are abstractions 
from ONE. A fortiori, ONE is not a relational structure, nor a plurality of 
relata-in-relations, nor a basic object upon which many objects depend. All 
relata-in-relations talk is fictional or only true under the fiction of 
decomposition. Alright. This means that ONE in-itself lacks relations; that 
relational abstractions do not correspond to real distinctions within ONE. 
Being abstractions that are not grounded in real distinctions, they are more like 
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fictions or projections. But what is the place for fictions, projections or 
abstractions within ONE? ArenÕt fictions, projections or abstractions also 
existents? DonÕt they also belong to reality? Sure, they are probably not 
objectively real if by Ôobjectively realÕ you mean non-mental or mind-
independent. But who says that mental or mind-dependent things are somehow 
less real, less part of our world, than non-mental or mind-independent things? 
Why do we insist in distributing ontological respectability in a way that we do 
leave portions of reality out of the picture? WhatÐif anythingÐmakes fictions, 
projections or abstractions less ontologically respectable than the non-
relational ONE itself? If thought is done in terms of relational abstractions, 
havenÕt we accepted the existence of these already? 
As far as I can see, there are two moves available for the supporter of EM to 
explain the place of relations within ONE, both of which are unsatisfactory. 
One move is to play again the Quinean card, and treat ONE as ontology and all 
relational thought as ideology. Admittedly, the Quinean thinks that all that 
ontology can do is to give a structureless list of what there is. The way in 
which we fill that list is by extracting from our best theory the values of its 
bound variables. And thatÕs it. Thus, if our best theory (i.e., our best physics, 
according to the typical Quinean; say, for instance, Bohmian Quantum Theory 
or EinsteinÕs Spinozistic General Relativity) quantifies only over ONE, then 
ONE is all that there is. All the restÐincluding all relational thoughtsÐis 
ÔideologyÕ. The second move is to understand the Quinean route in a more 
moderate way, a way that rescues it from what it seems to beÐas we will see 
nowÐa catastrophic consequence. Whichever move we choose, EM turns out to 
be either an incomplete or an incoherent metaphysics. 
Take the canonical Quinean route, the one according to which ONE is all that 
there is and all the rest is mere ideology. This picture of reality cannot be true; 
it is simply madness. Schaffer, who follows Moore on this, is right: we cannot 
deny the existence of horses and apples and colours simpliciter, without being 
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involved in some kind of madness. But the canonical Quinean route leads us 
precisely to eliminate those ordinary things from reality. In fact,  
[t]he Quinean method is eliminativist by design. After all, if one regiments 
physics into first-order classical logic (with no functorialist or fictionalist tricks), 
all one will have to quantify over will be whatever particles or fields or whatnot 
the physics invokes. One will certainly not have any people and horses, tables 
and chairs, or apples and pebbles. When Moore intones ÔÔHere is one hand ... and 
here is anotherÕÕ (1959: 146), such a Quinean must demur. This is madness. 
There may be a method to such madness, but madness it remains. (Schaffer 
2009a: 372) 
So the canonical Quinean move leads us to madness, it leads us to deny the 
existence of Moorean appearances. We need to amend it for its own good. To 
avoid the madness of eliminativism, we need (at least) to adjust the Quinean 
move with some operator that can give place to the existence of Moorean 
appearances. This is already admitting bits of a more Aristotelian way of 
understanding ontology, though not necessarily the whole Aristotelian package 
that Schaffer (2009a) accepts. Because for the Aristotelian thereÕs no doubt 
about the existence of ordinary things like horses and apples and colours. They 
obviously do existÐand, if so, they obviously are somehow related! The 
interesting bit for the Aristotelian is what kinds of things exist and how things 
exist. So in an obvious sense, questions of unqualified existence are trivial: 
horses, numbers, properties, persons, God, all of them do exist, of course. The 
problem is what kinds of things are these and how do they exist. For instance, 
the dispute between an atheist and a theist is not about the existence of God 
simpliciter, but about whether God is, for instance, a dependent fiction of the 
human mind or an independent and transcendental substance in its own right. 
Similarly, the dispute between the extreme nominalist and the Platonist is not 
about whether ÔblueÕ exists or not. Of course it does! The point of real 
disagreement is that the Platonist takes blue to exist as a transcendental and 
mind-independent form, whereas the extreme nominalist takes blue to be a 
concept or a predicate that humans apply to things (a sort of projection of the 
human mind into a world devoid of the blue form; recall the brotherhood 
between nominalism and idealism to which I pointed before in ¤2.1.3). 
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So a reasonable defence of ONE needs to admit some kind of operator that 
avoids the madness of eliminativism without necessarily falling into SchafferÕs 
full-blown neo-Aristotelianism (according to which all what we have called 
ÔabstractionsÕ from ONE are really dependent or derivative parts of one prior or 
fundamental substance). Typically, the neo-Quinean who wants to avoid both 
the madness of eliminativism and SchafferÕs neo-Aristotelianism needs to add 
a fictional or a projectivist operator to his ontology. Thus, the compositional 
nihilist who denies that there are composite objects rejects the idea that 
composites are somehow grounded in prior parts or the idea that component 
parts are somehow grounded in a prior whole (contra Schaffer), but accepts 
that composites exist under the fiction of composition of many simples (if he is 
an existence pluralist) or under the fiction of decomposition of one simple (if 
he is an existence monist) (contra the mad eliminativist). So what the 
compositional nihilist really does is to deny that there are mind-independent 
composites, but this doesnÕt mean that there are no mind-dependent or mental 
composites. Here is where his disagreement with the composite-believer 
becomes substantial: not in the question of existence but in the question of 
what kinds of composites exist or how do composites exist, whether as mental 
fictions or as mind-independent things. Similarly, the dispute between the 
phenomenalist and the materialist is not about the existence of apples, but 
about whether these are mind-independent material objects or not. 
Granted that the Quinean route only makes sense if it avoids the madness of 
eliminativism by adopting something like a fictional operator, the adoption of it 
is simply the covered adoption of an ontology that admits at least two kinds of 
things: mind-independent and fictional (or projective, or mental, or mind-
dependent) things. If so, the project of ontology becomes just like an exercise 
of bookkeeping: if you remove something from the account of mind-
independent things, then you better compensate it by adding something in the 
account of fictional things, and vice-versa. What is important is to keep the 
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entries well-balanced. After all, what is a fictional entity, a projection, an 
abstraction made by thought or imagination? What distinguishes it from the 
serious and sparse ontology posited by that strange utopia called Ôour best 
physicsÕ? As we saw, mental abstractions, fictions or projections cannot be 
mere ÔideologyÕ if this entails that they are eliminated from the realm of 
existence. This would be madness. But they can be called ÔideologyÕ if under 
this label we include what exists not in an objective or mind-independent sense 
(i.e., not in the sense favoured by Ôour best physicsÕ) but under a fictional 
operator or something similar (as fictions, projections or abstractions made by 
thought or imagination, that is, as mental or mind-dependent things; after all, as 
we saw in ¤1.1, even Quine himself thought of ÔideologyÕ as the domain of 
inquiry about those ÔideasÕ that we can legitimately have or that form the base 
of our thoughts). But donÕt these fictions, projections or abstractions also 
belong to reality? Sure, maybe fictions, projections or abstractions are mental 
or mind-dependent things, but mental and mind-dependent things exist 
nevertheless. In fact, being a mental or a mind-dependent thing and having no 
existence at all are two quite different things (in fact, two contradictory things, 
because something cannot be mental or mind-dependent and lack existence at 
the same time). And what about the fictions or abstractions that are the product 
of relational ways of thinking? DonÕt they also belong to reality? Of course 
they do, as we have already admitted! If so, what is the place for relational 
fictions/projections/abstractions within the non-relational ONE? 
When I raise these doubts about the Quinean canonical route I am questioning 
the idea that one can achieve in any ultimate sense ontological parsimony. 
What one can do is to move the bubble under the carpet, but one cannot get rid 
of it. One can move ÔblueÕ from the Platonic heaven of forms to the realm of 
sets of the set-theoretical nominalist or to the terrestrial mental concepts of the 
extreme nominalist, but this doesnÕt mean that one has eliminated ÔblueÕ from 
reality. One has simply moved ÔblueÕ from one realm to another one. Similarly, 
one can move relations from the realm of mind-independent things to the realm 
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of fictions or projections, but this doesnÕt mean that we have removed relations 
from existence altogether; we have only qualified their existence. Removing 
them from existence altogether would be madness. In fact, there is a clear sense 
in which no metaphysical theory is more simple than any other: as we can 
witness in the debates of composition, when the nihilist saves in objects, he 
spends more either in complex properties/relations or in ideology; when the 
composite-believer spends more in objects, he saves more either in complex 
properties/relations or in ideology (cf. Bennett 2009). And if you want to avoid 
the madness of eliminativism, you better understand that what you put under 
the account of ideology is just covered ontology, one that understands the 
existence of certain things under some fictional operator (or the like). And this 
means that when you save in non-mental or mind-independent ontology, you 
end up spending more in mental or mind-dependent ontology. But you donÕt 
get rid of anything Ôjust like thatÕ: you simply move things around. 
Having said this, here is where I think EM cannot succeed, because it faces a 
fatal dilemma, a dilemma that represents the two temptations of ontology: 
including too little, so the picture is incomplete, or including too much, so the 
picture is either inconsistent or incomprehensible. First horn: We can try to 
defend EM by taking the route of the Quinean ontologist. The only serious 
relations are relations of distance and they do not have place within ONE. ONE 
is ontology and all relata-in-relations talk is ideology in the soft sense 
identified above, that is, the only sense in which we can avoid the madness of 
eliminativism: relata-in-relation talk refers to fictions, abstractions, projections, 
distinctions of thought or imagination. But then EM is not a complete ontology, 
because it leaves out of the inventory of reality those mental or mind-
dependent pieces, which, as far as I can see, include countless more relations 
than distance, and are also real, as real as anything else. ONE may well be the 
only mind-independent thing, but this doesnÕt mean that ONE is all that there 
is. If ONE is the only mind-independent thing and we want to save the 
appearances and avoid madness, then we must admit that there are countless 
!229
other mental or mind-dependent things. And mental or mind-dependent things 
are not less ontologically respectable than mind-independent things; they are 
just different kinds of things. Second horn: We can try to defend EM by taking 
the Bradleyan route. This is an all-inclusive ONE. According to Bradley, the 
experiential ONE already insinuates itself in pre-relational experience, but 
relational thought makes abstractions and artificially chops IT down into 
distinct constituents. The non-relational unity of ONE can only be recovered by 
transcending relational thoughts and dissolving them in the supra-relational 
ONE, the Absolute. Thus, 
[t]here is only one way to get rid of contradiction, and that way is by dissolution. 
Instead of one subject distracted, we get a larger subject with distinctions, and so 
the tension is removed. (Bradley 1930: 170)  
But if this is the way in which we can get rid of relational thoughts, then EM is 
either internally inconsistent or simply incomprehensible. It is evident that 
relations do exist in the form of appearances or abstractions, after pre-
relational experience and before supra-relational experience, in this sort of 
purgatory where all relational ways of thinking are deployed and then wait to 
be transcended. If so, then this stage of relational appearance is metaphysically 
distinct from that superior stage of supra-relational reality where relations are 
abandoned. And if appearance and reality are distinct ontological realms, then 
they must stand to each other in someÐwhat else?!Ðrelation. Bradley was 
suspicious about the distinction between appearance and reality precisely 
because if it were accepted then we would be looking for the relations between 
them. But he seems trapped by it. Because a non-relational ONE can only exist 
by its own where no relational thought takes place. Yet it is clear that whenever 
thought is deployed we have already abandoned pre-relational experience and 
it is not clear how this stage of relational thought can be dissolved into a supra-
relational ONE, nor it is clear how could we pretend that it never existed or 
that it never had relational character. People like Bohm and Bradley take the 
fragmented talk of relata-in-relations as expressing more or less valid 
abstractions from ONE. What they cannot explain is why should ONE need to 
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start this sick game of fooling itself instead of staying quite. That is, they 
cannot explain why would a non-relational ONE ever get itself involved in 
Ôvicious abstractionÕ, unless someone else were trying to understand it from 
outside it. But then they cannot explain how does a separate being, a mind, can 
engage in abstraction without itself being the very result of abstraction. One 
could think of relational thought as a ladder that needs to be thrown away after 
we have used it. The problem with this type of metaphor, as Blanshard (1984) 
has argued, is that one cannot use and throw away the ladder unless this ladder 
somehow existed, at least as a disposable mean. If, as it seems to be the case, 
there are any relational thoughts at any stage, then an all-inclusive non-
relational ONE cannot be defended with consistency, because it accepts distinct 
metaphysical realms, and at least one of this realms (the realm of fictions, of 
abstractions, of illusions, of appearances, you name it) is certainly of relational 
character. 
One might be tempted to think the following: if the non-relational ONE needs 
to accept at some point the existence of relations, then better for relations and 
worst for the non-relational ONE! After all, if all thought is relational, why 
should we believe in any non-relational reality that resists to be thought? 
Against this, I can redirect the reader to all my (Bradleyan) suspicions against 
purely abstract modes of existence, as relations seem condemned to be. My 
main concern with this move is that if we think that reality is thought-like, i.e. 
relational-like, then something very rich, concrete and important is left out 
from the picture. I let Bradley speak: 
It may come from a failure in my metaphysics, or from a weakness of the flesh 
which continues to blind me, but the notion that existence could be the same as 
understanding strikes as cold and ghost-like as the dreariest materialism. That the 
glory of this world in the end is appearance leaves the world more glorious, if we 
feel it as a show of some fuller splendor; but the sensuous curtain is a deception 
and a cheat, if it hides some colourless movement of atoms, some spectral woof 
of impalpable abstractions or unearthly ballet of bloodless categories. Though 
dragged to such conclusions we can not embrace them... They no more make that 
Whole which commands our devotion, than some shredded dissection of human 
tatters is that warm and breathing beauty of flesh which our hearts found 
delightful. (Bradley 1922: 590Ð1). 
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My worries against EMÐspecially the last oneÐare the byproduct of a more 
general worry against ontology in general. All ontologies seem to offer us 
absolutes of some sort that produce in us certain state of uneasiness. On one 
hand, there are metaphysical systems that sincerely try to leave nothing behind, 
as BradleyÕs. The problem, as we saw, is that such an enterprise is simply 
unbearable and is betrayed in the very minute in which one tries to put it into 
words. On the other hand, there are those ontologies driven by an insatiable 
desire of reduction or elimination (everything is sets! everything is water! 
everything is relations!), or a monarchic impulse for labelling some things as 
more ontologically respectable (fundamental, basic, prior, etc.) than others 
(derivative, dependent, posterior, etc.). The latter is the double-path followed 
by most of contemporary ÔsparseÕ ontology. If BradleyÕs route is 
incomprehensible or contradictory, this second route is plagued of failures 
because (i) if we are told that we should exclude as Ômere ideologyÕ thousands 
of things, then we do leave thousands of things out of the inventory, namely: 
thousands of ideas, thousands of mental pieces; and (ii) if we are told that a 
Royal Family of Being is capable of supporting over its shoulders all the 
Kingdom of Being, we are never told in clear terms how this asymmetrical 
ontological dependence is supposed to work, how such a family is capable of 
supporting more ontological weight than its own, how a Kingdom that 
overtakes the Royal Family can pop-up from it, or how is it that the Royal 
Family does not depend upon the Kingdom as well. Sometimes this claim of 
asymmetrical dependence is not made in serious terms, as when it is said that 
the Kingdom represents no real addition of being. In this case, the Royal 
Family supports no Kingdom over its shoulders since it is the Kingdom. 
Typically, when the claim of asymmetrical dependence is done in these 
confused terms, such ontology falls into the previous vice: the Kingdom is 
disregarded as mere ideology. In this double-path of contemporary ontology we 
find the efforts of keeping very light the account of ontology, as if elements in 
the account of ideology were not ÔrealÕ enough; the efforts of disregarding 
appearances as not really existent; the obsession of finding a ÔrespectableÕ 
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stock of truth-makers for countless truths, or an elite class of properties that 
can do the job of countless predicates, as if truth-makers were more respectable 
than truths, and properties were more posh than predicates; the obsession of 
ÔgroundingÕ the mental in something non-mental, or the causally active in the 
causally impotent, in a way that brings to our mind the image of Paracelsus 
attempting to restore the original rose out of the ashes of its combustion. 
Metaphysicians seem to move between those two extremes, between the 
insufficient character of desert landscapes or sparse bases, and the unbearable 
character of the all-inclusive. EM does not escape from this tension. After all, 
this is a defect of any ontology. What happens is that a radical ontology like 
EM brings those defects to the light in a more obvious way. I am with Bradley 
in the sense that I think that no metaphysics is complete unless it is all-
embracing, unless it includes all realityÐand this includes appearances, errors, 
ideological discourse, abstractions made by thought, fictions, and the like. But 
I cannot see how one could ever have even the slightest possibility of 
completing, or even starting, such an overwhelming enterprise.  
It seems that these two ways of doing ontology correspond to two distinctÐbut 
equally easy to cureÐphilosophical diseases. The way of sparseness is the result 
of what Wittgenstein called Ôan unbalanced dietÕ, which takes place when Ôone 
nourishes oneÕs thinking with only one kind of exampleÕ (Wittgenstein 2001: 
¤593). And the remedy for it is to start eating in a more balanced way. The all-
embracing way is the result of a pointless suffering, like when one accepts to 
raise a heavy burden that needs not to be raised: 
The strange thing about philosophical uneasiness and its resolution might seem 
to be that it is like the suffering of an ascetic who stood raising a heavy ball, 
amid groans, and whom someone released by telling him: ÒDrop it.Ó One 
wonders: if these sentences make you uneasy and you didnÕt know what to do 
with them, why didnÕt you drop them earlier, what stopped you from doing it? 
(Wittgenstein 1993: 175) 
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Obviously, the remedy for this second disease is simply to drop the heavy ball. 
Better late than never. 
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